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PREFACE 
In formulating this thesis special attention was given to the 
.relevant statements of the principals involved notably Theodore 
I f1oo;3cvelt and Elihu Root, Due to the amount of controversy cen-
11 tering on tne Corollary and its application, the exact words of 
the particip8nts are used whenever necessary. The amount and 
length of the quotations are central to establishing the link 
bet~·reen the strategic significance of intervention and humani tari-
an i_ns ti nc ts, 
Special assistance was rendered by various libraries and 
collections in the Chicago area. Included among these are 
John Crerar Library, the Chicago Public Library, Elizabeth Cudahy 
Library, the Library of International Relations, Newberry Library, 
9.Dd Earpcr Library of the Uni ve:r.~si ty of Chicago, 
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PART I 
THE ROOSEVELT COROLLARY: 
BIG STICK 
Contrary to popular opinion the Roosevelt Corollary, a·s 
iA~erican imperialism in 1898, did not just sud~only appear. Actu-
ally, the principles contained in Roosevelt's pronouncements were 
tl1e result of an evolution of the Monroe Doctrine that had been 
! soing on I rec,olded 
1 It, 1ike 
'pect was 
~ 
sh1ce its lnception. .This development was changed and 
by various forces and ernphaises throu(3hout its history. 
history, was the produ'ct of its time. A particular as-
to be maximized or minimized by the historical conteX,t 
in which it was placed. The original message of 1823 and its 
espousal of the principles of No-Transfer, Non-intervention, and 
l'fon-colonization 11ere engendered by a desire to isolate the New 
':.'orld from the political entanglements of Europe, especially wars 
rrhe principle of Non-inte1'"'vention, however, can be clearly linked 
to t:i.1e rise of numerous Latin· American states and their exist-
ence hastened the growth and development of the principle.l 
1 
John A. Logan, Jr., No Transfer (New Haven: Yale Univer-
sity Press, 1961), p. 245 
. 
7 
President Polk was later to re-define the Non-colonization in 
~regard to lesser American states. 
The rc~sscrtion of this principle especially in reference 
to Iforth America, is at this day but the promul52.tion of a 
pol:tcy which no European,power should cherish the disposi-
tion to resist. It should be distinctly announced to the 
Horld as our settled policy that no future European colony 
or dominion shall with our consent be planteg or established 
on any part of the North American contlnc:nt. 
The acquisition of territory is a practical demonstration of 
the ri&rit and power of soverele;nty. The Ifonroe Doctrine closed 
the Ame:-cican continent to the colonial adventu1~es of Europe whi~h 
in effect curbed the territorial appetite of the strong and the 
• 
I teuntations of the \'teak. Gradually, these restr·ictions were to 
I,uicl:n from ::exi co to Vcnzuela and finally to Santo Domlne;o. 3 'l'he crisis in l,icxico in 1860 c2.uned President Buchanan to enunciate a 
further refinement of the Hon.roe DoctPine. 
I deem this a most important consideration-·-European 
Governments ·would have been deprived of all pretext to in-
terfere in the territorial and domestic concensus of Mexico. 
\'le should thus have been relieved from this obligation of 
resisting, even by force should this become necessary, any 
attempt by these Governments to deprive our neighboring 
Republics of portions of' her territory---a duty from which ue 
2 
Richard W. Van Alstyne, !r.;i_g_ri,_ga1l. .D:L-q_19ID£~~ in Action 
(Stanford University, California: Stanford University Press, 
1947), p. 29. 
3 
Talcott 'dilliams, "Europe and the United States in the 
;·rest Indies, 11 .Anoals of_the ~merican Acg,_de1:1Y__Q_f Poli ti cal and 
Social Science, XXVI (19051, p. 42. (Herein after referred to 
as ~nnals.) · 
.. -.,.,-, .... 
could not shrink without abandoning the tr~ditional and 
established policy of the American people. 
In aadition, the United States legation in Mexico City is-
sued to the diplomatic corps there a manifesto on the projected 
8 
intervention. In that rn<J.nife~~to the Uni tcd States c.enied Europoa1 
.J. 11.J.h • A , t 
5ovcrn.<>1.envs u _e .CJ.sn to inte:cfei-•e, directly or indirectly, with 
the political independence of the republ1c of :Mexico, 11 and. would, 
I, "to the extent of its power, defend the nationality and independ-· once of said republic." In response to this statement, a Britinh 
diplomat clearly envisaged the Roosevelt Co:collary: "If the posi-
tl(1n of the Uni tod States -••• is authorized and rnainta:i.ned, I 
ca1,:-:-:cot but vlew it as binding that country to assume the moral 
l·obligdion toward other nations, of restoring peace and order in 
i J'-':exico, and of preve::1tin3 the recurrence of scenes which disgrace 
humanity and neutralize ~ •• the international rights and natural 
cor,~:"1ercial relations of civilized nations. 11 5 
\Ij_lliam H. Steward on June 2, 1866 issued the following 
I statement regarding activities in Mexico in particular and Latin America in general. 
the republican system (in any South American State) shall 
not be wantonly assailed and that it shall not be subverted 
as an end of a ln:wful war by European powers. We concede to 
4 
J. Reuben Clark, Memorandum O:Q. the Monroe Doctrine ('\'lash-
in5ton: United States Government Printing Office, 1930), p. 135. 
5 . 
J. F. Rippy, "The Antecedents of the Roosevelt Corollary 
of the Vian.roe Doctrine, 11 Pacific Historical Revie.!'..L IX(l940), 
p. 269. (Herein after referred to as "Antecedents.") 
cv<: l'j n·i ti on the right to rnn ke peace or Wgr, for such c:1 us c: s 
,)t111"r t)1Gn pol1 ti cal :<rribi tions, ~s it thj_nk rir::;ht And wise.: 
In s1_1c.h wnrs ns :=i.re 1·:n,,=ed h~t·.1cen n:J.tions ':lhich ;:-ire in . 
f•·ien:l:::;hip v:ith ourselves, if they are not pushE?Q., like the 
f<'T.-·nch ··;~-1r j_n ;:cxico, to the poli tic'J.l point hefore mcntto:1.:rl 
Vie: •1o not 1.ntcrvcne, hut rcm8j_n ncutrA.l concr;<ilng nothing 
to one belligerent what He allow to the other. 
ronroc Soctrine in re3ar~ to the relations between Lntin A~erican 
tecritories and European powers. 
These dependencies are no longer rns:u·dcd ris subject to t:r:3:-;; 
fer from one Europ8&n power to snother. ':!hen the present re-· 
lation of colonies ceases they are to becooe independent 
powers, exercising the right of choice and of self-control 
,~1:\_,the,__'.ie_te~~m,~12~ti7n of their future condition and relations 
;, i Gn ,; '-'ner flO•· LJ. s. 
Gr~nt's Secretary of State, Hamilton Fish, foreshadowed the 
Roosevelt Corollary and the Santo Domingan Receivership in his in-
structions to rinister Partride on the convention with Venezeul2. 
"You are authorized to propose to the governm2nt of '~enezuela 
to place all the customs-houses of the country in the hands of 
p•;r.'::~ ons to be des ig:n:::i ted by the, United States.,. 8 Al though Fi sh 
~as primarily concerned with the collection of the claims of 
Arerican citizens, which he considered entitled to preferential 
tre3tment, he was not unwilling to assume the obligation of 
6 
F. E. Chadwick, "The Present Day Phase of the I·~ onroe Doc-
tri::e," in L-::,tin America, ed. by George H. Blakeslee (Kew York: 
G. E. StrecherE & Co.,-·-r924), p. 115. 
7 
.John Holladay La tane, The United States and La tin America. 
(Garden City, New York: Doubleday, Page & Co., ·1920), p. J24. 
8 
J. Fred Rippy, The Caribbean Dan~er Zone (New York: G. P. 
Putr~GJn' s .Sons, 1940), -pp·~-42-:Ti.J-.--- -
. -~·,,,- . 
Lollect:1.ng the claims oi' the Europcalls.9 
Tho concern over possible European acquisitlon of American 
.territory was a5ain prevalent in the attitude assumed by Presi-
ldent E:::cyes in ro5ard to De Lesseps' atteillpts to construct a 
'French financed Panaman Canal. In his message to the Senate he 
ltook the 3:i.~ouri.d that the smal~est measure of poll ti cal control 
Lrotection of the proposed canal by "f'~ny European power or· any 
Loy1'oination of European po~·rc:r's ·was h:.<:i.cJJnissablee "10 
or 
Intertwined and over·r·iding many of the other considerations 
of t'rrn I-:ori ... roe Doctrine was the concept of Manifest Dest1ny and all I . 
rit (:ntn.J.led. 'rhe eminent position of the United States, its spc-
lcial soral mission to the world, and its justification for its ac-
'tions '.!CI"e esccntial to the conduct of A!!lerican affai:r$.. The 
ls;iecio.l i 0 ole oi' the United States as the IP.oral guo.i0 dian oi' the 
~world was voiced by nurnerou~ spokesman throughout the period. 
\-Te are not insensible to the glamor of 11 1-l[-mife st De stin.y, '-' · 
Hhich means a destiny of power and control; but there is <..-i. 
hi3her and no less manifest destiny to extend sounµ govern-
ment and stable institutions.11 
Richard Olney, Cleveland's Secretary of State and author of 
jthe fctoous Twenty-Inch Gun Note, p:covided a co:nbination of all of 
-the ele:rients of the concept of Manifest Destiny because he offered 
9 
Rippy, "Antecedents,'.' pp. 272-273. 
10 
Edward Stanwood, "The Moral Aspects of the 1~onroe Doc-
ltrine," Outlook, 70(Feb. 8, 1902), p. 371. 11 "A lfotion To Take From the Table " ·The Indenendent, LVI 
r·:arch 3, 1904)' p. 508. ' --
···~-"---·-----------------------------------' 
wxr 
~....,,·~ ~-· '.,.,..., .............. -~~,,. ··"-···' 
1:~ynthesi s of all its compor"cnts. 'rhe realization of Aocri c2.n 11 
loi'ler i·ro.s intertu5.ned with a concern for lesser states. 11 The 
~irst duty of every nation, as eJrc~dy ohscrved, is to itself -
l1s a pror:iotion and concJervn.tion of its own interests. Its positio· 
f ::m 2.cti ve ::-:c::nber of tho }::'ltrn·:nzJ.tion.al fe;riily does not require ~s 
!1 t ever to lose sit)lt of that p1~1nciple • 11 This •,muld tend to be 
lin lrneping with the General view of what Jfa.nifest Destiny ehtailed 
~1ney, ho· . .rever, continues, "But, just weie:;...'1.t be1ng given to that 
L:cinclple, and its a'oilities and resources and opportunities per-
L1tting, there is no reason why the United States should not act 
'for the relief of suffering hw;1ani ty and for the <1dvancemcmt of 
Jc.i v111z~ ti on 1iherever and whenever such action would be timely and 
J~ffccti ve. 1112 Such a statement does no~ seem in keeping with the 
Luthor of the :CLOW fo..t;1ous quote that 11 'roclay the United States is , 
~ractlcally sovcrcisn on this continent, and its fiat is laid upon 
'.the subjects to ;·rhich it confines its interposition. 11 13 
Olney was convinced that "the Primacy of the United States 
cas respects the affairs of the American conti~ents is a principle 
lof 1 ts policy which will no doubt hold 600d and be as firmly as-
lsert~-~~n the future as in the past. u14 He further elaborated 
I 12 Ri chcird Olney, "Growth of Our Foreign Policy, " f- t lanti c 
~}:ont_h},x, I:XXXV (Karch, 1900), P• 298. 
13 
Clark, P• 159. 
14 
Olney, p. 298. 
··•· ,,.,T.,,,.. ,_ '-"~'"" .~, ., <#•, 'h• : .,, .. ~- -'·' ~,_n_,_ .~. ·;~ .. ,,- -~ .~,,,_.,.,_,._,.._.-:,,~,7;.<~·<t""'°""""'<;iC<'~c::;.,..,,..,_._._._,-.- ...,._.,..,,,,..,.,.,.,,,, •• ,.. '""""'~ .-w~ ·'····-_.·.,,...,·•"<11v,;,•'~·· ""' ~ .... ~ ..... ,.--..,;_,.,.,,,..,,_ .• "- .. , ..... 
12 
thin belief in his well kno~m letter of July 20, 1895. 
The,t Ancx•i ca is j n no part open to colonization, though thE1 
ni'oposi tion Has not universally admitted at the time of its 
first enunciation, has long boen uni vc::rs:i.lly conceded. \'le 
:::.Te now convinced, the:cefore, only with th2.t other practical 
application of the Ifo:nroe Doctrine the diro1"'e5ards of which by 
['~n :r<:uropcan power is to be deemed an ar-t of unfriendliness 
to~ards the United States. The precise scope and limitations 
of this rule cannot be too clearly apprehended. It does not 
establish any senoral protectm:·ate by the United States ove1"' 
otlllr Arneric~n states. It does not relieve any American 
state from its obligations from inflicting merited plmish-
ment for the breach of them. It docs not contemplate any 
:l.ntcrference between it ~end other llme2ican states. It dOO$ 
not justify any attempt on our part to change the establis~­
ed form of t;ovorrunent of any 1\merican state or to prevent the 
people of such state from altering that form according to 
their own will and pleasUre. The rule in question has but' a 
sint;le purpose and object. J:t is that no European power or 
combination of European powers shall forcibly deprive an 
;~;::erican state of the rie;ht and po1·rer of self-c;o".re:cr.u-nent c.nd 
of shaping for itself its own political fortunes and 
destinies.15 
The question of territorial a3grandizement in the New World 
·by G-n F:ln'opean power was construed by Olney to be in opposition 
to 11 a doctrine of American public law, well founded in principle 
~~.nd D,bundantly sanctioned by precedent, which entitles and re-
quires the United States to treat as an injury to itself the for-
ciblc assumption by an Eur·opeo.n power of political control over 
~·" ~.,, l"ican °.1..·,te 1116 c; . .!.i. .t"tl.!..o.8 i..JLc..,. • He continued in stating his case in even 
stronger and more bellicose language. 
Hence the message just quoted declared that the American 
continents \·1ere fully occupied and ·were not the subjects 
15 
Clark, P• 156. 
16 
Ibid., P• 160. 
for future colonization. by European powers. To this 
snirit and this pur:i:->ose, also, are to be attributed the 
nassases of the same. message which ti-·eat any infringement 
;f the :cule a3ainst inte:eference in American affairs on 
U:e ·,:,;~r·t of the po1·:ers of Europe as an act of unf'r•iendlinecs 
to tl1e United States. It was realized that it was futile 
to lay do·..rI1 :-,uch a :rule unless its observance could be 
enforced. It was thcrei'ore courageously declared not 
::ce:ce ly thn.. t Eu.:coi)e ouc) it not to interfere in Ame:ci can af:-
tail's, but t~·R.t <3.ny Eur·upean power doing so would be ree;n .. rd-
ed ri.s o.nto.~~oni :>;i.ng the interest 2nd inviting the opposi tj.on 
of the United Statos.17 . 
Olney' s message prorn:pted much coiHrront both :ln praise and 
. criticism. The criticism most often ass1nned 8tems from the ideas 
a_0 ·,reloped by Lord Salisbury in his reply to the letter. 
It follows of necessity that.if the Government of the United 
St<1.tes wi11 not conti-•ol the conduct of these com:nuni ties, 
r•n:L t:~,c;r can it underto.ke to protect them from the conse-
q11c;1;ees attacking to any misconduct of which they may be 
!:)Uilty t,O\·mrds other nations. If they violate in any way 
the rie;hts of 2nothor State; as of its subjects; it is not. 
allet;cd that the J\fon;_-·oe Doctrine will assure them the asl~ist~· 
<lnce of the United Statos in escaping fr-om any repartion 
':1l1ich they may 1Je botmd by lnternational law to give.iS 
The J,ondon Q.hronicle a semi-official organ of the British 
e:,overnr0ent vol ced much the same sentim,)nt. 
If an enlar5ed application of a neglected doctrine is to be 
enforced 1d th all the might of the United States, at least 
let us be assured that the United States will make itself 
responsible for the foreign policy of all the petty impet-
1wus little ~3tates of the two continents. There is no intor 
naVLonal ri5ht without a corresponding duty.19 
17 
Ibid., PP• 155-156. 
18 
Jpi_Q..' p. 165. 
19 
Rippy, "Antecedents," p. 276. 
Henry Cabot Lode;e, Roosevelt's friend and mentor, was of a 
different opinion regarding the M:o:rn"oo Doctrine and 1-rhat could bo 
e ·-'"'JC cted and demanded of it. 
·'·l 
It is not a doctrine of international lmv, and the ::1 .. ttempt 
to discuss it or oppose it on that ground is a ·,·raste of 
woros. Like the inclopcndence of this co1mtry, it ls a o_ue s-
t ion of fr1ct and not of law • • • • The Monroe Doctrine •.• 
• ls merely the dec1c::.ration that no foreign pOi·rer must es-
tablish a new 3ove1'11mcnt, acquire new territory by pu,rchas13 
or by any other method whatever, or :;eek to control exlstL15 
go-.rernments in the A:titYt>1ca.s. 'J111at is the princ1ple which 
I~r. l·'iOD.l"Oe declared. If tl:re:i.'e is any dispute as to the 
:'lc:~.n:inss of his language, it is not needful to di·;ell upon it .. 
j_'hat is what the American people bo1iove he Doant.20 
Theodore Roosevelt realized two i:;nportant aspects of the I.Con-
• 
roe Doct:i.'ine. "A navy will sustain the honor of the American 
rJ.o..g • • • • I want to see the Monroe Doctrine upheld in its 
onti:c1ty • • • • I be11eve in those policies with all my heart 
o.nd :.luul. 11 ~1 "Primarily our <".,ction :i.s based on national self-
interest. In other ·words, :tt is patriotic. 11 22 At the sa1ne time 
his long time confidant James Bryce, a British diplomat, i·:rote to 
Roosevelt in Jan. 1, 1896. · 11 As to the Mon~oe Doctrine, I have 
never been able to see how it applies at all to such a case as 
this (the Venezuelan affair of 1895-1896); if the United States 
20 
Wallace Thompson, "The Doctrine of' the Special Inte:cest of 
the United States in the Region of the Caribbean Sea, 11 t..m~1-~.ls 
CXX.X.II (1927}, p. 154. 
21 
Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt: A Biog~~phy (New 
York: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1931), p. 167. 
22 
Ibid., P• 279. 
15 
t asslline a protectorate over all Central and South 
,.,re n:oing o -
C• '-' 
A:r:erica, c<.nd see that these so-called _Republics behave like civi-
l:il~cd States, thc~t is anothel' rnattero The other• countl'ies will 
:.-now .,,,}1om they have to deal wi th. 11 23 In order to one day act in 
, -~ ,,_ 
the rr1::t11r1<::r 2.dvocated 1)y Bryce, Roosevelt felt that American navy I had to be strcnc;thcned; :i.n fact, it vras essential "if we mean to 
protect the people of the lands uho look to us for• protection f:L'OL 
tyr:rnny ~~nd a3gression 11 • If this 1:0x'e not the C.'.-'.sc the United 
StP.tes ;:niGht as well "abandon all talk of devotlon to the Honroe 
Doctr•ine or to the honor of the American na:21.e. 11 24 In 1898 he 
.,. 
'"'cnt on to dcsc:ci be the :M:o:n:coe Doctrine as: 
forbidding European encro0ehment on American soil. It is not 
desirable to define it so 'rigidly as to prevent our taldng 
into account the varying degrees of national interest in 
vn.ryine; cases. The United St2.tes has not the slightest wish 
to ostahlish a universal protectorate over other Amex•ican 
Sto,tos, or to become involved in an ordinary quarrel with a 
European power, such quarrel must be settled between them by 
o.nyone of the usual methods. But no European state is to be 
e.1.J.owed to aggrandize itself on .Mnerican soil at the expense 
of an Ar:iei-lcan state. Fu1·th0r:;:iore, :no transfe1" of an Ameri-
c<"m colony :from one Eu:r-opean state to another is to be per-:-
rnitted, if, in the judgement of the United States, such 
transfer would be hostile to its mm interests. 25 
Latin America at the turn of the century was a cause for 
1,mtu2-l distrust on the part of all contending po1·1ers. Roosevelt 
23 
Rippy, "Antecedents, 11 P• 275. 
24 
Pringle, p. 172. 
25 
Logan, p. 262,. 
' 
p: 
" 
16 
said in 1898 "Gerr:iany, and not Er~3land, is the power with whom we 
are rnos t apt to have tpouble ovor the l>roff{'Oe Doctrine. 1126 Bri tis' 
mistrust of the United States 1;.';:i,s voi eod by the fu~.Y.:l,Q_l'{. __ of R~yi~!!_~-
in 11399 11 the only quest ion as:.i:ed in Fn5land with certain laquid 
curiosity is as to how it wjll be before it (Santo Domingo) fol-
lows Porto Rico and Cuba in becoming a dependency of Uncle 
I 1127 Sam s. In this period of growing bellicose feeling and ever 
ur:t::e~1sing fcr"r of encroac:b ..ment on the prlnciples of the r.:onroe 
Doctr·i:rie it is not difficult, to see Elihu Root's sense of ur5ency 
whon he st2-ted "no man who carefully watches the signs of the 
times can fail to soe that the American people will wl thin a ;_~ew 
years have to either abandon the ?fonroe Doctrine or fight for it, 
and 1 .. :e are not e;oing to abandon it. 11 28 In regard to a possible 
. attempt at British anne:w,tion of the GaJ_ap2.5os Islands, he went o 
to reiterate his position "An attempt to obtain possession of 
those Islands by a foreign power would raise for the United States 
the question whether the Monroe Doctrine ·was to be abandoned or 
not, for there could be no part of the territory of the American 
continent to which that Doct:clne would apply with greater force, 
-----------------·-·---------··-----------· ---------------------·--·--- -
26 
Theodore Roosevelt to C. A. Moore, Feb. 14, 1898, The 
J-,eti~.~rs of_ The9dore Roost2_yelt, ed. by Elting E. Morison (Cam-
brid.;e: Harvard University Press{ 1951), Vol. I, p. 722. (Here-
in after referred to as Morison.) 
27 
"The Assassination of the President of San Domingo," 
F.eview of Reviews, XX(l899), p. 123. 
28 
Phillip c. Jessup, Elihu Root (New York: Dodd, "Viend & Co., 
1938), Vol. I. p. 543. 
--.. w---.--· _"'!I,,, ___________ "''°' _______________ ~.., -~-~!l~<U>r.-.._~.-.-.--------....... 
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17 
and, that, in my jud5nent, the United States would not permit tl;e 
. 
1 slo.nds to be occup).ed by any other than ci_n American country. 
11 29 
'~he 2"rea over which America was to c18.im sway was severely! 
restricted by the Report of the General Board in.1901 Hhich that 
"tl'le p1·Jnciples of strategy and the defects of our seographical 
posi t1on ,.,2.ke it irnpracti cable successfully to maintain naval 
control by our :torce beyond the Amazon unless present conditions 
'i 11 h - ~ d II 3Q are raa_ca y c.ang~ • 'Hli s appra:tsal came into dire ct con-
flict with a number of the fears e.nd assUi'Tlptions of Americans in 
formulating their policies. The Monroe Doctrine was to foster 
• 
repub1i c2"nlsm throughout all of Latin America, to stren5then tl1e 
United States position from both a political and economic st~nd-
point. In addition, its opposition to the complication of the 
Caribbean situation by European control of territory either per-
manent or temporary would suffer from it lack of sufficient 
strength to combat possible aggression.31 
Concern over possible German advance at the cost of American 
px'imacy was widespread throughout prominent circles in the United 
States. This fear centered on possible German acquisition of a 
----------------------~----------------· 
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Ibid., p. 563. 
30 
Seward W. Livermore, "Theodore Roosevelt, the American 
Navy, and the Venezuela Crisis of 1902--1903~ ·American Histor-
ical Review, LI(l946), p. 457. 
31 
Chester Lloyd Jones~ The Caribbean Since 1900, (New York: 
Prentice--Hall, Inc.m 19361, p. 107. 
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foothold on South Aoorican soil and a naval station in South 
American waters.3 2 'J:'he e;r·owth of' Ger-r,1an colonies, especially in 
00ut11ern Brazil, ~· 7ns felt to ce .:~n occasion for a possible con-
frontation over the Monroe Doctrine.33 This fear was so great 
~11 ~t Roosevelt needed no push of nublic opinion to force him to: v• c;. ... , ...._ -
uphold the Doctrine for both Lodge and himself had long been con-
cerned about Germany and its intent on Venezuela.34 In their 
correspo:c1cJence rnuch is made of the dane;er that Germ<:n1y offered 
to J\;nerice?n interest in t11e Caribbean. "I find that the Gerrrw.ns 
regard our failure to go forward in building up the navy this 
.. 
year :-:.s a ;.oisn that our sp2.sm l)f pr0pto.ra t1on, as they think it, 
has come to an end; that we shall sink back, so that in a few 
yc8.rs they will be in a position to take sor;,e step in the West 
Indies or South Arier1ca which will n:C'.ke us ej_ther put up or shut 
up on the Monroe Doctr1ne; they are counting upon their ability 
to trounce us if He try the former horn of the dilem..'na. 11 35 
The feal" of any European, especially a German, ase;:candizc1;;,en 
----------------
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"The Venezuelan Crisis And After," R~vL~w qf__R_~__yie1·rs, 
XXVII(l903), P• 145. 
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Stephen Bonsal, "Greater Germany In South America, 11 i;orth 
Ameyi_c_.0n :Review, 176(Jan., 1903), p. 60. 
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Howar•d K. Beale, J'he()_Q9re Rool?eyel t_ ancl_ the Ri s~_9_f___Arr~er­
i c_9,_ __ t_o t'o:i::lC!__J'01-;er (Baltimore: ThE? Johns Hopldns Press, 1956), 
p. Li-03. - -
35 
Roosevelt to Lodge, March 27, 1901, Morison, III, pp. 31-2 
19 
tl1e cause of another letter from Roosevelt to LodKe a few was ~ 
months 1[1.ter. 11 I would do a11 · in power to have the United States 
t.::.ke the attitude th<J,t no European nation, Germany or any othcn·:i 
should gain a foot of soil in any shape or way in South A::nerlca, 
or establish a p:cotcctor>ate under any disc;uise over any South 
1 (~O'Ll.·,-,+-,.,.y.1136 .t~-l~:cl'l call ; .:..l.u.J.. The Venezuelan cris1s sc:i.·vod as a practical 
te~3 t for tl1is approach to the }:onroe Doctrine. 11 I was bound that 
we s~ould not be put in the position of preve11ting the collection 
of an honest debt. I was also bound that there should be no ter-
ri tori al 2,ge;randi ze:CTent by an European power under the cover of 
. 
the collect:lon of such a debt. 11 37 ~ 
The question of the collection of debts raised a thor·ny p;.....,ob-
lem as was demonstrated in the Venezuela crisis. The Aserican 
m~nlster, Russell, had stated i;,hat the 1-~onroe T)octr>ine would not 
"serve as protection for rascals, 2.nd that the United States 
would not lift a finger in case of a for-cible :tntervention on the 
part of Germany in Venezuela. 11 38 'This appe.rent contradiction is 
resolved only if consideration is 3iven to Roosevelt's duality 
re5arding the Mor ... roe Doctrtne and the mission of civilized \'lest-
ern powers to help civilize the bD..ckward people lil:e the Venez-
36 
Roosevelt to Lodge, June 19, 1901, Harison, III, p. 98. 
37 
Roosevelt to G.W. Hinman, D~c. 29, 1902, £,forison, III, 
p. 400. 
38 
Dexter Perkins, The Honroe Doctrine_, 1867-1907 (Glouces-
ter, Mass.: Peter Smith, 1966), pp. 323-324 •. 
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l 'D"' :59 A1thonuh the United StG.tes sanctioned Ger•man actions 1 ue :"' ,., • t:r· 
thcI'e HilS a q_u:1lific:1tion to them as Sccreta:cy of State Hay 
reso:ct to fo::cce on the part of European powers against the Repub-
lies of Cc:nt:i:·0,l ex:d South .Ar::erica but they could not object to 
any <".et~_on t::c~rnn 1Jy them with the view of obtaining redress for 
injuries inflicted on their subjects, provided such action did 
not contemplate any territorial 2.c~quis:l t,j_on. 11 40 
:::Loosevelt had felt that his policy uas a logical continua-
tion of Clevele.nd' s and took time to tell him so. 11 It seems to · 
ne ti:.at ~:e hn.vc succ::-cded in accomplishing this time in connec-
tion 1<1ith £~;-;tting Englo.nd and G~rmany explicitly to recosnize 
the J.:oni-'oe Doct:cine in refel''ence to their controversy i;.ri th Ven-
c1:ucJa ;::nd in e;ettine; all of the :parties in inter·est to accept 
2.r()i t1·ation by the He .. gue Court.. I congratulate you heartily 
on the rounding out of your policy. 11 41 Later, he wrote to Al1::.;,·r-t 
Shaw 11 1:.y pos1tion has been consistent for a long time on the 
~~onroe Doctrine. I "supported President Cleveland in 1896 • • • 
the :p:r:i.ncip1es 1·:e set fo:r·th ·Here explicitly accepted by both 
Ge:cmc:.ny and En5land, and of course nothing that they have done or 
39 
Beale, p. 405. 
40 
Dana G. Munro, Intervention and DolJ~a~~Dii:>J.omac_y in the 
Caribbean, 1900-1921 (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University 
Press, 1964), P• 69. -
41 
Roosevelt to Cleveland, Dec. 26, 1902, Horiso!l, III, 
p. 398. 
tened to do so far has in any 1;ay or shape cc:?l:Lr'licted vd tr 
or threa 
tention as to i'lhat the Von.roe Doct:c:tne means. 1 '* ~~2 In ef-
our con . 
the uni tcd States had enla1'3ed the ideal of dut:-y to keep 
in .. "":nerica and to prevent E~opean powor•s from 8etting up· 
or protectorates in L~tin America.43 
The Venozuela crli3is gave b~_rth to one of the nl/L'"l:erous con--
surrounding Theodore Roosevelt. This part:-:l..cular one 
on his actions r:.nd th<-;ir 1ict:i.v1r~lon during tl~E2! actual 
In a letter to Willis1~ Roscoe Thayer, Roose.;7E2!lt explain-
thus: "I also became convinced that Gerr:iany int'.=-E2!nded to 
some Vcnezuoln,n ha:cbor ,?-nd turn it into a st.:co~e;ly fortif)_c -
of arms, on the model of Kiauchan, with a view to exercist 
mca:3lH'e of control over the future Isthmian Canal, 2.nd 
over South .t~meric:~n affairs g.:;ne1•a1.ly. u44 This soemg3 to be a 
logical continuation of the ti1ou3hts he had expresseCl to Spring---
earlier.·· '1\·/hcn I flrst came :\.nto the 
I was inclined to think the Germans had s~l:">:tous de-
South America. But I think I succeeded i:C=l impressing 
~n the Kasier, quietly and unofficially, and with eq~ql courtesy 
·and emphasis, that the violation of the Monroe DoctrL--l1e by terri-
torial aggrandizement on his part around the Caribbe~~ meant war, 
____ _,_ __________ _ 
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Roosevelt to Shaw, Dec. 26, 1902, Morison, VI:C:::t, p 0 1102. 43 
Albert Bushnell Hart, "American Ideals of Int&l:"'national Re 
lations," The American ,Journal of I:n_t __ er_ national Law, l (1907), pp. 633-4. --- -
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Roosevelt to W.R. Thayer, Aug. 21,1916,Morisor!l,VIII,. p.110 
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• ~ 0-- •• ·'' • I not ult;.,,"' te ly, but b:nedi ate ly, and without any de lay. " 1+5 22 
Roosevelt's second letter to Thayer was more bellicose in 
tono .'.~:,;cl he.s touched off a stlll rc:.ging contr>ovorsy as to his 
1, 0 nsons and recollections. 
11 I 2.i1swe:ced that I tho1"oughly counted 
tho cost bGfore I decided on the step, and ssked him (Ambassaeor 
EolJoben) to look at the map, as a glance \·;ould show him that 
there i·tas no spot in the world where Germany~ in the event of con-
flict with the United States would be at a greater disadvantage 
then in the Caribbean '•6 sea. 11 "• C:ci tics, have noted that 
this statc;r:ll:nt was shar·pened by the war 2x1d also Roosevelt's dis·~ 
Jike for Eolleben after he had.induced him to prepare the way for 
-t:1e blockade by defining the Monroe Doctrine in his message to 
the Con£::)'ess as "not intended to guarantee any state against pun--
is]·F;:ent if it miscor~ducts itself, p:covided that puni~1h;:;1ent does 
r:ot take the form of acquisition of territory by any non--American 
?01·,'er'. 11 47 
Roosevelt, however, was quite satisfied with his action in 
the crisis. In a speech at Chicago Apr~l 2, 1903 he noted both 
Garmany and England had exp:c•ossed in the moGt explicit te:..""ms that 
45 
Roosevelt to Spring Rice, Nov. 1, 1905, !;f.orison, V, p. 63. 
1+6 
Roosevelt to W. R. Thayer, Aug. 21, 1916, Iforison, VII!, 
p. 1103. 
47 
Hubert w. Bowen, "Roosevelt and Venezuela," ,North American 
Review, ccx(l919), p. 416. 
t , "Y c-,r,d not the slin:htest intention on their part to violate D<- , __ , - ....., 
tbe }:om•oe Doctrine, a,nd 11 tl1is assUX'<.3..nce was kept ,:Tith an honor-
'·s rb1 e .-c·ood :f\:d_ th ;fni Ch ;;cpit S l.'ull E~ck.:n.o·l'llcd3er::ent OU Our part• 11 '' 
(...1.. -- u 
In his .:::nnual Dlc s sage of 1903 he ~3t<:.ted 
It w.1.11 1)8 i«':.1c!"'.t)er--ed the,t ,~u-vin3 the sccund session of the 
last Con5ross G:coc.1,t Bx•itc?t1n, f1 1 :r·,i1~--.uy, and Italy folmd an 
alli~nco lor the purpose of bJ.ockading the parts of Venezuel· 
~,nd uslng such other means of pr•essure as 1.:ould secure a 3,::;:t-
tJ.c:-:-.cnt of claims due, as they alleged certain of their sub-
jc:;cts. Their employment of force for the collectj_on of t·h2f3e 
cla:Lns ;;as tei-;·1 i.n;-::i.tod by an 3..i9'C;enwnt brought about through 
the offices of the diplomatic representatives of the United 
States at. Caracas and the Government at ~·rashington thereby 
ending a situation which was bound to cause increasing 
friction, and ~1ich jeopardized the peace of the conti-
nont .49 ' 
i3c Cl'etary of State Hay had rc•c::de clear i'iashington' s 
1;osJ. t~.on earlier. Advocating and adhering in practice in 
quc~~ttcns concerning itself to the resort of international 
a:c'bitJ.·o.tlcn. ln r:;ettlc:rnent of controversies not adjustable 
by the o:ccorly tr-,)<.0,t::-:-i·::nt of diplo!.!mtic nee;ot:tat:i.on, the 
Gove:r·rr.,c:nt of the Unlted St.-1.tcs ~,.·ould o.11·rays be glad to see 
the ~1estions of the justice of claims by one State against 
2,nother g,rowlng out of i:ndi vidual wrongs or national obliga-
tions, as well as the gun.r2,:n.tee for the execution of what-
ever c:.w2~rd may be made, left to the decision of an impartial 
:.::trbitral tribunal before which the litigant nations, weak 
and strong alike, may stand as equals in the eye of inter-
law and mutual duty.'.)0 ·· · 
1+8 
Ho'.'levrd C. Hill, P: .. ~J{J?.:;_Y.§_it-.:_9:2lsi. tJ.:ie C_gr:i,j_)J2.san (New York: 
Russell and Russell, 19651, p. 131. 
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J?a"Q£rs. R~I~tJ.ng___!._o_t.hE?_fo~_~J __ e;n R~lati9ns of the United 
S't_a0s 0Tashin13ton,Government Printing Office, 1904), 1903 
p. XVIII. (Herein after refe:cred to as f_or9_~£iP. Re]..aj;.ions~. 
50 . 
fore~_g:n_Relat_ions, 1903, p. 6. 
\ 
Rc.'.iction to Rooscvel t 1 s )olicy was both favorable and un-
f;::.vorn.1Jle. Scme felt that the United States had conducted itself 
I proix~j~ly ~-ind l:iroue}1t :eoal 1wncfi.ts to the L.'"!.tin Au:ericans by re-· 
iliicin3 claims, protecting their territory and in effect, serving 
. opin1_on th3.t .:l.ooscvelt hL1self had procipi tated the action as an 
zu:copoan test to the statsrJents in his annual messages. Thus th.i.s 
:3. ttcr1pt to uphold the .Mom ... oe Doct:r·:l.ne h~"<.,d o.1>:.::ost :resulted in its 
'.L'he :uaj ori ty of the claims which had brought about the <:.ct:to11 
1,·e:cc b::<.fJed on i.njuries <..11d losses dur1.ng the civil wars in whj_c:i 
C:1'.;tro lwd :rlsen to p01·:er and on the violation of' contr2..cts by 
the 1lcnc zue lan sovernrnent. 53 The Gel"man government aD.nou:n.ced to 
the United States that it along with Great Brj_tain and Italy 
would establish a pacific blockade of Venezuelan harbors. The 
Unj_ted States replied, houever, that it did not l"<?co511:tze such 
oJ.oc}i::adcs \'rhich adversely affected third party rights as valid. 
The i'JOWers then proposed to establish a "warlilrn blockade" but 
"without a declaration of 1-:ar" in oPder for the Germans to stop 
the approval of the Blindesrath necessary for a for·;nal declaration 
LVII 
roe 
51 
11 Elihu Root on the Monroe Doctrine," Tiie_.J.11<iep§nd~~nt. 
(Dec. 29, 1904), p. 1514. 
52 
A Jeffersonian Democrat, "The Venezuela .Affair and the Mon 
Doctrine," North American Reyiew, 176(Harch, 1903), p. 321. 
53 
Hill, PP• 109-110. 
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: of u.~'.r._, i- l\oonovelt ::i.nd Hay while approvlng :Juch action on the lpnrt of the Allies sou5ht to limit it, ~c tenets of the Draso 
1 Docti·ine 1 .. ·L;re iznorcd while the Brtt:tsh mn.de political bCly of the 
I need ror Ameri ccen e.s s ll'"pi; 1 on of the re e ponsi bilit y f'or the a cti ans 
I of the Latin A"eric.~n L'cpnbltcs,55 I ':Che concept of e,J1ow:i113 ce1"t.'.1in rm .. ni ti ve clctions to be t<".k(;;n 
• 
2
,u'.1:nst cfolinquent Latin Amer~can states opened the way for many lun~ooirRble circumstances. T~ first of thcee being t~ sacrifice 
I of the i<lcor;ios 1.·;1ich was necessa~y. to the very existence of the 
·-6 stntcs.~ Second, the conditions in most Latin American states 
pr-ovide the neans for a I,atin Am0r1can l"ejection of the ~-~onroe 
r-8 
, Doct:eine and a swing to GerEw.ny • .? Fourth, if such actions as 11."~.'::;o"'.~ ~ouscs neizures c:cro allo1·:,;d by foreign creditors it .J .. 1,_,_d ,,.L10st be hnpos:3ible to dislodge them and a subsequent 
would lc.:,ve all o.f th::::m o~pon to such action. 57 '.i'hird, it could 
viol;n\ion of the Ifo::roe Doctrine would result.59 Flnally, such 
o.cU.on uould ru:c1cer the l-~on1•oe Doctrine suspect in Latin America 
54 
Lat2ne, .Th&Jlpits;d__fil~_E'.-_t§.E_a:nd_ Latin Ame_,tj,_9_§:, pp. 251-252. 55 
Van Alstyne, p. 217. 56 
A Jeffersonian Democrat, pp. 331-332. 57 
Ibid., p. 323. 
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"How to Develop the ?·ionroe Doctrine, 11 R0viey _ _Q.f Reviews, XXVII (1903), pp~ 231-232. 
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Ibid. 
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as doTJonstrated in o.n odi t.o:cial from the .Q.QJ't.Q.1_9 __ g_~_}i~11J1~ of Rlo 
de J~niero on March 30, 1903: 11 The 1.fo11roe Doctrine as such h;:i.s 
no vr:.lue 1fi:1:.,_tevor. At best it is siQply :3.nothcr uoct1J:1ent for tl:e 
benef1 t of tho;-:ie who would determine the c1v"rc.ctcristic psychol1)t;Y 
of 
'l'he e ction taken by the .A.11ies sanctioned by the United 
str~tes was cont:cary to tho Drago Doctrine formulated by the I•Iinis·-
ter of Ar3entj_na. It fo:e1x:'.,de the foJ.·ci ble col le ct ions of pubJ i? 
debt[3 bD.~Jed on the contention, 11 It is C1.11 inho:ccnt qualifico.tion of 
all coverei5nty that no proceedings for the execution of a judse-
~ 
;.1cnt , ;c'.y co in~3t,j. tutod or carried out ae;ainst :i. t. 11 61 21i.r•t}1eI'-
:;;o:ce, it held tha.t the public debt ce.m1-ot ocassion zu·~.:ed inter-
vent"_oa 1101" ei/en the o.ctual occupation of the terri toi-y of Amori-
:S2.~-:3iC~lJ.ly, t:'.t1e doctrine provided first 11 the 
C<}.pit;::i.1:\st ·,·cw lends !:1is r2oney to a fo:eeign state always takes in-
to 2.cc.ount the resou:cces of the country and the prob2.bility, 
sreo..ter or less, that the obli5ations contracted will be fulfillcc1 
Hi th delay. .All 5over:a::tient s thus enjoy different credit accord-
ini_sly to their degree of ci vilizat:ton 2.nd culture and their con-
-----·----------·----------------------- --
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Forei~n Relations, 1903, p. 26. 
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Henry G. Hodges, The Doctrine of Intervention, (Prince-
• ton: 'I'he :Ganner Press, 1915), PP• 85-6. 
62 
Samuel Flagy Bemis, The Latin American Policy of the Upi~e 
Stc:.tes (Ee1·1 York: He,rcourt, Brace· & Co., 1943), p. 147. 
' 
~ '-··, 1 , 0 ~ -..... .-.. ~ ., QUCt .Lfl U ,.o.L1.l •• :>J tran~iactions. 11 Ono 
. >r J 
of the fundamental principlos 
of intcrn~tional law, the enti~y and equality of all states, re-
qu:L:'ed that n.c:<:eowleO.scnent of debt and payl'lent must be left to 
the cor.ccrned natlon "without discrimination of its inherent 
r1::)1ts Cd3 a soverelt:-:n cnti ty. The coJlcct:ton of loans by mili-
tary ~0ans implies territorial occ10ation to make them ~ffective, 
s.nd terr'i torial occupation si5nifles a suppress:tcn or subordina·-
tion of the goverD~ents of the cov;'Jt1·:tcs on 1.fn5.ch it is i;;rnosed'~ 63 
- I 
The ~raso Doctrine was actually an adoption of the Calvo Doctri~e 
which condemmed intervention (diplomatic as well &s arffied) as a 
J.c[~i t.5 ,;:ate ,.Gethod of enforcing any or all p:ci vr~te claims of a 
pc c11.n i.rt:cy 1:2.ti.:_1'e, o.t least ;3uch o.s are based upon contr2,Qt or are 
the result of civil war, insurection or mob violence.64 America's 
refusal to prevent the arm ad intGrventlon of the AJ.lj.od PoHers of 
necessity make the Calvo and t11 0.e;o Doct:cines stand on their own 
raerits rather than under the sanction of the United States.65 
United States did, however, offer the Porter Resolution to replace 
the Drago Doctrine. It provided that none of the contracting 
p~rtios would resort to force in collecting contract debts unless 
the ~0btor state should disregard an offer of arbitration or, after 
--.-----··---~--·---
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John Hollo.day Latane, A_l:Lii?°t.9.r.Y __ of American 
York: The Odyssey Press, 1946), p. 496. 
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Hodges, p. 85. 
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Hubert vr. Bowen, "The l>(onroe, Calvo 
~--lndependent, LXII (April 18 1 1907) 1 p. 
and Drago Doctrines," 
903. 
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VJ~ l'~ "cr'i··n-'-1.t·'Q, t11e offer, shoi1J.d f bi __ l +o ,.-:;nb1nit to +'ne ~-',-,r;l_·(·d. 66_ 113. . -b '-·· "~J;;' • ~ • '--· •• ,_ . v ,\,.(. • u ~- ,_.._ 
Ifficodiatcly after the crisis debates took place in Parliament 
a profound effect on futu:ce British action and 
on the r_';C;velopr:lent of the I!.onroe Doctrine. PrLne r~inister Dalfou:c 
in the couTse of these dclli'.tcs stated; 11 I do not deny---in fact~ 
I freely- 2.01ait--·that the bc!'l(f-,olde:cs <3.y occupy an inte:cnational 
position which may require intc:crn:i.tio:nal action; but I look· upon 
such 1ntcrl1ational action with the e;c: 0.v0 st doubt :::.nd 'rnspi cion, 
and I doubt whether we have in the past ever cone to war for the 
bondhoJ.ders, for those of our countrymen who have lent money to a 
forci(,_p ~~ovcnncnt; and I confess that I should be very son:.'y to 
that ,,;;:cde a pr::::..etice in this country. 11 67 In ree;ard to the Iv:onrce 
Dcctrine, 2alfour m~de his position clear in a speech at Liverpoo~ 
on Feb. 14, 1903. 11 \·te welco;;~e any lncrc:<.1se of the influence of 
the UDited States in the ·western Ec:misphere. 1-fo desire no colon-
iz::i.tJ.on, we desire no alteration in the bo.lanca of pm·;er, we de-
sif·e no acquisition of territory. \'le have not the slightest in-
tentj_on of :tnterferring with the mode of government in any portio 
of the continent. The Monroe Poctrine, therefore, is not really 
in question at all.n68 
66 
J. 
oll['::.:cy of 
XLIX, p. 
67 
F. Rippy, 11 Britlsh Bondholders and the Roosevelt Cor-
the ::~onroe Doctrine, 11 J'oli tj_,..Q.<!l Scienc_~---5':..ld.@;.fterl~, 
203, 
Latane, American Forelg__n Policy, p. 495. 
68 
. Dexter Perkins, H0n_ds_Qff (Boston: Little, Brovm & Co., 
1941)' p. 224. 
29 
•rhe press in both En5land imd the United States kept up a 
stc
8
.dy cL:: 1,:or for the enunciati?n of a new .A:nerican position to 
changing conditions of the day. The most 
' 
corrsion .?cl'tY:'c";nt l'8.n very much stmilar to this. The United States 
ce_nnot a:2s11 .. 1e to fo:r:bid forei5n po\·1e:cs from collecting debts due 
from a South Ar1c:cican Republic unless it be willing to assuGe the 
responsibility and exercise the authority to enforce the pr9tect-
ol"~1te lt clo.ir;J.ed to establish.69 ri.'l:te ;tu:"_clog J;:j.};lg§. stated the pre· 
rnise e;vcm r:lore succintly on Jan. 30, l9U3 "the Po'l'ier wnich holds 
a shield over the weaker States is under an obli5ation to compel 
th0:n to o1rnc.cve their dutio s jn :c(:~2.r·d to othe:cs. 11 70 Sydney 
-:Srool:s ::>.s:wd 11 Eave we BUcceeded in convincing America that the 
:.Conroe Doct:cine Ci'.:c:cies w:i.th it certain l"esponsibilities?
11 71 
Thus the idea tl10.t ~.:un:coe Doct:cj_ne 1-:as put for·1·1ard. At least in 
part due to British urging the Roosevelt Corolla:c•y resulted.r( 2 
The question of European occupation of American ter:ci tory 
was cent:cal to the Venezuela crisis and to the Hhole concept of 
the ?-Conroe Doctrine and its relation to the European powers. 
11
The 
Uni tcd States was ·willins to c,llow European governinents to punish 
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[~clcit;ant Latin Anerican republics, provided assurance was 
t , "t '-~1,·re ,_,:,-Juld be no p, ermarwnt occupation of te·.I.-.ritoL-"Y• ,;73 5i ven no. l'" ,; . . 
Fi~om the tj_~~10 of his es cenB:to:i to the ?:ce :=:ldcncy, Roosevelt had. 
voiced his assent to E:tx:c9pean action ac;ainst defaulting govern-
r;~cnts p:covj_ded it did not vj_o1,.,..te the Monroe Doctrine. 11 1 do Ecit 
..... nt the 1J.1i ted States tc:c:ci tor·iaJ.ly to a5rr,,..andize itself in 
If(..,;,,,. Q-
south .L-'\:w1'ica, end neither do I w2.nt to see any European cou.:r1tl:'.J 
ward <'.ilY :SuI·0pen.n Gountry, let the European country srmnk it; hu:, 
I do not wish the United States or any other COlmtry to get addi-
tional te:n:•i tory j n South .i'\•,,orl c9..:11 7 4 
In a letter to his Secreta:cy of State, JoJ.m Hay, Roosevelt 
cleG.rly outl1n0s hj_s policy: 
'J'he chlef interest of the United States in relation to the 
other r1.:;publi cs upon the -~~neri can continent is the safety 
c:.nd r~c::crn<:i.nence of the political system which underlies tl:.eir 
and our existence' as nations, ---this system of free self 
covernnent by the people. It is, therefore, to be desj_red 
that all the :L:ecodom m-;der just laws, each soverei.sn co:·:_;:un-
i ty pursuing its own cour·se of orderly development without 
external rest:caint or inte1'fercnce. To this Condi ti on of 
security the peace and prospex•i ty, of all our neighbors will 
;::,;~terially contribute. Every failure on their part to main-
tain social order, every economic distress which mi{y'lt 51 ve 
:cL;e to domestic disturbance, every discord between t~:cm 
i,.,,hJ_ch could impede their industries, menace their stability, 
or b:cing upon them the- calarni ty of foreign interference 
could be a misfortune to us • • • the deep interest which 
the Government of the Uni\;ed States has in the peace and 
tr2.nquili ty of all the American states and in their terri-
---------·----·----------·---------·-------------
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Jessup, p. 497. 
74 
Roosevelt to Von Sternberg, July 12, 1901, Morison, III, 
p. 116. 
:::1 
torial intesrity. tfuile no specific engagements or declar~­
tions should be made with regard to ~3Uch questions, it is 
desirable to cause it to be generally understood that the 
Govorn.rnent would ser·iously condemn any attempt to destroy 
the territorial :integrity or to encroach upon the sove1'ei::;n 
r·it;hts of t_he existing state, or any con.du.ct on their part 
which might tend to evoke such a cc..lamity.15 
A~nin in the fj_~st year of his Presidency, Roosevelt made his 
position cleel:e :tn no uncerta1n t•:-o:i:·ms. "I regard the I·,:onroe Doc-
trine as being eq_ui valent to the o~"lcn door in South America:, that 
1s, I do not want the United States or <:.:ny :~uropc;r;n po~:er to cot 
territo:eial possessions in South America but to let South America 
gre.dually develop on its o·wn lines, ·with an open door to all out-
side !l:J.l,ior•s, ~~c-~:'."i1e as the individual. count:cies enter into indi-
yiaual treaties with one another~ Of course this would not ~ny-
where int«::rfol"e with trc:m.si tory intervention on the part of n.ny 
State outside of ~"iouth A.:-,1e:;_•ica,' wb:;n there i.-;a.s a row with sau:e 
Sto.te in South Arne:cica. 11 76 'l'he £.ionroe Doctrine was a declaration 
that theI'e must be no territorial age;:eandizement by any non-
Amerlcan po1·1er at the expense of any American power on American 
soil. It "..;as in no Hay intended as hostile to any nation in the 
Old 1·:0r1d. Sttll less we.s it intended to give cover. to o.ny e.5-
t;rcssion by one NeH '\'iorld poHer at the expense of any other. "It 
is simply a step and a large step, toymrd assuring the universal 
peace of the world by securing the possibility of permanent peace 
=.~----------------------
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Roosevelt to Hay, Oct. 8, 1901, Morison, III, pp. 164-165. 
76 
Roosevelt to Von Ste:cnberg, Oct. 11, 1901, Morison, III, 
p. 172. 
t l1iS on 
hc:rii sphere. 11 77 
32 
'I'he vc~nezuela crlsis of 1902-1903 ce.used Roosevelt to further 
refine the clpplication of the :,ronroe Doctrine. 11 ·rhe American pE o-
ple interpreted the rv:o:n:coe Doct:;:•ine as meaning of course that no 
Europcc:m po>·:0r should c;ain .9.S!.Xlt_rgl of any American republic • • • 
by any fJUCh :.:.rnbterfuge as exerc:ts:i.ng this control under the color 
of a. pretense to the 5uarantee or collecting a debt. 11 78 The very 
pretense of such 2.ction would be reuioved 11 if all of the republics 
to tha south c.f ·Lis will only grow as those to which I allude have 
a.lrec.dy 1.5rovm all need for us to be the especial champion of the 
Doctrine w~.11 difoappear, for no stable and growing American Re-
publtc Hl shes to see some 3r·oat non-American military power ac-
quire terr:l tory in its neighborhood. 11 79 The United States, ho;:-
ever, would not "5u::?.rantee any state against punishment if it mis-
conducts itself, provided that punishment does not take the form 
of the l?,cquisi tion of territory by aJ:}.y non-American power. 1180 
This policy was to demonstrate that America did not intend to per-
mit the rfonroe Doctrine to be used by any nation on this Continent 
,! 
as a shield to protect it from the consequences of its 01·m mis-
77 
for~ign Relations, 1901, p. XXXVI. 
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Roosevelt to Hay, March 13, 1903, Morison, III, p. 446. 
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Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXVI. 
80 
Foreign Relations, 1901, P~· XXXVI-XXXVIII. 
deeds n.e;ainst foreign nations.81 
The policy while not allowing control of te1~r1 tory did not 
·1 that .:t'oreign): ere di tors should be denied theil"' J~ust due. mca1 
Thus, America was to stand for justice and not sanction for the 
avoidance of hone st claims. 82 )'-1any of these countries, ho',;cver, 
..,.:ere in a state of constant economic peril which invited such ac-
tion as prohibited by the Monroe Doctrine.83 Roosevelt fe1t ''if 
a republic to the south of us commits a tort against a foreign 
nation, ouch as an outrage against a citizen of that nation, then 
the l·~onr·oe Doctr•ine does not force us to interfere to prevent pun 
ishr.ent of the tort, save to see that the punishment does not as-
sume the fo:cm of tep:r•i torial occupation in any shape. 11 84 
Assuming this principle the creditor was placed in a diffi-
cult situation. The intervening nation must occupy such terri-
tory as appropiated only until it claims have been met and must 
reject the idea of permanent occupation.BS On this point Elihu 
Root in his speech to the New England society noted: 
81 
.E_QX'QJiill._Re_l_g_tj,gn§., 1905, P• XXXIV. 
82 
11
The United States and Guatemala," Outlook, 104 (Xay 17, 
1913), p. 89. 
83 
Theodore Roosevelt, "South,,_America- and the It.:oru"oe Doc-
tx•ine, 11 Outl9_Q_~, 106(March 14; 1914), p. 583. 84 . 
Foreip:n Relations, 1905, .P• XX.XIV. 85 ... 
Hodges, p. 83. 
;·:e don't undertake to say that the republics of Central and 
South America are to be relieved from their international 
obll3ations. \'le don't undertake to say that the Powers of 
Europe shall not enforce their ri5hts a3ainst these memberB 
of the sisterhood of state,s. It is only w}1en enforcement of 
tho~;e ri5hts comes to the polnt of taking posse~-;sion of the 
territory of any American people that we say th2.t it is in-~ 
consistent with the peace and safety of the United States. 
And we can not ~-;ay it with justice unless 1·m also say that 
the American republics nre themselves to be just.86 
In this same ree;::ird, he \,.;,:is later to state that "if 11e are t 
::_,1 aintoJ.n this Doctrine, wD.ich' is vital to our nat~_onal life and 
safety, at the same time when ·we say to other Po~w:rs of the ':torlrl., 
'You shall not push your remedies for '\'T!"ong against these repub-
lics to the point of occupying the!r territory'; we are bound to 
say the.t '·,·.rhenever the ;.-r:cong cmmot be otherwise redressed, we 
ourselves will see that it is redressed'. 11 87 
Roosevelt, hir.:iself, was of the opj_nion that one of the fund-
auental objects of the lfonroe Doctrine 1·ms to assist the Latin 
American republics in their desire for peace and order. The grad 
ual growth of the ethical element in indivi_dual relations and 
the sharing of burdens should be expanded to nations.88 Actually, 
h01-.'ever, the civilized man can keep peace and obtain justice only 
if he subdues his barbarian ~eighbors. Fair dealin5 must also 
enter into the relations but force must be the overriding consid-
86 
"Our 1Fiscal Protectorate' in Santo Domingo," J.,iterary 
Di~est, XXX(Dec. 28, 1905), p~ 120. 
87 
11 Elihu Root on the rfonroe Doctrine, II p. 1514 . 
88 
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The 3ains to be realized from such a~tion far out-
welshed the dr•awbaclrn because every expansion. of civilization made 
for ::_1c2.ce. 'l'hus the gains of a 3reat civilized p01:er meant the 
triu~Jph of law, order, and righteousness.90 In effect, the steady 
aim of the United States, as of all enlightened nations, was to 
strive to bring ever nearer the day ·when there should prevail 
throughout the world the peace of justice.91 
Since one of the most effective instruments for peace was 
the r-:onroe Doctrine as it he.d been and was gradually developed by 
this E2tion and acc_ep_ted by oth0r nations, its extension could re-
sult 5.n tho hemispheric peace Roosevelt soug...t-it.92 Therefore, it 
re22.lncd America 1 s clear duty to st1·i ve in every practiable way to 
bring nor.rer the time when the ~'.rnrd wou1d not be the arbiter a- J 
mons :n.a ti on:;. During Roosevelt Is time, the practical thing to do 
1-;as to try to minimize the nwnber of cases in which it had to be 
the ar1)i ter, and to offer, at least to all ci v:_ilized poi·rers, so:ne 
substitute for 1·mr which would be available in at least a consid-
erable nwnber of instan.ces.93 One of the major causes of conflict 
-----~----------
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in tree '\.'cstePn hcmi sphere 1·12.s the collection of defaulted debts. I 
In 111s instl"'Uctions to the representative at the Hague he sought 
to rc:~;ove this possible source of confrontation. 11 It is doubtlt\ss 
r1 tl"J.e th.:1t the non-payment of public debts ;;;,ay be accompanied by 
h· 
'1 ci_ :::'CliJ'stances of sUCl fraud and ~~onsdoing a violation of treaties 
j ..L • ..... .L, ..,, f as to USGlIY Gne use 01 orce. This Gover1'ln1ent 1·;ould be gl;:;.d -~o 
see an inter·ne.tional consideration of the subject which shall 
discrininate between such cases and the simple non1;erforn12.nce of 
a. contract ·Hi th a p:ei vate person and a resolution in favor of re-
lirmce upon peaceful means in cases of the latter class. 11 94 
. 
on 
)~:c;d_cc.n 2.ssu::nption of such a role led to misunderstn.ndj_ns 
"An idea had beco1oe prcvo.- I 
Doctrine i:np1ied, or C2.l:'l':ted 
I 
with it, an as::o1.-1Dption of supe1•io:city, and a ri5ht to exercise 
some kind of protectorate over countries to ~iliose territory that 
doct~ine applies. Kothing could be fa:cther :from the truth. 11 95 
In rc<llity, Foreign J:.:inister Drago of Argentina pointed out that 
11 the traditional policy of the United States without accentuating 
super·iori ty or seeking preponderance, ccnder:ined the aggression of 
the nations of this part of the 110rld and the control of their 
de0tinies by the sreat Powers o.f Europe. 11 96 Elihu Root added 11 ·\'le 
94 
Fore~n Rcl~tt9ns, 1906, p. 95--
! Ibid., P• XLVII. l ___ ~6lliQ.' P• =II~-- ... 
XLIX. 
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37 
for no victories but those of peace; for no territory except 
for no soverei5nty except the sovereignty over oursel-
Rl)o sevel t hoping to di sspell other rumors 1.\1."ote to Root 
"It 1s not tr·l.1.e that the Unit&d States has 2.ny land hunger or en-
~ 
tertains any projects as re5ards other nations, save as are for 
their welfare. 11 98 Latr::r he was to state 2.s1::dn 11 it r11ust be unde.~"'-
stood that under no circumstances will the United States use the 
I-".onroe Dcctrine as a cloak for territorial aggression. 11 99 
President Roosevelt was keenly aware that "the right of fi"<(G-
dom o.nd the responsibility for the exercise of that right can not 
be di'IOJ.'cod. 11 lOO ' This was especiallr true for those who profit6d 
·by the Monroe Doctrine. For they 11 must accept responsibilities 
along with the rights which it confers; D.nd that the same state-
ment applies to tD.ose who uphold the doetrine. 11 101 It was a raere 
~ truism. to say that every nation, whether in America or anywhere 
f 
else, that dosired to maintain its free(':.om, its independence Lriust 
ulti~ately realize the right of such independence could not be 
separated from the responsibility of making good use of it. 102 
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11~·rot only we, but all .Ar;:ei-'ic::i.n Repub1ics who are benefited 'by .L' . t....'1.G 
e:x:istGnce of the Doctrine, mu::it recognize the obligations each 
n.ation is under as :t'03ards fo1•eign peoples no less than its duty 
to insist upon its own rights. 11 103 
I 
If the United States was.to insist upon the rights proclai~e~ 
under the Eonroe DcctPine, Ro8sevelt had to undertake the forLllid-
able task of rc-awakeing the American people to its tenets.and 
e.do.ptations. 11 1 am hav1ng my hands full also in endeavoring to 
make our people act on a national interpretation of the Konroe 
:Doctrine. No such policy as that of the £•1onroe Doctrine can re-. 
irFl.in fossilized whj_le the nation 31~m·rn. Either it must be o.i)an-
doned or it must be modified to meet the changing needs of nat-
ione.l life. ul04 He a5r•eed who:le-heartedly with 1·,'hitelaw 2eid t}-0..2.tl 
11 the thine;s that make the Monroe D~ctrine have disappeared • • • I 
we rJay find, if nobody is opposing, that its extension quite so 
far 1)eyond the original purpose ••• as the furvor of our patri-
ots has c2.rried it, may prove to be attended ~11th wholly urrnec-
essary inconveniences in the absence of a salutary European pres-
sure, we shall either modify the present extreme extensions of th 
old doctrine . • • or some day or another we should have to fisnt 
for it. Secondly we should limit it to our legitimate sphere of 
national interest--Gulf of Mexico, the Caribbean, and the waters 
------------------------.---------------
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Foreign Relations, 1905, p. XXXIII. 
104 
Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905, Morison, _rv, 
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on 'both OCC:CJ.ns :i.l-::out the Isthrnus. Finally, we should apply it 
,. a '1 
_';;_,, I 
with increased strinsoncy in the sphere, beyond it moderated in: 
remote countries which under 1;han5ed modc:rn condi t:l.ons are no 
,r \·iithin that sphere. 11 105 lonse · Thus, the Doct:eine had to be e1..:. 
ther c-.dvnncod or expanded to cover the ever lncreasing number oi' 
-~ ~u+c•'"' ·cpininl.1' QJ. SJ.J v _,. 0 c~, ...... :>_~ 
0 from the reckless creation of public debts and 
loose :fjrH;,ncial 0.drn.lnistration which courted Eur·opean interven-
tions ::o.nd to set the limits to which that intervention could 
rea.ch. l06 nif we h:::.d refused to apply the Doct1"ine to changing 
conditions it would DOi'l be completely out\:orn, would not meet any 
.. 
of the needs of the present day, and indeed uould probably by 
this tL:ne have sunJc into complete obliv:l.on. It is useful at ho::r:e, 
and is :·n(~eting with reco5ni ti on abroad because we have adopted 
our application of it to meet the growing and changing needs of 
the :Jr.mi''D1•e-re rrl07 
... .l.<..J~ ... f 01 .l.~ • 
It was because of this ability to change itself to fit the 
si tu2tion that Roosevelt :felt "the l.:Onroe Doctr·ine · should be the 
card1nal :feature of the :foreign policy o:f all the nations of the 
two Ar:1er·icas, as it is of the United States. 11108 The extent to 
~ Which economic concer·ns 5overned foreign policy, especially the f 
t· ---t. 
' 
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gor.!l'Oe Doctr>ine, has been the c::::.use of r::e.ny G..n argument over the 
ooti y[',tion behind the new inter:;iretation of the lfonroe Doctrine 
Roo:::cvelt fo1·u1le.ted. In his messae;e of 1901 he stated "this 
doctrine has nothing to do with the commercial relat~.ons of any 
American poHer, s::::ve tha.t in tn1th allows ee.ch of thsm to form 
such as its desires. In other 1·10:.cds, it is really a e;uara,nty of j 
the commercial independence of the A111ericans. Tl'!e do not ask urcderl 
I 
this doctrine for any exclusive cornLlorcial dealings 1'f3.th any other! 
' 
3ave this 2.d-1 · f",t·,ate. 11 109 H r in th ~ le ' A2el'l can - -Oweve , e sc..r: L.1e ssa3e ne 
f monition to busiP..ess. "Business concerns \ihich have the largest I 
~ 
' 
I r,- ....... • ,,. '-'-oi·r u'i"·~o 0 ·11 .,,.,,,re t·~e Jead in -'-he s"-ri·fe ""'or 
I
ir.,c~1i.:> c--~ vlJ. _ 'e>l-' .:oc._ • • • L"°''"' !'l _ 0 0 .i 
· cor.::,,cr·cial nupre:mD.cy among the nations of the world. America has I 
only just begun to a:3sw-;ie the con~ile.nding position in the j_nter-
national business Horld which we believe will more 2.nd more be 
hers. It is of the utmost importance that this position be not 
jeopardized, especially at a t:lme when the over·powering abu..>'ld.:::mce 
of our o-vm national resources and the skill, business enerf:5Y, and 
mecho,nical aptitude of our people make foreign markets essent~-
'
-ial. 11 llO :r,,_any critics saw more to the Monroe Doctrine than rr~erely 
e~ononic considerations.111 11 The roots of our Caribbean interests 
109 
f_9_r.e:\_f:_ll_J1elations, 1901, p. XX.XVI. 
110 
11/illiam Appleman Williams, The Tragedy 9f American Di plo-
lgi.2.cy, A Delta Book (New York:Dell Publishing, 1962), p. 57 111 Dexter Perkins, The United States and the Caribbean (Cam-~:~doe: :~r~~iversity Press, 1947), p. 134. 
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41 l 
.t>.,.,,., deoner than that. Tl:.ey are embedded in the very soil of 
'run .J._ c~... . • 
our '·10··1·11 life nll
2 
l,...!.~L u l 1.. ~ • 
11 It seems elem."' that the motives that in-
spired its policy vrore basically political rather than econom-
ic• "113 Em·r~".l'd Hill 5oes even further than these statements. 
"Political rather than econo~ic consideration seem to have deter-
cou:cce. l'for must it be overlooked that the 
policy he favored was often opposed by influential financiers 
.,..-~ .. ,.,.,'·io·.-. ~-··~au1s.11114-co ... 1,o~·-1'- • .1. -"· ~ Samuel Flagg Bemis also believes that 
andj 
"-'~ ;~ -V., L ' 
strato5ical requir•c;::ients of continental security • • • not sel:i.~i s: 
interests (\·!all SL"cet) r·eally explains the Roosevelt Corollar7 1~Jl5 
i·!illie.m A1Jple;:nan 1:iillia:-ns, ho\·rever, clings to an econornic inter-
pret2.tion. 111rhe economic and political leader of the count:cy de-
ci<i<~d th2.t wliat was 3ood for Americans w2.s al~30 c;ood for foreign-
ers. =:ti..:-.!ani t<1.:ci2.n conce:cn 1·.ras thus reinforced by hal'd-hcaded 
econo1ni c r·equirements. "~16 
Almost everyone is agreeded that Roosevelt realized that the 
112 
He!1ry Ki thedge :tforton, 11 The United States in the Carib-
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116 
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l:-2 
major determ:tnant in the i.nt.ern{i.tional 'dorld was power. 1 1'1 Sine.a 
the Monroe Doctrine ·was not a par·t of inte:cnational law but a 
pi"onou:n.c:c~r;·;ent of a policy and this could be 15nored by anyone wl:o 
chose to do so, 1 ts exist,ence only had mean:tng as so as the Uni t_ed 
states t::ould doal f1~om strength.118 In effect, the 1-fonroe Doc-
trinG emoux1t.ed to a policy conceived and maintained for its own 
we1fo..:ce; in reality, it was a defensive policy of the United 
states • 119 'I'hc:i.:·e ~·::.:;.s a b:".sic truism in the statement "our forei5n 
policy is the !-Ion.i·oe Doct1 ... ine. What.ever our foreign policy hap-1 
pens to be for the moment, it is c~.lled the Monroe Doctrine. 11 120 
Du-c'l:r43 thj.s pe'.!."iod one of the focal points of .kmerican for...: 
eign policy 1-1a.s the Ca.r:tbbean.- Its importance was thought to 
ovc:i.~sb.:'.dow all others. Charles Evans Hug.hes said of the Carib·-
bean. 
If we had no gonroe Doctr:tne we should have to create one. 
And this is not to imply' any limitation on the scope of the 
doctrine, as originally proclaimed and as still maintained, 
but simply to indicate that new occasions require new appli-
cations of an old principle which remains completely effect-
ive. vrnat has taken place of late years in the region of the 
Caribbean has given use to much confusion of thought and mis-
apprehension of purpose •. As I have said, the Monroe Doctrine 
as a particular declara.t+on in no way exhausts American rig..1-:i.t 
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or policy. The United States has rights and obligations 
w:11ich tl1at doctrine does not define. And it has been neces-
so.r·y to assert these ric;hts and obligation~ as well as the 
li81ted principle of the Monroe Doctrine.l~l 
Roosevelt stated "the 1-:oDroe Doct:r>ine is necessary today to 
the United States. The Caribbean Sea washes the coast of the 
richest part of the United States,_ and it is necessary that it be 
dominated by them in order to e;uarantee the independence and se-
curity of' the United States. 1!122 The acquisitlon of the Canal 
zone and the construction of the Panama Canal w1de the Isthmian 
a.re:J. one of the greatest of strategic significance in the American! 
defense system. Its importance prompted a move to secure the con-1 
trol of bases rcquisi te for the defense of the canal by the Unit·-
ed sto.tes and the exclus:ton of any rival great power from obtain-
ing a foothold in the vicinity of the canal or on the approaches 
to it • 123 Such feelings were voiced by Elihu Root, "In V1at re-
gion (the Caribbean) the United States must exercise a dominant , 
influehce. It is there that the justification and necessity for 
the l.:On:coe Doctrine is found. We must control the route to the 
Panama Cana1. 11124 It was contrary to the Monr•oe Doctrine, Roose-
--·---------··---------------- -----------
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cester, Mass: Peter Smith, 1964), pp. 116-117. 
124 J :i.:unro, Intervention, p. 113. 
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for any non-A:nericG.n power to have any control over the 
Istbnian canal. 125 Lodge was l~ter to extend this principle to 
include 1'any J.1(~:cbor or other plLtce in the :~rnerican continents that 
is so situated that the occupation thereof for naval or military 
purro:ocs mi5ht t'rn·Ge:1.ten the co;1rnunications or the se.fety of the 
,_ d Q .... ,_,_""S 11126 lJniue ul,<.-.L..v • 
:S.cosevelt 2.nd the nation were prepared to support the 1'·1onroe 
Doct:c1:-1e ~'·.nd <ie:Lend the C2,r-i bbean on the grounds of national se-
curity •127 He fi:cmly believed American rights and interests were 
deeply conce:cned in the maintel'\ance of the Doctrine so clearly 2.s 
hardly to need arv1ment. This was especially true in view of the 
co::Lstruction of the Psnama Canal. "As a ;.nere matter of self-~de-
fense we must exercise a close watch over the approaches of thi~ 
can2.l, and this means that we must be thoroughly alive to our in-
ter·e~3ts in the Caribbean Sea. 11128 Root was cognizant of the fact 
th::i.t :tthe i:nr:;vi table effect of our building the Canal must be to 
req_uire us to police the surrounding premises. In the nature of 
thin:;s, trade and control, and the obligation to keep order which 
---------------·------------------
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EP t
, )..• . ..,,~ ·.·.·,· .. ·L1 <>t CO"'.· ,e our i\ray. 11 129 v::\. n ul'.l-.~l, ...... '" 
In i'csar•d to a proposed J.oi1n to Costa Rica, ne noted the 
United States :cequi:ccd the rn:;:ct door nei3hbor of 1-'anaman to be 
unC.er the fin2 .. ncial cont:c·ol of the United Sto.tes rather thnn h.-c'.Ve 
it ve ;..;tod in any forelgn PO'.ier.1::50 'l'he d.cfon~oe of the Po.ne.~aa 
c::i.nc"l dominated our Caribboc.i.n policy w:nich rested on the p:c:l.:"12.cy 
of the United States and its inter·ests w:riich we:ce :"'oster·ed PY the 
. cx:i s t,:-nce of the Canal .131 Roosevelt :cec>.,li zed 11t:1e contr·ol, in 
the lntercst of the com.;nerce and traffic of t'ce '\·"'i",ole civilized 
world, of the :means of undisturbed t:cansi t acr·oss the I str.mus o:' 
' ho.s become of t:co.r,sccno.ont Lni)o:ctD .. nce ,_ .l.• u · t a s+ .... . I uO 0ne ill e va0~s. 
I 
exe:ccl sed this control by intervening in the I 
l 
' ' 
course of domestic discussion, and by protecting the territory 
., 
from foreign invasion. 11132 The ~-:onroe Doctr:i.ne :12"d se1-·ved in .... '1111 
ftmction and was endorsed by the citizens. "Cur people intend c~o 
alY'..de oy the Zonr·oe Doctrine 2.nd to visit upon it as the one sure 
cc;.:>x1s of securine; the peace of the v-.'estern Hemisphere. 11 133 I 
Roosevelt's strong av:areness of manly virtue carried over inlf 
to his consideration of relations between nations. I 
In foreicn affairs this 
toHard other nations as 
country's steady policy is to behave i 
a strong and self-respecting wan 
129 
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I 
should beh:1ve toHs.:cd the other men ·with vrhom he is brou5ht · I 
ir~.to contact. In other ·Ho:rds, our aim is disinterestedly to 
:-ceJ.p other nations ~ .. rhere ~-n1ch help can be wisely given with- f 
out t:ie appearance of meddling with what does not concern us; 
to bo caPeful to act as a 3ood neie;hbor;. 2,nd at the same t:'Lnl 
in 6oocl--natured fash:ton, to make it eviC.ent. the,t we do not 
j_r1tcnd to be iriposed upon.135 . 
;~e c<.wit:i.nued 011 th:ts t:i.·c=dn of thought in a letter written I 
!· 
le. .. te~. 
In short, ray belief is that this nation should judge other 
n:•.tions each on its conduct; a,nd that it should fearlessly 
<c.nd 1·1}1c1·e pos8lb1e effectively talrn r~ction asainst w:con5-
d()5_ng; that it should prepare itself so as to w1ke it unsafe 
fo:c r::,ny other l~,2.tion to do l'ff•ong to it; ond that in its tu:cn 
it should_ scrupulously do justice to every nation that act~ 
ric;htly.l3b 
~hG RooGevelt of 1901 to 1909 had greater wisdom and more 
.discretion thc,n the Roosevelt who had in 1896 pronounced his 
theed.cs on pat:ciotism. In r-eality he had aba.ndonded none of 
ti,0::1.137 nI believe '\'tith all my heart in the J,~on.:coe Doctrine ~:nd 
have, for instance, for·mally notified G-er1:!lany to that effect. 11138 
In a speech in Chicago on April 2, 1903 he again voiced his sent-
ic.ents and gave birth to the title of his policy. 
p. 
p. 
I am convinced that the immense majority of our fello..,,.,.-
countrymen so believe in it, but I would infinitely prefer 
J.:.o see us abandon it than to see up put it for\·12.rd 1.=md blust-
er about it, and yet fail to build up the efficrent fi5ht1.ng 1 
Hhich in the last resort can alon~ make it respected by e:,,ny 
135 
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136--
Roosevelt to B. Dernburg, Dec. 4, 1911+, .i'~orison, VIII, 
861. 
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Pringle, pp. 279-280. 
138 
Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905, ~·:orison, IV, 
1286. 
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' 
"t:cong -:..~orei[-;:n pN;er 1-rhosc interest it may happen to violn.te ! 
1.t. 'l'hei-•e is a homely old adae·e uhich runs: 11 Speak softl~· 1 
.,; I 1 ~~d carry a bi3 stick; you will go far. 1 If the American I 
0~tion will speak softly and yet build and keep at a pitch o~ 
~-,;·co hle)lest tra'Lninc;s ~~ tho:ecuc;hly efficient navy the l,:offC08 
roctrino will go far.159 
=~~s speech was pronpted by the realization that the efficacy 
; 
~of 
I 
the ~ohroe Doctrine depends, lar5e ceasure, upon the :rw.ta1·- l 
I ; ::.1 
f ~od 
power of the lli1ited States.140 'rhe Chic2.go address also ser·-
cc~:;t him <-1s a typical repre,sentati ve of j_r;-1perialistic j:Jol-
l I ::..cies, for he sy:2te:J1e.tic2.:Lly expressed natiorn~.l C'.:nbitions, 
I 
I 
ofi"'21·ecll 
I 
I:?. clobal comprehension of what was to be accomplished, and 
j co:·_,)lcte o..cco:rd with the elan of luis people • 141 The basis 
W2.S in 
of tJ:-:e 
.. :~: 1J ,:;h, the :.:cnroism of Hoosevel t :::md l·~ahan had terminc-~ted t;1e 
' 1 1' ·'- , -- ~ .... , . f">j . • ,_ .• , r n ~ . d lt d i 
, -~:vo ._u 0..:.oz.1. 01 t.,~1e _p_ .. L'll 0.L ve .i:;~onroe .ucc c.rine an resu e n an 
j ! A:·.crj_ce.n :1ef,<.::nony '..rith its O':m conplete nationalization.142 
The ure;e to increase A_nerican influence in the iJOI'ld i.·:as 
'
in part et least, to Roosevelt's desire to extend Anglo-Saxon 
I i<ier:.:'.'.'., practices, and virtues throu5hout the world. 143 In bj.s 
: ,;jn:nJ.nv of the ~'Test he implies that the Anglo-Americans enjoyed a ! ---- ·-·· ·-----·----·---
, --- --~-39 ---. ---------------~ 
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1,·o 1U 
o,s well as ci. cult:u1•<J .. l sup:cemo.cy .14-4 
by others only by being able to 2cestcr them·-
need C'f•;r to kec~p in mi.nd the..t among the uc.ny qualities indispos-
able to the success of a sreat denocracy, and record only to a 
}1j_sh a::1d stern ~;cn:~e of duty of )"loral obligation, are self-know·· 
The white r2.ce was destined to· sprea' 
Defined by Euro:x::;n GGO[£raphy, the 
Chri~-,tj_.'.:'rl :celi3ion, a cultural link with Greece (~nd Rome and a 
kinship of b1ood, they \':ere the superior peoples of the modern 
f;J.'P-. T)ir.:;y 1:0:ce o:edc.:i.ned to rule be cause they -;-.'ere endowed with 
.t}:e cnc~r3y o.nd ability to cont~ol other races.146 This was so 
bccc.u~::e a ne.tm·al process had best fitted these people for expan- . 
It wo.s they who would control the b"el'4 
Pro-eminent among this select few wei'e( 
sion und self··e;ove1·1r,1ent. 
ward regions of the world. 
t?1e ::nglish- speaking 1'2,ce s. ~47 '· "In the long run there can be no 
i justlfic;::,-..tion for one race ·managing or controlling another un- ! 
less ••• in the interest and for the benefit of that 
! 
race. ul48 I 
--------i ·-------- -----··----------- ---- --
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I 3urton, "Social Darwinism, 11 p. 116. 
___ .:._..,.. ___ _,,._.....,., __ ~-- ... -~.....-.__..._ .......... ~~ ......... - ·-----~--.-.,·~-fj-'• . ~-.v --~----· -~·~.-.._-....... ™""'-- _._ ...... ..,.~.....-..... ...... ,.._.,J 
:~:<.turally, the :c-:nzlish spe8;1dng races could car1"y out this task. 
~\cosevcl t' s doctrine wc.s compounded by a sense of the super-
1 _\ ori ty of the :cD .. ce, P<~rticularly by An5lo-A~J.ericans, the guardians 
J of deL";ocracy. The influence of the 'de st was seen in the urge to 
I 
11c:1inate c.nd his der.;ir~~ to be the preceptor of lesser civiliza-
i 
! ti'-~ i;; and the champion of unfortunate peoples. 149 Ee contrasted 
i .;-,;~,~ successful democracy of the white race with the chaos of S3.ntoi I . I 
! 
I 
::,,,;1~_nc;o. 11 A hundred years of fr•eedom so from tee.chine; the Sar:to 
i '~o;':in:_:ans how to enjoy freedom. and turn it to good account, hs.s . 
.'.'·~=::,_;ltc;cl so badly that society is on the point of dissolutioD. 11 l50 
·• 
.- - rl '-""""" ~ ,_..,. ·Y•OV"" "'·E -1t Of t'ne lo-'- 01"' ""'1e ina.~~ Vi ~Ual l5l ,• .;..·-....<.. ~1.1..1....... J.,_; .... J;).... !;_.;~~ ~l y Ltl - Q • 
;,; ·u_:;i(ic:ced in 8,n a1!.10st Neo-Lamarckian sense. ':Chat :ts, t1-1e c:_c-
~~term~ncd action. In the race of the Latin A~ericans, this was 
~2~onstrated by their weakness and inability to rule the·nselves 
I 0 fectively.152 Kost of the Washington officials were of ~he 3·_~9 
I 09:1 nion. Latin American :cepresentati ves were "Dagoes 11 while 'Sur-
' c:oe ··:c: .. s t'l:e c:radle of culture and civilization. ':'he inevitable ' 
----------·-------- ----·- < 
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11cvcs that his southern neighbors are trivial and childish peo~ 
p1cs, o.nd above all incapable of maintaining a proper self-sover'.1·-
~nen t." l54 Root went so far as to sa:y, "All of the Latin Ameri cf,ns 
na v1~ ':l genius for 1ni srepresentati on • ., 155 Roos eve 1 t 1-.rrote to Eay 
·"it v1i 11 do ai.·;ay with the foreign nations having any pretext for 
interference on this side of the water, and in the next place it 
, ~6 
'-'Ti 11 shoN those Dagoes that they will have to beh8.Ve decently.",__,, 
With such a batt~ry of intellectual assumptions it is quite 
e.ssy to see how Roosevelt was convinced that the United States 
wo11ld nev0r act unjustly or wrcnglj. Hence, whatever position 
f,!·~,; ci ca took was right .157 Thus, the systmn of "prevention in'~er·-
vt:ntion" was born to substitu~e orderly democratic processes ror 
~c'~, o1t in Latin Arneric8., especially the Caribbean and Central Ame~~ 
ic0n stotes. 158 The decision of the arbitration tribunal was 
thought to put "a premium on violence" and, therefore, the United 
St3tes sought an alternative to European naval demonstrations in 
---------------
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"Sooner or later it seems to me inevitable thgt 
the United States shoUld assume an attitude of protection and reg-
ulBtion in regard to all these little states in the neighborhood Q 
160 
the Cnribhean." It was America's duty, when it became absolute 
lY j_nevi table, "to police these countries in the interest of order 
161 
9.ncl civilization." 
Roosevelt :nc..de the distinction between civilized and barbar-
0 us peoples or states. The civilized or white states were subjer::;t 
to different criteria for the p8rformance of duties and rights, 
"~~rs with barbarous or semi-barbarous peoples come in an entirely 
• differ~nt category, being merely a most regrettable but necessary 
~ntcrnational police duty which must be perfo14 med for the sake of 
t11e welfare of mankind." 162 Where Cari bbeR.n stntes were s t2.ble 
And prosperous they stood on a footing of absolutely equality with 
nll other communities. But some of them were prey to such contin-
1;ous revolutionary misrule as to have grown impotent either to do 
th8ir duties to outsiders or to enforce their rights against out-
siders .163 It could not in the long run prove possible for the 
TJnited States to protect delinquent &~erican nations from punish-
( 'i\ ew 
(Xe';'; 
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·;1cr, t::; for U1c nonpc~rfornonce of their duties unless she undertook 
' ,_,1..,m })- -~forrn ·t·'1 "'J0 ....... (luti '"' 161} R ~eve] t ··1 s co·"v1· n '"'d t"-to i:l'~.,(C ln t,. CJ. '" I C .J. •. 8-> 0 OO::; '·· 1vfl. ri c,c . ,rn1 
tncse 1·:ere ·\'Teak and incompetent nations which could not protect 
rights of foreigners against their own citizens or vice versa. In 
.such c'J.ses, it bccaJTie necessary. for some outside power to inter-
165 
v 8 ne. As to actual intervention, noosevelt was of the opinion 
th.::• t "nine-tenths of 1·1i sdom is to be wise in time, and at t.he 
right time; and my whole foreign policy was bnsed on the exerci88 
of intelligent forethought and of decisive action sufficiently for 
1n advance of any likely crisis.to make it improbable that we ~auk 
j_ nto serious trouble. 11 166 
";o nqtion (;ould claim rights without acknowledging the duties 
that ~o ~ith the rights. It would be a contemptible thing for a 
crcat nation to render itself inpotent in international action, 
'':hethcr because of cowardice or sloth, or sheer ina bi li ty or un-
willingness to look intb the future~ 167 This look into the future 
included a belief that civilized peoples have definite obligations 
168 tmrnrd the backward tribes or races of the earth. Concern h'o.s 
rr"isr:-d over South American nations who "will be happy ••• if 
-···---------·------~ 
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onlY they will be e;ood. 11 169 There will be no peace until the d.v-
ilized nations had expanded in some shape over the barbarous nat-
ions .170 Accepting as he did the equality of nations, Roosevelt 
emphasized the bel:l.ef that membership in the family of nations 
carried with it duties as ·well as rights,. and that nations can en-
joy real liberty only if the exercise~of their rights takes the. 
consider2.tion of the rig,.1-its into account. Thus, the rights. of 
sovereignty which a state enjoys cannot be separated from the dut·· 
ies touching the rights of life and property of citizens of for-
eisn states within their borders.171 Failure to perform these 
duties could result in interventio~ for a number of reasons. 172 
169 
I. Policy 
A. The right of self-preservation. 
B. To uphold the balance of po1·rer. 
c. To protect neutralized states. 
D. To protect neutralized canals or other works of man 
affecting the world in general. 
II. Legality 
A. In pursuance of treaty agreements. 
B. 1.·lhen acts are committed against the principle 
of international law. 
C. To prevent or abo,lish another intervention. 
III. - Non-political 
A. Protection of citizens. 
Pringle, p. 294. 
170 
Beale, p. 32. 
171 
Jones, pp. 463-464. 
172 
Hodges, pp. 23-80 passim. 
r 
54 
B. Denial of Justice 
c. Protection of Missionaries 
• 
IV. Conditional 
A. Collection of contract debts 
B. Protection of humanity 
C. Intercession for persecuted Jews, etc. 
D. Right of 2.sylum 
A:nericans had previously maintained that they had no respon~ 
sibility for the conduct of Latin American states Europeans. 
juclc;cd them liable to supervise. 1 73 By refusing to acknowledt;e 
its cluty to establish law and decency in South America, the Unite 
ste.tes 1-ras according to some critics responsible for the anarchy 
e.nd bloodshed that plagued the area•.174 'l'his ~·;as in part due to 
,the Horkinss of the :Monroe Doctrine which prohibited Europeans 
from extracting Latin American dictators from power.175 Bence 
nany critics assailed the :t.t,:on.roe Doctrine because 11 it was never 
loc:,ically defensible, for the right to protect any Power when 
threatened involves a ce:r:•tain responsibility for the acts of that 
Fower, and vla~3hington persistently refuses to acknowledge the.t 
responsibility. 11 176 Thus, the .United States had to either to 
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fight for or e;i ve up the :.:on:coe Doctr1ne. The belief that no 
European should be allo11ed a lod;ynent in the Hemisphere and the 
p:cccipitatod by constant debt default would eventually 
1ea.d to a cor1frontation.177 
The Ea3ue Count decision of Feb. 22, 1904 which sanctioned 
military means to collect defaulted loans was not necessary to 
convince President Roosevelt of the need for intervention by the 
U!litcd States.178 11 If we <ll,.e willing to let Germany or .Ene;land 
act as a policeman of the Caribbean, then we can afford not to 
interfere when gross '\v..C'ongdoing occurs. But if we intend to say 
" 
'Hc::.nds off 1 to the powers of Europe, then sooner or later i·ie rnust 
J:eep order ourselves. 11 179 ·Europeans had always felt tho.t the 
United States could not enjoy the advantages of the r-:orrcoe Doc-
trine if it do not assume the responsibilities entailed. Si1:ce 
the Americans insisted that disorder should be punished only in a 
uay that is satisfactory to tbem, they should be.under an oblie;a-
tlon to pr·event disorder.180 Ei thor the United States had to re-
cosnize the sanctioned right of intervention to collect debts and 
the responsi bill ty entaile<:l for intervention by the United Ste.te s 
822. 
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Roosevelt to Root, June 7, 1904, Mor'ison, IV, pp. 821-
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Brooks, P• 293. 
·'""" ~ ..•.. , .. ~ 
1 ~ 181 itse I• 
:G 
The 1cQPdQD:__]2Q._..th.Er:ss~ remarked that "the United States has 
.,,cc.:urJ.cd ·paternal responsib:UJ.ty for the 1Jhole of the l"lestern Her.ni·-
'""""';:,) ~... ~ -
sphere resenting any outside interference in the affairs of any. 
pe.:ct of the te:critory cover·ed by the f.'Ionroe Doctrine. They must 
accept responslbility for the maintenance of civilization within 
the compass of their claim. 11 182 The 1,ondon Times voiced much the 
sa1~e r::entiment. "It has beon askE;:d Hhether the American people 
are to become the debt collectors for Europe. Certainly not, so 
lone; as they do not interfere with other people who want to colle"' 
" their o'.-i11 debts for thenselves; .but· it for their o;·m ends they 
three.ten a war against a European nation collecting its o·\\·n debts, 
by the only means at command among South-Amerlcan republics, than 
they must play the policeman of the civilized world in a much less 
respectable part. 11 183 
Roosevelt was convlnced that the 1-!onroe Doctrine could not be 
used by southern Republics to shield them from the consequc.::nces 
of their 01·m torts .184 His passion for law and order was of great 
importance ln formulating his policy as regards the Caribbean.185 
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of law dopended upon a competent judge and a respon-
sible offi.ct::r to carry out the judgment, if neccss2.ry, by force. 
-ocr·'et t~1.bly this Has not the case in lnternational affairs. E2..ch 
J:• er ~ 
to depend upon 1 tself for its. orm protection. Thus, 
m1i_tod ;3te:'.tes needed to ac1o'pt ·a. policy the.t ·would enable it 
p:.:·otcct ourEwlvcs against the strong and as l'ec;ards our duty 
a.lwe.ys to act only justly 1)Ut generously toward the weak. 11 1~6 Due 
of an effective or3anization in_ j_nte:cna.tional law, 
judiclal we..y of enforcing a right. When one nation 
1.1ron5ed another or 1·r.con5ed many others, there was no tribunal be-
~ 
fore 1;hich the u.t·ons(1oer could be brou5ht. Either it was neces-
:~1;_pinely to acquiesce in t_he w1•ong, thereby putting a premiu,11 
upon brut:.111 ty and aggression; The other, c.nd more typically 
American, ~ltornative was for the aggrieved nation valiantly to 
stand up for its rights.187 
The 1-~onx·oe Doctrine itself lies outside of international law. 
Since it was the cardinal principle of American policy, the only 
difficulty in maintaining it arose when American power ·was proven 
1·:eak and delinquent in foreign affairs .188 Roosevelt went on to 
state the logical extension of such a position in his annual ses-
Of 1904. 
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187 
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Roosevelt, Autob:tor.i.:raph¥, p. 506. 
Therefore it follows that a self-respecting~ just, and far-
seeing nation shou1.d on the one hand endeavor by every means 
to aid in the develO!)rnent of the v2.:rious moveriients i'rhich ten" 
to provide substitutes for war, which tend to render nations 
in their acti6ns toward one anDther, and indeed toward their 
01m :;;ieoples, more :cesponsi ve to the 5eneral sentir.J.ent of 
l:.u.:'11.ane and civilized mankind; and on the other hand that it 
should keep prop2,red, ·while scrupulously o..voi.dlng wron5doing 
itself to repel any 1·1rong, c::~nd ln exceptione41 caDes to t<?.ke 
~;.ction which in a more c.dvanced sti:lr:;e of :i.nte:cnatlonal re-
lations 1 .. 'ould cor;ie under the head of the exercise of the 
inter·national police.189 
"'.f·he e:ffectl ve power of civilization must be put back of civ-
ilizo.tion in collective purpose to secure reasonable j ..... us vice be;;. 
tuecn nation and nation. 11 190 Thus, even the weakest nations were 
as safe from insult and injury ·at ~~perican hands as the str·ongest .. 
For l:'oth possossed a knoulcd5e that the United States possessed 
ooth the will and the a bill ty to guard its elf from w:C"ong or in-
sult c~t the hands of· anyone .191 In Ol'"der to be a e;reat pow·er, 
Roosevelt was convinced that the United States must act accordin5 
ly. It was, therefore, his duty to take any action that seened 
necessary for the security of the United States, althou&~ su~h 
action could disregard the rig...h.ts of another nation. After some 
time, he felt the United States must insist on honest and decent 
relations between all natlons.192 Thi;3 was especially true in 
urecis of strategic significance, where the major po"Wer would in~ 
189 
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190 
George H. Blakeslee, The Recent Foret,s_n Policy 
Di..tf'~2.tes (New York: The Abington Press, 1925), p. 
191 -
Roosevelt, Aut9b1ography, P• 538. 
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force, assume real n.(lministrative functions, and irnpcoe 
order from above according to its own rather thc:m to indigenous 
+ ·•i'' 193 cri vCl . '··· • 
In tlie Caribbean the United States was the major power. Tl:'.e 
of e.n :1 nternntional police pol-ier was never to be considered 
1n co...se:s of prosperous and stable nations, ree;QrdJ.ess of their 
size or strength. 194 "This Ng_tion's foreign policy is based· on 
theoPy that ri2)1t m.ust be done betlreen nat:tons precisely as 
betv;een individual. We have behaved and are behavlng, to\mrds 
nations as in private life an honorable man would behave t9-
his fcllm·:s. 11195 
~ 
Due to the lac;k of sufficient internation-
aJ_ controls to che cl>;: 1Jro11...g-doing, Roosevelt felt 11 it would be bot' 
e.nd an evil thing for ~ great and free nation to depPi Ve 
the pouer to protect its own rights. 11 196 This was not 
, the sole consideration in resard to the action he espoused "in 
asserting the Monroe Doctrj_ne, in te.king such steps as we have 
in regard to Cuba, Venezuela, and Panama • • • we have o.ct-
our own interest as well as in the interest of hU:.'";lani ty at 
193 
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194 
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James D. Riche.rdson, A Compilation of th?_)ie§_S.0.£.e_s. __ ara 
~'lners of the Presidents (New York: Bureau of Natione.l Literature, 
Inc., 1910), pp. 7230-7231. 
196 
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11197 II ie.rse. Intertuincd with this concept ,,,as the feeling that we 
' of the 5reat republic of the, no:cth, should make all our sister 
na.tio:'1s of the A"TiericD.n Contlnent feel that >1hcnev«~r they will 
per;1it it He desire to show ourselves disintere8todly and effect-
1 . _,_,,, ~~r ·"'rieY"\d 11 198 i VG. J v~.C.l. J. •. u • 
The c:ctual Roosevelt Corollary was a for:u.ula ar:ci ved at over 
of years. It was the effort of both Roosevelt and· Root., 
a question remains as to ~rho its prime e..uthor was. The 
first inkling of such a policy is found in the a:nnual message of 
1902. 
~ . 
It is 00.r-nestly to be hoped that all of these countries ·will 
do o.s :Jo::r1e o:f them have alr.:;ady a.one, will signal success, 
o.nd will invite to their shores co1ur2erce and improve their 
:::::.:",terial conditions by recognizing that stability and order 
o.re the prerequisites of successful development. No inde-
pendent no.tion in .Airrorica need have the sligll.test fear of 
aggression from the United States. It behooves each one to 
:112.intain order within its m·m border and to discharge its 
ju:Jt obligations to foreigners. 1'frlen this is done, they can 
rest assured that, be they strong or weak, they will have 
nothing to dread from outside interference. More e.nd more 
the increasing interdependence and complexity of intornation 
al political economic relations render it incumbent on all 
civilized and.orderly powers to insist on the proper policin, 
of the i·rorld.199 . · 
In a speech given to a Cuban group in New York in 1904, he 
stated 
If a nation shows that it lmows how to act with decency in 
19T 
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industrial and political matters, if it keeps order and pays 
its oblie;ations, then it n0ed fear no interference from the 
United States. All vle <J.sk is that they shall govern them-
selves \·:ell and be prosper·ous and orderly. \'lhen this is the 
cn~rn they will find only helpfulness from us.200 
In a letter to Root on May 20, 1904 Roosevelt states almost 
what is 1~.'!ter to be enunciated in his annual messe:,ge late_ 
yeD..r • 
.All that we dcsir·e to see all neighboring countries stable, 
o:cde:;:•ly and pr·osperous. Any country ·whose people conduct 
thu1;t::el vcs well cc:.n count upon our hearty friendliness. I:f 
a nu.tion sho·l'ls that it knows how to act with decency in in-
dustrial and political matters, if it keeps order nnd psys 
its oblie;atlons, then it need fear no interference fl'.'om the 
Uni tcd States. Brutal wrongdoing or an impotence which re·-
sults in a ceneral loosening o~ the ties of civilized soci-
et,y, may fi:ri_ally requ:tre intervention by son.o civilized na-
tion, and in the ·western Hemisphere the Uni tcd States c:ou1.not 
ic;nore this duty; but it remains true that our interests, 
and those. of oul" southern' neighbors, are in reality ident-
ical. All that 1·1e ask_· is that ·they shall govern themselves 
well, and be prosperous and or-derly. \·rne:ce this is the case 
they will find only helpfulness f1--om us.201 
Roosevelt 1 s now famous Corollary to the Monroe Doct1.,ine is 
fom:d in his nnnual ncssac;e of 1904. A quick glance at the L:os.-
sa5e of 1902, the speech to the Cubans, and the letter to Root 
show a continuity of thought on this matter which has previously 
escaped a great deal of 8.ttention. 
All that this country desires is to see the neighboring 
countrien stable, orderly, and prosperous. Any country whos 
people conduct themselves \vell can count upon our hearty 
friendship. If a nation shows that it lmows how to act with 
200 
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201 
Roosevelt to Root, May 20, 1904, Mor•ison, IV, p. 801. 
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rcasona.ble efficiency and decency in social and poll tical 
matters, if it keops ardor and pays its obligations, it need 
fear no interference fr•om the United States. Chronic wrong-
doinz,, or rm jmpotence i;fhl(;.h rt::Tults i.n a general loost:m:tn5 
of the ties of civilized s0ciety, may in America, or else-
where, ultimately require ~-ntervention by sone civilized na-
tion, <3.nd in the \'!estern Hemisphere the adherence of the 
Un:tted :3ta tes to the I•1onroe Doctrine nay force the United 
:-3t::o.tcs, ho'\·1ev .. n· reluctantly, in f12,gr·2.nt ct:1scs of such irC'ons-
aoing 52r inpotcnce, to the exercise of an lnternc.tional poll 
p01·:er. c02 . 
13oth Roosevelt o.nd Root 1·1ere later to state the America's 
to the rfonroe Doct:cinc required the formulation of :~uch 
At Chautauqua, Roosevelt noted, 11 inasmuch as by V1is 
doctrine we prevent other nations from j_nte:r•fering on this side of 
1·r.::.ter, 1;1e sl1all ou:L·selves in good _faith try to help t:ho•Je of 
sister republics which need such help upward tov:ard peace and 
11"03 or•clcr. c: Root held the position that if wron3s by a Latin-
Ane:cict:'.n sta.te 1·10Pe unredressed, "we ourselves will see that it is 
redressed • • • • ·h1hat ·we -..·rill not permit the great powers of 
Europe to do, we will not permit any ft..merican republic to make it 
necossL:i.ry for the great Power of Europe to do. 11 204 A cont1·oversy 
has arisen over the actual authorship of the Corollary with \·Jil-
fred Callcott holding Roosovelt resporrsible-- 11 Roosevelt practicGJ.... ~ 
202 
Foreign Relat:tons, 1904, p. XLI ~ 
203 
Po..rker Thomas !-fonn, 11 : 1 Self Defense• and 'Unselfish Ser-
vice' in the Caribbean," in 'fhe United States and the C;iribbean 
by Chester Lloyd Jones, Henry Kittredge Norton, and Parker Thomas 
Moon (Chica30, The University of Chicago Press, 1929), p. 162. 
204 
Van Alstyne, p. 168 • 
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i f rem the State Department"205---and Dana Munro hinting, at least, oj 
1 
I th::1t Root played an important role in its development. "Root, 
11 ,,::~o c1J_re:cted Latin American -policy in Roosevelt's second admin-istration had helped to formulate the President's Corollary to 
i,>c :-:o:c-u'oe Doctr·ine and believed ln its validlty. 11206 Dexter 
Pcrklns, the dean of Monroe Doctrine scholars, re121ains uncommittc:d. 
::~s to its source. "It is not possible to state with certainty 
where the Roosevelt Corollar·y with re3ard to the lv~onroe Doctrin(~ 
actually originated. But there· are clear sig._rJ.s that an assistant 
:_:ccr•ctary of state had something to do with it. 11207 For my 01·m. 
I r;:'1't, I am inc1iEod to think that. Roosevelt is prh:s:cily 1"1c;Sl)On'--~3~ble. The continuity of thought and language in the four ex'1:n-l plcs cited are difficult to overlook. Root most certainly played 
2. role in its formuL3.tion '.rhile the influence of an assistant 
secretary of state remains to be demonstrated. 
Assuming that intervention was legiti::ne.te and necessary, 
?..oosevelt felt morally bound to use .America police power since 
European force was forbidden by the Monroe Doctrine.208 The doc-
tri.ne of police power was but another derivative of the concept 01 
205 
Calcott, P• 201. 
206 
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Hunro, Intttverition, p~ 532. 
207 
Dexter Perkins, The_Ame_rican Approach to For>eign Poli_g_y 
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 196~p. 181. 
208 
Albert K. \'leinberg, Manifest Destiny, Quadrangle Paper-
backs (Chicago: Quadrangle, 1963), p. 431. 
1 ... '"if e ~t :~ s tiny~ ...... ~·m·~:. :~~~··:~~c::e,::~~o~ld-~~-:a~~~::~~d-·~~i; 
11 ts :3pc:cial p:i."erog2.ti ves derived from specicd duties involved in 
lt::e p0cul1~r mission of a nation with preeminent capacities. 209 
A ctu:o..lly, ~ceri can intervention was not limited to legal self-
p:cotc cti vo r,1casures. Since it was fo:cr..nJ.1<:•.ted as "police power" 
it offered nny remedy short of complete takeover and less of in-
dependence. The use of broad moral criteria sanctioned inter-
~ ic:n.ticn not only in cases which had a le13al justificci.tion but 
A,lso in any case that the United States disapproved of. Vlhat ho.d 
teen co.lled "international police power" 1-ms in reality the use o 
·,r:cI'iCc'.n force solely in the V7este~rn Hmnisphere. 210 The use of 
}:,id. s pouer was prompted by the dofaul ting of debts and arbi tral 
a~~rds on the pa~t of the lesser states to the south. Force be-
c;'Te a major int_s:cedient in the relations between them and the 
Colossus of the :t-:orth. 211 The I-lonroe Doctrine ( orie;inally in-
tended to prevent European intervention :tn Latin America states) 
1ms adapted by the United States into a corollary that justified 
and even sanctioned American interference in the control.of the 
aff<:drs of the Latin-American republics. 212 
As it stood at its enunciation the Corollary was successful, 
209 
Jbid., p. 415. 
210 
Ibid., p. 428. 
211 
Jessup, p. 493. 
212 
Dexter Perkins, A History of 
Little, Bro\·m & Co., 1955), p. 230. 
the 1-'fonroe Doctrine (Boston: 
cnsendered no new hostility, and was more or less accepted at 
ho:::e and a broe.d. 213 11 The 
Ito accept the exercise of 
United States \ms bound sooner or latE!r 
police power as a Corollary of the Xon-
roe Doctrine. ri 211+ It was natural for the United States to initi-
t
. ~te such m policy. Thi• resulted in part from the actions of 
I 
nur:erous i:c:eec;pon;:>i ble mj_li tary dictators who had used the United. 
1
.stmt:: to exempt them from action European powers wished to exeh 
, on t,icon:i to make them co:nply with their obli3ations. 215 ?1--ior to 
that time, the United States had been in the unenviable position 
. of c~1oosin3 betueen repeated interventions on the part of Euro-. I i~er'.n po-;-:ers in vtolation of the M:o~oe Doctrine and assuming re-
.:;ponslbility for the actions of the Latin Anerican states, whicJ'l 
th.ey we1·e un\·1tllin5 to do. 216 In effect, the new policy was an 
'· :':...::::-:noillcclsement of the Au~.;ric:.:,,n responsibility to European 5overn-· 
n:cnts for the conduct of certain Caribbean states in respect to 
European nationals.217 
Prior to Roosovel t' s administration the ?fonroe Doctrine \'ms 
regarC.ed by the Latin-American states as solely a protective pol-
213 
Perkins,. ~ionroe Doctrine. 1867-l-2.Q1, p. 455. 
214 
Horton, P• 91. 
215 
Ibid., p. 89. 
216 
Perkins, lfonroe Doctrine 1867-1907, p. 363. 217 ------------
Rippy, Caribbean Dane:er Zone, p. 36. 
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1 C6 
I ~ I c.-n:·onco..n intm:·fcrcnce with the do"ncstic policies of these states ~i, 
1;0 r~sulate the conduct of states in regard to Europeans and them-
1 selves, was the price responsibility of its Corollary. The Car-
i ')bc8.n countries 'ilere warned to act decently in their foreign 
. r~l~tionships, pay their debts, and maintain order. Their ovm 
1
1 "'"'urity ilnd independence hung in the balance as weil as, and ~,ore 
iD:)ortantly for Washington, the security of the United States. 219 
The Corollar·y prompted many criticisms Loth ccntew.porary 
e,:,1d scholarly. 11 ?4!'. Rooscvel t in laboring under the delusion 
t:12.t this country has a di vine mission to keep order abroad, whlle 
it can not keep order at home; that i~ is obligated to compel for-· 
e,i;_:;n states to pay their debts, altho it can not compel the do~-
ostic States to pay theirs. The Roosevelt doctrine is the Uonroe 
Doctrine turned inside out and E\tood on its head." 220 The Cor-
ollary wo.s prompted by fear, just:i.fied or not, of possible Euro-
pean takeover due to chronic disorder in the Caribbean. Such a 
takeover raised the specter of permanent European occupation of 
some strategic spot in the Caribbean.221 Revolutions and bad 
financial p1"'actices were to be abolished and general economic nnd 
nocial were to be inproved, so as to eliminate the causes of in-
17, 
218 
Latane, The U.S. and Latin America, p. 326. 
219 
Rippy, Caribbean Danr:er Zone, p. 451. 
220 
"How the Message. Is Regarded, 11 Literary Digest, XXIX (I:ec 
1904), p. 830. 
221 
Perkins, The_ United States and the Ca:ribben.n, p. 134. 
stability in ~ose statcs.222 Although it was not probably that 
;c):ropcan 2:C "-._-:_:r·nments irould deliberately set out to conquer a 
cnrib1:can state such instability could offer the pretext for an 
intervention which could jeopardize a country's lndependence.223 
Sose scholars, however, hold that Roosevelt and Hay did not 
". h t' 1yc;_!.r10.l s .c.e ~onroe Doctrine, the Americans did. In their opinio9 
nothing else was necessary. 224 EJJhu Root in an article :tn'Inqg_::: 
r1:;_IlQ.?Pt reco5nlz0d the.t "the Cox·o11ary is clear. If we will not 
allow transatlantic nations to become masters of recalcitrant 
A ;;,eri C['.n :riJ1tions we must see to it that their obliga tlons are 
. i>:d.<1; '.-:e r:ust collect the debts ourseJ~ves; whore for•ce is ncces-
foai.'Y we 11mst use it; we must control, if control is necessary; we 
~'Uc}t he the polj_conian, we uust wield the 'big stick'; t1:ere is no 
. other elternative. 11225 Thus, the Roosev~lt Corollary altered the 
Ifon:roe Doctrine from a policy denying the right of European inter 
vention in the Americans to one sanctioning the process when con-
r.ucted by the United States.226 Europeans-"'.'"far from being ad-
verse to the new interpretation were actually quite disposed to 
it. 11 The Corollary to the Monroe Doctrine which Mr. Roosevelt 
---·------·--·--·--------------~-----
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C8 
just devised, must if adopted as a standing 
rule of Arr;erican po1icy' enormously lighten Europe Is difficul-
I\i:copenns cci1:3idered the policy to reflect a chan5e of 
:ie:irt in the United States, for she became the policeman rather 
thGn the 2~cttor of the so-called criminal activity of the South i. ~·c-n ctot~n 228 jl_ :'!lf'3 .l ..1- ct >...."J L..._ •' t.,:,..:;. e 
Reaction to the new policy~ however, was not completely in 
.r.ccorcl with Hoosov2lt 1 s lJOsition. 11 It is not the duty of the·u-
ni t2d States to police Latin AL1e1•ica, and the sooner we get that 
idea spread broadcast not only in South America, but also in North 
,1~;:12rica, the better it be for our i:iternat:lonal repute. 11229 Many 
l•t home and mbroad felt that the new interpretation rather than I being a pl'otcction .'.lf:;ainst "the burden of militarism" invited it. 
1An effective Doctrine depended on the American preparation for a 
lpossl.ble confrontation with one or more of the strongest powers of 
:Europe. 230 The London Outl_gok questioned the new policy and 1 ts 
1
1
,extent. 11 If the Americans ~nswer, as we suspect they will, that 
lthe :.Conroe Doctrine includes the whole of both the Americans and their adjacent islands, and that if they deny that it carries with 
·-- -----·------- ---------.---
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(9 
it any responsibilities, we can only hope, by way of reply, that 
theY uncerstar:rl what th~y are about. 11231 The .Eta~_fu.:r.-_t5?_r ZeituQD 
noted that the Corollary marked a significant depa:cture from pre-
vious Araerican policy. "Roosevelt says: We require forei3ners to 
rcn-;1ect the :r.~onroe Doctr:tne throu£5.hout the whole of .America. 
Therefore, it is only just that He, aid the fore:tgner in obtaining 
his rights when those rights are disregarded in k::er:tca. This 
mc<.ns that just now the 1~onroe Doctrine is not conccJ.-lcd in this 
1- it 11232 sp .C • 
Eoosevelt went to great length to demonstrate to the Latin 
~ 
A:no~ic:c_:.ns that they had nothlng to fear from the United States. 
"·It is not true that the United States feels any land hunger or 
entertained any p:rojects as re3ards the other nation of the ~'lest-
ern :Iernisphere save such as one for their welfare. 11 233 "The 
... 
United States have enough to care for without appropriating trop-
ical territory. 11 234 In his annual message for the next year, 
Roosevelt again disclaimed any sinister designs on Latin American 
territory. 11 In the first place we must as a nation make it evi-
dont that we do not intend to treat it an any shape or way as an' 
-·-----------··---
231 
"Can the United States Save South America From Europe," Lit£ra_cr_J2.~st, XXX (April 29, 1905), p. 636. . 
232 
"President Roosevelt, Santo Domingo, and the Senate, 11 Lit 
era:r.-_y__pigest, XXX (April 8, 1905), P• 515. 
233 . 
Foreign Relations,· 1904, P• XLI. · 
234 
"President Roosevelt's Table Talk," Review of Reviews, 
xxrx (1904), p. 364. 
for acgrandizcrnent on our part at the expense of the r,~pub-e:{cuse o _ ~ 
lies to the south. 11 235 In no uncertr-dn terms, Roosevelt stated 
''It r::w;t be u..ndcx·stood.that under no eireUJ'J.~1t2..nces will the Unite 
sto.tes use the r~~o:n.roe Doctrine as a cloak for terri torfal aggres-
'Y'6 
1 ,........ II '--:J SJ..C1.L.• 
Althou5h America's relations w'ith Latin America have been 
charactcr:lzcd by a high degree of altruism, the Latin Americans 
h::tvc a 1:11.J.ch o-1._ffercnt view. In spite of the fact that United 
states atte1ipted to be just and upri13li.t and for the benefit of 
her neie;hbors to the South, its actions have been suspect. This 
1-F:J.S due to a failure to ta.ke into account the view point of the 
·Latln Americans. No consideration was given to whether our ac-
tions plcc: .. sed him or whether our suggestions were formulated in 
o.ccordonce w:i.th his views.237 ·our no-transfer principle and the 
Cor·o1lary itself seemed to cause increased disquiet in the South-
e:cn continent.238 This was in part due to the advantages to alie 
investors rendered greater by the application of the Corollary to 
defaulting debts. The people and their leaders prefered that for 
ei<:>ners be left to shift for themselves.239 They further resente 
---------
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):bid., p. xxxrv. 
237 Sherrill, Modernizing the Monroe Doctrine, pp. 53-54. · 
238 C.H. Haring, 11 South .America and our Policy in the Carib-
bean, 11 Annals, CXXXII (1927), P• 147. 
239 
Rippy, Caribbean Dana:.er Zone, p. 227. 
71 
o. t te;.1pts to IJana3e their n.ffairs in possible cases of failure o'c 
violc.tine; the sovereignty of independent sto..tes and the senerally 
<.cccpted principle of nonintervention. 21+0 This rc~j(-:::nt::1ent and 
suspicion was in part due to the Monroe Doetl"1ne itself. It had 
-if 
,; been so ei,fecti ve at el~i.Dlnat:ln3 E~1JroJ;c:an intel."V8ntion that Latln 
A~ericans no longer feared the military and expansionist powers o 
Europe. Tb.e United States was the natural heir of a:ny suspicion 
wh1ch remained in the Southern.continent. 24-1 Many of the leaders 
of these states interpreted the 1·:on:c·oe Doctrine implication of 
"A-.::1e1'ica_ r'or ftj_nerico..ns" as denonstratin3 the United States in-
.. 211.2 
tcntlon to t~ke possession of thoir t~rritory. -
240 
Blakeslee, PP• 109-110. 
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242 
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PA~T II 
THE SANTO DOMINGAN RECEIVERSHIP: BIG BRO'l'H;..:R? 
The first practical application of Roosevelt's policies was 
• 
assumption of the Santo Domingo Receivership in 1905, Through 
its history the Caribbean i~land republic had deuonstrated 
that "chronic wrongdoing and impotence" that were apt to initiate 
the 1.Jse of "police power to protect civilization and its princi-· 
ples." 'rhe years of Santo Domingan •rule had pointed up its great 
difficulty in establishing an effective democracy without resort 
i .. to dictatorship, Whe:n the occasion arose for the overthrow of 
these dictators bloody revolutions frequently broke out, 
From the earliest moment of its independence the island was 
racked by internal disorder and conflict, President Baez in 1869 
attempted to have the United States in tm person of President 
Grant annex the Republic to the United States. Such action was 
defeated by the United States Senate and the Republic was left to 
fend for itself. The period from 1874 to 1882 was another era of 
interparty conflict: 1882 marked the beginning of the rule of 
Ulises Heureaux who ruled the island with an iron hand until 1899 
when he fell to a revolutionary's hand, This rule was marked by 
an ever increasing system of financial irresponsibility. It was 
during his reign that the San Domingo Improvement Company began 
_______________ fu.1oe2-+------------·~"'- __ g ___ .. 
·• -~--·-·~-·~-.,,~.,··"'·~ •. , _______ -~ ··"·" ····- ····-"••····--. -~.-,.~ .... , ... ,. ..... ~~--.,--~---~-~-~·-----··-~-"-"~~-- ". -=,~--· -- ···@1 
. r:~s ever increasing influence on the affairs of the island in . I 
1895. 1 By 1899 the intensified financial difficulties and growing 
Af'.lerican interest due to the Improvement Co. proBpted Heureaux to 
pr·oro:::;e a secret treaty with the United States. The substance of 
its intent was the assurnpt1on of an American contractual protec-' 
torate over the Dominican Republic, 2 
The ascension of the Jemenez govern.~ent following a brief p~riod 
of political reanuvering did not ease the desperate financial con-
dition of the country. In the face of possible French interven-
tion for defaulted loans Hay sent the following message to Powell 
' rec:;,;Tding American claims, especia:t'ly the Improvc::raent Co.' s as of 
Fehruary 15, 1900. 
~~ing to the difficult situation which confronts the 
Dominican Government it is not to be pressed for 
immediate payment of American claims, although the 
American Gover:nment is necessarily insistent t~t all 
rights of American citizens be fully protected, 
The Improvement Company itself was the subject of much of the 
bla.rne and disgust of the people. Rumors were circulated that it 
was responsible for undermining the credit of the government by 
mqking unfavorable appraisals of the Jimenez administration, The 
entire controversey was laid at its feet because the agreement 
-·-·-·-------------------..--------------------1 
1 
Sumner Welles, Nabo~h's Vineyards The Dominican Republic 
18h4-_1924 (N'ew York: Payson and Clark, Ltd., 1928), p. 508. 
2 
Ibid,, p. 533. 
3 
Ibid., p. 558. 
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I entered into by Heurc:,_nx provided for company pnyment of 
4 
cJ:lounted to the French claims. · The Company had now become so en-
trenc.hed that it was next to :tmpossible to re:rnove it, especially 
since the government was unable to repay the company's original 
investment,5 As a result, a new contract was negotiated providing i for the relief of the GovermJ.ent' s financial needs, its settlement 
of the nation's public indebtedness, and ellrnimation of defaulted 
.loan interest. To this end, the contrast of Xarch 20, 1900 pro-
vided that customs revenues up ·to $2, 000, 000 except the export 
duties set-aside for conversion of the paper money issued by the 
.., 6 
Ya.tional Bank be used for such liquidation, Such an agreement 
later proved unsuccessffil and on January 10, 1901 the Improvement 
Co;'"lpany was at once excluded from further participation in the ' 
collection of the public revenues,? 
. 
The ouster of Jimenez and the assu~ption by General Vasquez 
in Xay, 1902 marked any shift in the dealings with the Improvement 
CoYDpany. The company's claims were recognized to the amount of 
.$4,500,000, $2,000,000 of which resulted from the values of the· 
national bonds held by the Company. $1,500,000 in claims resulted 
from its interest in the railroad from Puerto Plata to Santiago 
4 
J_bid., p. 560. 
5 
Ibid, 
6 
.IJ21.d. 
7 
Ibid !.l-P ·- .i~)_:,_,~~-~,,~-=~-;·-· ----------~-----.1 
nnd :;n, 000, 000 from the shares of the bankrupt National Bank and 
other cl3ims and accounts of the Company. This brief survey 
s•"Tves to demonstrate both the incompetence of the Santo Domingan 
£Sl)V8L'n~ncnt and the complexity of its financial problems. 8 
The outlii~e of Do;11Lngan financi es given above serves to i 1-
iust:cate a commonplace occurence in that country and many of its 
La.tin American :neighbors. The history of public debts in this 
a~ea shows a surprisingly long list of failures of these govern-
, 1:~nts to meet their financial pledge. ~hese failures were demon-
strated in many fashions ranging from payment of obligations in 
debJ.scd or flat money to open repud'iati on of loans contracted wit' 
citj_zens and foreigne:rs.9 Amdreades in Las controles finencitious 
lnte£~~~~i_on_~]:_~ deinonstrates that these young states have practi-
ced nearly all the fOl!llS of bankruptcy in the history of finan- . 
10 
ces. 
'rhe governrn.ent of President Woss y Gil ·who succeeded Vasquez 
rnn into further financial difficulty. The customs revenues whic 
were the major source of national wealth were constantly dimin)She:i 
8 
Ibid., p. 586. For a more complete treatment of the history 
of Santo Domingo see Summer Welles' Naboth's Vin~_lard. 
9 
Chester Lloyd Jones, Caribbean Backgrounds and Prospects 
0\ew York 1 D. Appleton & Co., 1931), pp". 237-2'.fB .-
10 
M. de J. Tromcoso de la Coucha, La Genesis de la Convencion 
Dominico-Arr,eJ±gn (Santiago1 Editorial El Diario, 1946), p. 59. 
(hereinafter referred to as Tromcoso, p.) 
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~·~xcriptions granted to merchants loaned money to the Government 
v:ere the prime cause of this loss of income, Furthermore, the 
export tax or CffaO had been mortgaged to the Italian Government, 
specific revenues alloted foreign creditors as security had fre~ 
quently been repledged to others, The defaulted interest of the 
Belgian and French bondholders ~lone amounted to more than $600, 
ooo. The Santo Domingo Improvement Company's claim had alr~ady 
been recognized as $4,500,000, in addition other /unerican cl;::i.ims 
totnlled $1,000,000, The debt was growing daily and the Govern-
mcnt had no credit with which to stem the tide, As if to add more 
fuel to an already brightly burning•blaze, the revolution of Jime-
nez from Oct, 24 to Nov. 24, 190J increased the debt by 
$700,000. 11 
The continuing unsettled political state resulted in the as-
cension of Carlos F, Morales to :power with American assistance, 
' 
According to Captain Dillingham, "the placing of .Morales in San 
was my doing. 1112 Morales while admiring American in-
stitutions and desiring its political friendship was strongly op-
to any policy that would render his land a political depen-
of the United States, either in the form of annexation or a 
protectorate, He was firmly convinced of the ability of the Dom-
to administer their own affairs, if his gover11ment were 
-----------------------·---·------
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Welles, pp, 604-606. 
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,J. Fred Rippy, "Initiation of the Customs Receivership in 
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?? 
·given time to institute the ne~essary reforms and to straighten 
the complicated financial situation it was in.
1 3 
xorales, however, was in difficulty due to an qccident of 
was a mulatto. His great fear was that the United States 
deal with him but confer its affection on a 1·1hi te nan. 
Although he previously felt that the mulattoes were the best of 
people, because they possessed the best qualities of both white 
·.and black and would attempt to prove it so in his govern~ent. 14 
feeling, however, was not shared at home or throughout the 
One visitor to Santo Domingo noted that the antipathy of 
for white "is res·ponsi ble for J/4 of the offenses against 
~11.L::ci cans and Europeans, ignorance of the duty of a government 
professedly civilized being the remainder. 1115 
The large public debt was partly funded, partly floating, of 
a nominal value in excess of its real value, bearing a high rate 
of interest, in default both as' to interest payments and arnortiza-
tion provisions. The origin and growth of the debt was due large-
ly to: 
A. Periodic accumulations of floating debt owing toz 
1. Political instability, requiring large outlays 
13 
Sigmund Krausz t "The Si tua ti on in Santo Domingo," _9utlook, 
78 (Sept. 17, 1904), p. 192. 
14 
Troncoso, p. 26. 
15 
William Throp, "Santo Domingo, the 'Isle of Unrest'," Inde-
£enient, LVI (~arch 3, 1904), p. 468. 
for soldiery, for bribery of potential revolu~ 
tionists, and for the suppression of actual rE·:'-
volutions. 
2. Corruption of officials. 
3. "Asignaci ones" or pens ions to mollify enemies 
and to reward friends of the existing regime. 
B. Usurious interest c~mputations, on account of: 
1. "Bonus" in principal. 
2. Extravagant interest rates. 
c. Interest default and compounding accumulations. 
D. Recognition and liquidation of excessive or6illegal claims as a condition of further advances. 
T:1e actuc'1.l debts fell into five categories and total $40,269,404J8. 
/ 
Date 
1869 
1888 
1890 
1893 
1893 
1894 
1895 
1897 
16 
Bonded debt 
Liquidated debt 
Floa.t:l.ng debt 
Declared claims 
Undeclared claims 
Total indebtedn2ss 
/unount Interest 
757,700 6 
770,000 6 
900,000 6 
2,035,000 4 
1,250,000 4 
1,250,000 4 
1,750,000 4 
2,736,750 2 3/4 
1,500,000 4 
$17,670,312.25 
9,595,530.40 
1,553,507.79 
7,450,053.89 
__ 1!, 000 r 000. 00 
$40,269,404.J'B" 
Bonded Debt 
% Term Years Name 
25 Hartmont loan 
30 Westendorp loan 
56 Railway loan 
66 4% consolidated gold 
bonds 
66 4% gold debentures 
66 French-American 
66 Reclaimation consels 
102 Obligations 
83 Dominican unified 
debt 
---
Otto Schoenrick, Santo Domin~o: A Country With a Future, 
(New Yorks The MacMillan Co., 1918 , p. 352. 
Liquidated Debt 
san Domingo Improvenent Co. 
consolidated internal debt 
Internal d2bt held by the Vicini heirs 
old Foreign debts 
Sola claim 
Vicini heirs 
Italian protocal 
sp3 nish-German protocal 
B. P.ancalari 
J. B. Vicini Burgos 
Ros claim 
THO cacao contracts 
B::i_ncalari Lrunple & Co. 
28 minor contracts 
Floating Debt 
Registered doferred debt 
Registered floating debt 
Privileged revoluationary debt 
·certificates of co~ptroller's office 
Certificates of treasury offices 
Open unsecured accounts 
Declared Claims 
Internal revolutionary claims 
American 
Spanish 
French 
Italian 
German 
British 
Cuban 
Font c1aim 
II 
II 
II 
II 
" 
II 
II 
Heureaux estate claim 
National bank notes 
Luberes contract 
West India Public Works 
Vincini heirs claim 
American claims 
British claims 
Ita1ian claims 
II 
II 
" 
II 
II 
" 
II 
Co. claim 
Undeclared Claims 
$4,403,532,71 
1,737,151.35 
l,598,876,04-
J65,183,20 
356' 314. 20 
242,716.32 
186,750.36 
100,0J4.0J 
175,000.00 
55,500.00 
39,967.78 
68,296.16 
16,733.19 
. - __ ?:..~_2_, l+ 7-5..!4,=2 
$9, 595, SJ0.<+0 · 
$ 587,710.24 
140. 8 50. 27 
79,812.12 
633,124.60 
Jl,771.07 
<l'-______ 8 0 ,.?_3 9. 49 
.;;il,553,507._79 
$ 8 8 5 • 2 58 • l 0 
71,000.00 
40,000,00 
190,000.00 
40,000.00 
10,000.00 
5,000.00 
35,000.00 
186,643.00 
3,100,000.00 
1,574,647.00 
250,000.00 
250,000.06 
8~0_5.00 $?,1rso, 053-:139 
$1,000.000.00 
50,000.00 
200,000.00 
I sp:;tni sh and Gt::c1~an clEl ims 
other foreign c.airns 
oorninican claims 
........ •' ..... ,..,,. '""'""" .·~··-. ";ib 
I / 
200, ooo.Vo 
50, 000. 00. 
. 2..L~_Q_o,000.00 17 $'4,000.000.00 
The debts just listed were the results primarily of 1) the 
accumula.t:ton of current obligations in consequence of re-
volutionary disturbances and civil disorder; 2) the extravagant 
terms upon which such temporary.loans have origlnally been obtai 
and have s1J.bsequently funded; 3) the chronic default in the ser-
vice of the debt funded and flo~ting, and the consequent rapid in-
18 principal. The problem of the debt was compounded by 
' Domln~an instability and possible f9reign intervention to enforce 
· their claims. The fact that Wass Y Gil sought G.nd :cecei ved refuge 
German warship demonstrat~d her desire to neutralize the wa-
and some of the parts of Santo Domingo in the event of war. 
action proved provocative to the United States for it viola~ 
ted the Monroe Doctrine. 19 
America had established a basis for its intervention in Santo 
Domingo by the Roosevelt Corollary. America's desire to safeguard 
its security and realize its wishes had been demonstrated in the 
Parhma incident. The Krenz Zei t~mei ominously pointed out that "the 
-----·-----
17 
18 
19 
Ibid., pp. 353-365, Eassim. 
Jacob H. Hollander, "The Financial Difficulties of San Do-
Annals, XXX (1907), P• 93. 
"Peril to the Monroe Doctrine in Santo Domingo," Literary 
21.cl!'~st, xxvrrr (January 2, 1904), p. 24. 
L._,_~----~------~ 
l 
!subject of the Powers~ especially of Germany, have claims to make 
L:;,,od in Santo Domingo. 1120 The Journ21 f:.<?~ Debats also reflectec 
the gro~ing European bellicosity regarding their claims in Santo 
I Domingo." Even in Washington they are noting that European Po;.,rers ore not disposed, out of consideration for the Pan-American hegc-
Lr;ony to which the United States pretends, to allow their interests 
to be compromised by ~n American state. 1121 
This growing European animosity towards Santo Domingo caused 
1 
various reactions in the United;. States. The Philadelphia ~_?rth 
1 American commenting on the murd~r of J. c. Johnson, the engineer 11 ~;:1-·;he -:rusier }";:;;.~~.C:.£• noted, "If those rebels had killed a sub-Ject of some European Power," the incident would be rn~.::.de the "ex-
cuse for assembling of an unwelcome fleet in ':!est Indlan waters," 
1·i' 
·and we in the absence of ability to guarantee retribution, nor 
prevent recurrence of the outrage, could not justly object. 1122 
~2ny felt that the United States was under moral obligations to 
<:i.ssist the Santo Do!ningan people or else abandon the Monroe Doc-
trine and let them seek assistance from any power that was Willing 
20 
Ibid. 
21 
"President Roosevelt's Fear of France," Literary Digest, 
XXVIII (January 16, 1904), p. 89. 
22 
"American Interference in Santo Domingo," Literary 
Digest, XXVIII (February 20, 1904), p. 249. 
l 
1 
Ito n~su~e the responsibility f i i i 1-1,, -2 3 o ass s~. ng ~c1em. Scholars, such 
IDs, John Bassett Moore, were opposed to all attempts to secure 
,, I p;:,y::ient on <iefnul ted 1o:? .. ns. 
'::nen citizens of a country go abroad and engage in business, 
they must be held to assume all the risks of disorder and 
injury in the country to which they go, and can look to the 
local authorities only; no matter how inefficient or malevo-
J1:::nt they may be, for protection; but it suffic~s to say that 
no respectable government acts on such theory.2'-+' 
'~l-wodore Roosevelt as the leader of a self--acclaimed respec-
t;:_:_ bL3 ,sovernoent and the fo::c1,2ula tor of a poll cy -;~hl ch sanctioned 
intervention could not overlook the developments to the South. In 
a letter to his son Kermit he related the events taking place. 
·• 
S:cJ..n Domingo is drifting into chao-s for after a hnnclred years 
of freedom it shows itself utterly inco•npetent for govern-
·~ental work. Most reluctantly I have been obliged to take 
the initial step of interference there. I hope it will he 
a good while before I will have to go further. But sooner 
or later it seems to me inevitable that the United States 
should assume an attitude 'or protection and regulation in 
regard to all these little states in the neighborhood of 
the Caribbean. I hope it will be defe~r5ed as long as possible but I think it is inevitable. 
In a later letter to his friend J. B. Bishop the inevitable 
has happened and Roosevelt is caught on the horns of a dilemma. 
I have been hoping and praying for these months that the 
Santo Domingans would behave so that I would not have to 
act in any way. I want to do nothing but what a police-
~an has to do in Santo Domingo. As for annexing the island, 
23 
Edwin Maxey, "The Future of Santo Domingo," Ar~, XXXI 
(1904), p. 480. 
24 
Munro, 
25 
Bemis, 
Intervention, p. 13. 
p. 155. 
I h8.Ve about the same desire to 2.rmex it as a gorged boa 
constrict or might have to s1:1allow a porcupine wrong-end-
to. Is that strong enough. I have asked some of our 
people to go there because, after having refused for these 
three months to do anything, the attitude of the Santo 
Do'Tlin2;ans has become one of half chaotic war to':rards us. 
If I possibly can I want to do as little as possible. 
Their government has been bedeviling us to establish some 
kind of protector2te over the islands, and take charge of 
their fi~ances •. we have been answering them 2~h~t we could not possibly [:50 into the subject now at all. 
Some of the Santo Domingan officials who were bedeviling 
Roosevelt >·re re aware that they were in great d'.ln2;er. The European 
bondholders, Belgian, French, German, Italian, and Spanish not fo 
mention English, since their interests were in the hands of the 
United States Governr1ent would get~tired of waiting for payment. 
?he t~enty five million dollars due could not be paid by mere 
promises. The threat of a possible c6mbination of these Powers to 
force the Do;ninican Republic to pay which require the United S-.ates 
to enfurce the Monroe Doctrine. If the United States refused to 
terfere to assist the Dominicans or resist a possible European in-
tervention, a violation of the Monroe Doctrine would result which 
could impair the security of the United States. 27 The Dominicans 
felt that "in the proposed treaty with the United States lies the 
only hope for peace and prosperity in Santo Domingo. A rejection 
of the treaty would result in international complications for the 
26 
Bishop, p. 431. 
27 
General Juan Francisco Sanchez, "The Future of Santo Do-
l'lingo," Indep0r:dent, LVI (March J, 1904), p. 477. 
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St .... ..28 "United a \,es• 
. I 
A:neri can observers ·..:ere well aware of these complications,. 
wrote to General Rodriquez, ~n opponent of Morales 
snd 1n~o-German sympathizer, "the revolution must close and that 
he more than anyone else must think for a ~oment that Ger-
any other foreign power could be situated in any portion 
of the Dominican territory; that the United States would not for 
.a i:Jo;r:·.~nt s:::i.nction it. 112 9 Rear Admiral Wise in appraising the sit-
. ·ua.tion car::e to the conclusion that "eventually the United States 
have to assume grave responsibility on the island in order to 
out the solution of a stable g6vernment."JO 
On June 19, 1904 Morales succeeded in postporting the Belgian 
French claims to revenue the customs houses at Santo Domingo 
~acoris. The Italians were granted 1/10 of all customs reve-
nues of the Republic and specific hypothecation of the Samane cus-
An arbital commission for the claims of the Improvement Co. 
consisting of J~dge George Gray of the U.S. Court of Appeals, Joh 
and Don Manuel de Jesus Galvan granted a decision of 
a $1},500,000 claim to be paid at 4% per annum.by monthly install-
rnents beginning September, 1904 from customs revenues and port dJes 
of all the ports of the northern coast of the Republic. 
28 
~Hnthrop Packard, "New Conditions in Santo Domingo," 
Outlook, 80 (May 13, 1905), p. 124. 
29 
Rippy, "Initiation," p. 4J2. 
JO 
Ibid. , p. 426. 
i I Judge Abbott, the Financial Agent of the United States, was 
! :3.ut'nori zed, in the event of the failure of the Government to make 
I 
: u~e p<1ynents due each month, to take possession of the customs 
I 
I 1-:o1)ses at PUt?rto Plata and u~1dertake the collection of all revenues I there. In the event that such sums should still prove insufficient 
l ifor pqyment of the amounts due the award, he was to undertake the 
I collection of all customs duties in the other northern parts of 
! the 2epubli c with the same righ,ts and privileges 9_s :in Puer~o 
IPlata.Jl When the inevitable happened and the Republic forfeit~d 
its obligations Abbott conducted himself according to the provi-
1 
s~cons of the agreement. The other "foreign bondholders namely 
i ~~L-i.nce, Belgi 1Jtn, Italy and Gennany protested the infringement oq 
I the provisions for their pa;y-ment. The Italians sent their minis-
1 ter Orestes Savini to investigate the developments, During the lpre~idency of Noss Y Gil he had paid a similar visit.and with the 
1
ass1stance of the crusier Giovanni Banson had concluded an agree-
, r~:·::;ilt }{nown as the Italian Protocol, Its provisions v:orked out the 
regulation of pa~nents of debts contracted by the Republic and 
1those Italians who had claims during the Hcureaux reign. The Gio-
f i v::inni Bans~<2.!! remained in the Caribbean while Bartolome Bancalari, 
1~:-old friend of Heaureaux, was placed in Sanchez and Samana to 
1rcgulate the shipping houses for the Italians and to collect the l·d~inistrator's debt by regulating the customs houses.of the port 
I The French government threatened to do the same thing at the capi-
Jl 
Welles, pp. 614-615. 
! to l n n:··. s~n:-~=~·,::~:···~~ ;·~·-:·~~: r:-:~··· t~~-:~:~~ ~~~:··~:·::a: 
'its d<'::n:Ands. The German crusier, .Y..t~-1'2 .. <::~ta, was also in Caribbe2n 
f ,,s it ho.d been two years previously i·1hen it participated in the 
I ~o::-1l:i8.rdn;ent of Mnracai bo. This occured when England, Italy, Ger-
' ~;.:1ny <:',nd Fi· an cc a ttc=mpted to use force to col le ct their defaulted 
'~cbts from Venezuela.3 2 The stage was set for a replay of the 
s.r:i;ne situation in Santo Domingo unless the United States int.;er-
vr;ncd to head off such a disaster. 
To avoid the possible development of what would in effect be 
an j_ndefinite occupation of Ame:r;-i can territory by non-American po-
J.:it~_cal interests, the United States~ inqul:ced as to the d isposi ti on 
, of the DonJnigan goverr1:nent to accept Ar;ierl can coopC;rati on. J 3 In-
f . . -
•8Ct1on at this stage of developments, Roosevelt realized would re-
'S'.J.lt in a violation of the l'f;onroe Doctrine by what could amount to 
l;e a permanent occupation and control of the Republic by an Euro-
. r:ean poKer or a combination of European powers.34 American action 
::c.s complicated by agc;ressi ve intent and action of Germany most 
notably of all of the powers i~volved. Minister Powell noted on 
I 
October J, 1904, "I find that the German Goverrnnent is fully ac-
' CJU'.1.inted with all my movements. 1135 The obstacles confronting 
32 
Troncoso, pp. 30-Jl. 
33 
Jones, Caribbean Backgrounds and Prospects, p. 258. 
J4 
Latane, American Foreign Policy, p. 546. 
35 
Rippy, "Initiation," p. 4Jl. 
., 
i t ,. ,:J.·j i::;;:rn n c ti on prompted Cn.ptain Dillingham to report on Dece;1ber 
I;-,· .1904. "'.1e must govern the country as well as its finances, 
t t>ie 1~cople of S::into Domingo can learn to gove:cn themselves." 36 
'r:i.n r..tttcmpt to s.:cronge such an Ai"nerican cont1'ol of the island Hay 
'~·::i:·ote to C:::-~, .. ·son on Dec en ber 28, 1904. 
You will sound the President of Santo Domingo, discreetly 
but earnestly and in perfect friendly spirit, touching 
the disquieting situation which is developing owing to.the 
pressures of other Governrr.ents having arbi tral PJ.Kards in 
their favor nnd '•~Lo :ceg<=ird our award as conflicting with 
their rights. ALce<J.dy one J'.:uropean GovernJnent strongly 
intimates that it may resort to occupation of some Domi-
ni can customs parts to secure its own payment. There 
appears to be a concert among them. You will ascertain 
h'"hether the Government of Santo Domingo, would be dis-
po~>ed to 1·equest the United States to take cf121.rge of the 
collect1on of duties and effect an equitable distribution 
of the assi~ned quotas among the Dominican Gover~ments 
and the several claimants. We have ground to thin~ that 
such an arrsngement would satisfy the other powers, 
b2sides serving as a practical guarantee of the peace of 
Santo Do:rrdn;:;o, from externfll influence or internal dis-
turbances .Jr 
The agreement settled on was amenable to both Presidents in-
:valved as they urged their respective Congresses to take action. 
President JV:orales told his Congress on February 27, 1905, "The 
,protocol is the result of necessity and means. the reaching of an 
l3greement which mqy place the cbuntry in a position to solve the 
problem of its debt. In submitting it to your high appropation, I 
~m confident that your patrioti~m ••• will gather inspiration 
I from the reality of existing circumstances. The only kind of pa-
37 
Ibid., pp. 436-437. 
l 
' 'trtotism which is useful is that which shows results in works of I practical utility."38 His counterpart in the United States, 
Roosevelt, urged his Congress to action far but for a different ! 
rec.son. "Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful &.nd 
lf£ic~dly nation. This aid we are able, and I trust that we are 
I v:i 111 ng, to bes tow. She has asxed for this aid, a.nd the expressicn 
lof~frle~~hl~ repeatedly sanctioned~ the people and the Goyer~-
, il:•;nt of tne United States warrant her in beli cving that it wi 11 
not be withheld in the hour of her need ... J9 In a letter to a high 
Stqte department official he stated the justification for his po-
• 
. sition: "the treaty now before.the 'Senate was conc1uded with 
lsouth Domir.go at Santo Domingo's earnest request repeatedly pres:;ed 
11'
0
pon us and was su bm 1t ted to the Senate be cause in my j ude;me n t it 
,~~s o~r duty to our less fortunate neighbor to respond to her call 
for aid, inasmuch as we were the only power who could give this 
aid, and inasmuch as her need for it was very great. 1140 
The United States was to assume control over the customs 
houses of Santo Domingo in order to render the debt amortized. 
This action was initiated in rnid--March and Minister Powell repor-
tect. "According to your instructions the President agrees to 
plG.ce Custom Houses in the custody of the Government of the United 
J8 
Welles, p. 630. 
J9 
Bishop, p, 4J2. 
.. 
I 
j ;-;tr1tes. 1141 
'""" ·-·r .,.,., "" ,,.,_,~,,.~•-'"''"""''='~"•·V· . .o .... v.·.~<e•• ._. .. ,~ .. >-<- "' '" ··•M ""·'"""""-"~~ ~-- .. ~·~-.-·•• ""'" ·,., .. ~-1 
'f'his n.ction was not undertaken at the mere whim of the 
I p1-.::sic':.ent but only after serious discussions with his most trusted 
c«lvisors. "Y·~orales asked us to take over the custom houses pencl-
ing action by the Senate. I decided to do so, but first of all 
·>Y:;::;uJ. ted Spoone:c, Foraker, Lodge 2.nd Knox. All heartily agreed 
t:--n. t it w.-:is :ceccc~sa:cy for me to take this action. 1142 In a letter 
to I~y, Roosevelt noted 
In Santo D0~ingo we have taken the necessary step; but it 
·,:as one of those cases, whether from action or from in8 ct ion. 
I felt that much less trouble would come from action; but 
beyond a doubt we shall have flurries in connection with 
revolutionary uprising and filibustering enterprises, as we 
ossume the protection of the customs houses. I do not think 
,.hat Santo Domingo itself wilr give us much trouble, but f 
~he fool vote and the timid vote-Will both be greatly alar~8d 
at home, and.divers knavas will play skillfully on this 
a 1a:cm from time to time. 3 f 
The Xonroe Doctrine, especially Roosevelt's interpretation 01 
1·<hich required European abs_tinence from Ar.lericAn affairs nece-, 
ssitated the United States to exercise its "police power" in re-
gard to these states. In a letter to Spring-Rice on July 24, 190 
J he stated his position regarding American action and intention in 
the Caribbean. "We must make it evident on the one hand that we 
do not intend to use the Monroe Doctrine as a pretense for self-
n.1~grandizcment at the. expense of the Latin American republics, an 
41 
Rippy, "Initiation," P• 443. 
42 
Roosevelt to Hay, March JO, 1905, Morison IV, p. 1150. 
43 
Roosevelt to Hay, April 2, 1905, Morison IV, p. 1156. 
' . 
; 
on the other that we do not intend it to be used as a warrant for 
letting any of these republics remain as small bandit nests of a 
wic~cd and inefficient type, This means that we rust in good 
f~ith try to help them as we are now trying to help S8nto Domin30, 
~,nd be ready if the ~':orst co.mes to worse to chastise L14 them." r 
~ speech at Chautauqua he reiterated that the United States did 
In 
not intend to let the Monroe Doctrine be used as "a shield to pro 
t0ct that republic from the consequences of its o~n misdeeds 
l} 5 
asainst foreign nations." 
In his annual message for that year, 1905, Roosevelt made an 
·• 
sppcal to factors other than the Monro~ Doctrine in the case of 
th:; proposed action in regard to Santo Dori1ingo. "Santo DornJ.ngo, 
1n her turn, has now made an appeal to us to help her, and not 
only every principle of wisdom but every generous instinct within 
us bids us respond to the appeal. It is not of the slightest con-
s0quence whether we grant the aid needed by Snnto Dofuingo as an ~ 
cident to the wise development of the i'!onroe Doctrine or because 
we regard the case of Santo Domingo as standing wholly by itself, 
and to be treated as such, 2nd not on general principles or with 
any reference to the Monroe Doctrine. The important point is to 
give the. needed aid, and the case is certainly sufficiently pecti-
Roosevelt to Spring Rice, July 24, 1905, Morison, IV, 
p. 1286. 
45 
Rippy, "Antecedents," p. 267. 
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. 46 j ii:e:r t,o ·1ese1·ve to be judged purely on its own merits." 
I The ovenidfrg consideration, however, was one of fear of a 
. ;,ossi ble Europeun t·:ikcover in S2.nto Domingo. In the Protocol 
' ... 
i2oosevelt points out that "in view of our past experience and our 
t ~~r:;y,>Jlf:dce of the a.ctu:J.l situation of the Dorni:ni can Republic, a 
~ . -
I definite refusal of the United Stg_tes Gover:cJ:icnt to t,'}ke ~":lny effe 
itive action looking to the relief of the Dominican Republic and to 
lche dis~harge of its ow~ duty un~er the Monroe Doctrine can on1y 
, [.e co~1s1dered as a acquiescence in sorne such action by another 
,5overnment.·"47 ?or "in the case of one of these nations, only the 
,.,ctugl opening of negotiations to ttlis end by our Government pre-
! I vt::r-: ted the seizure of terri to:cy in Santo Domingo by a Europer:tn 
';,c.~·:er . .,48 The proposed agreement with the United States would 
~void any such possibility for ~it is for better that this co11ntry 
i:::hould put through such an a:crangement, rather than.allow any I foreign country to undertake it," 49 Root shared this concern and 
'.:OO stated in a letter to Lodge on December 7, 1905. "The impor...a.n 
thing is that a request from the Congress of San Domingo should'be 
inserted 1-:i.s a condition to the general sweeping power of interfer-
________ , _______ .. _, __ . 
46 
Foreign Relations, 1905, p. xxxv. 
47 
Ibid., p. J40. 
48 
Ibid., 9. xxxvi. 
49 
C3llcott, p. 208. 
! 
!.;nee. The unco~ditionn.l power of intarfcre~ce would practically 
liiestroy Dominican sovereignty which, of course, none of us wish~s 
!to do. 1150 
f Opposed to such an occ.nTence, Roosevelt remarked in his ann1 1 
f rr1~:--;::>:::ige "under th.~ proposed treaty the indepe:nc1.;nce of the island 
l':,·.<~JJ~·tsrc:1~~1·epu~J-You.ts},1LYe respected, the danger of violation of the Monroe - - - I l intervention or foreign powers V8nishes, and the 
'1 nt :rfcronce of our Government is minimized, so th~"lt >·Te sh:::ill o:rily l~~t in conjunction with the Santo Domingo authorities to secure 
I : ':: :,~:::.:: t: d:: n: :::A:: ::s o:n:h: 0 :::o::: ::: \ ::::: f ~::e ::m :: ::re 
;::::,:inst d:.::rne:-:.nds for unjust debts."5l In effi;;ct, the United StB.tej' 
! ~·::<S to do three things s ( 1) to adjust the Domini can debt, foreig., 
l ·c;_;;d doJY.f~s tic, n.nd to as certain the validity and <.1.r,10un t of all per.-
ding claims; (2) to administer the Dominican customs houses and t 
ci011 ver 45;'& of the receipts to the Dominican go•iernment, applying 
the net remainder to the interest upon and the amortization of th 
t i0bts and claims so adjusted; and (3) to afford the Dominican Re-
1 public such further assistance 9.S needed to maint.9.in orderly and I ·? ffi ci <mt government, 52 
50 
Jessup, p. 546. 
51 
Forei~n Relations, 1905, p. xxxvii. 
52 
Jg_cob H. Holl<tnder, "The Convention of 1907 Between the 
:~~ni ten States and the Domini can Republic," _A.2Yleri can Journal of I:r.. ! I tr~-;-n2tional Lqw, I (1907). pp. 289-290. i 
-,~,,__,,,,.,.~··-------"""'---~·-· -----------------------~-~----.i 
T t scr:::ms c 1e:lr that neither Roosevelt 
'>:ork ·::;1.S in p~1rt rc.spo:nsi ble for the action, thought the U:ni ted 
states should intervene more than was absolutnly necessary for the 
:nn i :ntr::n9nce of stable government. 53 Roosevelt could h:J_ve had one 
of :;<'01;r possible reasons for intej_'Venti on accordJ.ng to J. Fred 
(1) fear of European intervention of a more or less perma-
nent nature in the Dominican Republic; (2) the desire to pr?tect 
lives and pronote as well as protect the economic interests OI 
1 ::: citizens of the United States; (J) willingness to gratify cer 
tain expansionist influences; and (4) a disposition to give aid t 
'~he inl1abi tan ts of t!1e Dominican Republic, :i'any of whom desired o-;. i . 51' 
: »;;;re supposed to desire the assistance of the Fni tcd States. ,,, I 
1:ould tend to dismiss the third reason and minimize the second~ 
! ·r.2 first ·was, in rny opinion, the overriding consic.cration. In YG 
I ,~3rrl to the fourth, Roosevelt himself said of the action, "it vras 
1 
strictly an instance of working out the ~onroe Doctrine in the in 
terest of the United States, in the interest of all people dealin; 
~ith Santo Domingo, and above all, in the interest of Santo Domin 
itself."55 '"0 c 
I_. Root stated in rei:;a1~d to the proposed action, "our treat:nent 
53 
Yunro, Intervention, p. 531. 
54 
Rippy, "Initiation," p. 419. 
55 I ::loosevelt, "South Ar:terica and the ffonroe Doctrine," p. 58) 
L_o_·~--~~••=~- -· WJ 
«· ... «~-~~·'""~·--··-,~--··=~~,. ....... ··9rr~j 
. . . is but a p8 rt of the ~·Ior:.::::tng out of the 
pol\cy of pe 8 .cc and righteousness as the basis for wealth and 
r
·o"n'"'·.L·, 1· ty 1· n n~_:J.ce of the policy of force, of plunder, of cot.-p . ".t· ~ . , ' .... 
. ~6 
~~est, 9.S the n:cans of acquiring wealth."../ '.l'he chief :oaterial 
'-1 
The United States would gain some indirect advan-
tcses by 2nking the comnunities to the south stable and pro~perou~ 
snd "tLe:rcfo:cc :not merely in name, but in fact ind epcnd.ent and 
., .P . • • ·.-.·11' • ..., ·~ "57 S2.:_J.-S0\'el.i 1 1 G• 
~he specter of an unfriendly European nation entrenched in 
0 ne of the Cari~bean islands haunte~ many Americans and made them 
. 58 
:::,nx i ous for .S\ q u:t ck set tlernent of tl1e ae;rce:;;ent. Tioos 0vel t held 
to !ii s principle tr:a t ".9.n ag.:;rieved nation can K1 th out interferi nr, 
~ith the ronroe Doctrine take what action it sees fit in the a~-
~,,st;:.ent of its disputes with Ar:ierican States, provided that ac-
tion does not take the shape of interference with their form of 
._:o':e-ct.rr: ent or of the despoilment of their terri toJ.~y lJnder any dis 
,;ui se. 11 59 Threatened European military action, however, prompted 
____ ... ________ ,,, __ _ 
·-------·--------· 
~6 
_. -~~lihu Root, Latin Arr:erica and the United States, ed., Ro":.J-
,·:rt ?-n.con and J 3rnes B-rown Scott (Cambridge 1 Harvard University 
Fr e ~ s , 1 91 7 ) , P • 2 7 7 • 
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F'orsir:n Rel9.tions, 190.5, p. 342. 
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Henry J. Hancock, "The Situation in Santo Domingo," AnnPls, 
I.XVI ( 190 5), P. 52 • 
59 
i 
?oreivn ReJ.9ti~, 1905,. p. 334. 
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1
1 t:w ;'i-,i L-E::d St::.tes to assume 8. r"ew position. 'T'he United States 
t!ins bcca':.e n. p:-=i.rty in interest, bec.0 ,use 1mclc;r the ~·:onToe Doctrine 
it c.ould r:ot see <"!.DY :2':uropeon po':ler sei. «:e ··n:d lX<c;11r;,ncntly oecupy 
the territory of one of these republics, and yet such seizure of 
L<o c1·]_ tory, cHsguiscd or undisguised, offC:.L'Cd t!w only ~·;ay in which 
tr1:::: :i)C~\er in qliestion could collect any debts, 1;nl;.::3s ';.;{~ere -,.;as ir: 
terference on the part of the United States. 60 Thus, it 1-:'as real-
i ;~cr1 th'.! t the United States Government could not in te:cfere to prc-
1 ver~ t such sei zurc <.1nd occupa tl on of Domini can terri tor·y vJi th out 
eiti1er itself proposing some feasible alternative in the way of. 
, "'etio:r., or else virtually s;;:,ying to 'European governments that they I ;·';";ld <"•ot be allowed to collc~t their cbims, 61 Roosevelt therc-
1 fore, concluded that "either we must submit to the likelihood of 
I 
I !~~fringcment of the Konroe Doctrine or we must ourselves agree to 
~'o::ne such arrangement that nerewi th submi cted to the Senate." 62 
~herefore "this protocol affords a practical test of the efficien-
r:y of the U:r.i ted States Government in m8.intaining the Monroe Doc-
•-r-·i·r-"' " 63 ~ ic. The ~onroe Doctrine mentioned here can be interpretated 
I:< s ::1c3ni ng two things. First, the Monroe Doctrine refers to the 
i ---------------------------------· ! 
! 
l 
60 
61 
62 
63 
Ibid., p. :335. 
Jbid., p. 337. 
1bid.' p. 341. 
I'oid., p. J42. 
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. Sf6'~1 
I 
of Arno:cic~0.fi I )Olicy of opposition to European control 
Second, the Monroe ~octrine can also refer to the 
::ioo::: ~ vc 1 tir.:in concept of the policy of "police poi·;er" in cases of 
,_. 
wro~cdoing, such as Santo Domingo, whose efficacy was also being 
u:s:J(l Ly the crisis. 
''he long standing fear of possible American t:::ikeover and 
"':·;::-J~~·::-:._tion in Latin American countries had to be once more dis-
"It can not be too often s.nd too emphati cglly ·asserted 
th~t Lhe United States has not the slightest desire for territor-
i8 l ,..,:;grandizernent at the expense of any of its southern neighbor~ 
,-._:id w·i 11 not trF.:at the Monroe Doctrine as an excuse for such 
64 ;. s.ESl''.:;t:dizei':lcnt on its part. 11 Hay received this letter from 
. 
J. i\'. Lee; er on :.:arch 5, 1904. "In the course of the interview you 
did 'r:t: 'chc honor to grant lile on the Jrd instant you were as good 
as to tell me that the lh1ited States had no intention to take ad-
van:asc of the events now taking place in the Dominican Republic 
el t'1•::r to ?.nnex that Repub1i c or to force a protectorate upon it, 
65 
or to 3cquire any part of its territory, Samana in particular." 
PRrt of the objection to the protocol itself would have been re-
~oved if the obligations were more rigously defined and a demon-
str~tion that no annexation of the Dominican Republic was contem-
64 
Ibid. , p. 3 34. 
65 
Foreign Relations, 1904, p. 371. 
·~ne control of finances was pG.ssed to the United States. 
-,-., s ':..:o collect the principal reveni;cs of 'che ::cpubli c, arrar.e;e the 
I :3;tt'..,0 rnent of the national debt and readjust the tAriff. L'l.tin 
1
1 
/ .. ~c;t::ri cans 1;~ lL-::ved U:a t "the :?ovw1~ that con Leo ls the purse rules 
~-he State. 1107 Eence to them the U11ited States ;·:-as j_n control of 
!all of the affairs of the Republic. Loomis, however, was q1:1ick t 
I _  0 '"' t o-.i. ..... ~;,~)...LJ.1 Lt,,a ! .- 'l'}1c,re is no thought or possibility of the o.r·Lt;).n_-c1on of 
Santo Domin~o to the United States, in the Dinds of either 
the Ad1r1inistration or of the representatives of Santo Do-
rni~so, now in ~ashington. It has not come into consider-
stton :-'J1d will not. It 1s'simply an effo:ct which is being 
!:":.:;de to a1:rive at some iJl:an "h'hich shall saf1,;s·1"s1~d all in-
-~- "- ... ,o:tc- -···'d i•11i- a '"·'--op i·o the 01.i.-'--A ?<:>o•·s ,.;-~.,_·,,, of . ..,-r~. i· -~c: \._~1.::"':Lc:~~'.!-: ... :.!- ....... _v_~ ... ,,L. • ....,""... 6CS t ..... .L8.b-....... i..-l L..J.vi::J..L..t::: •.::;.L..L.l2 ... ..L ...... r.o.<J t:XlS G.Lng in tnose l::>l~nds. . . ; 
! ~~e corTcspondence between the State DepartQent and Xinister 
! ; PoKell will serve to demonstrate how meticulously the question of 
S8nto Dominigan sovereignty was discussed. 
Loomis to Davrson Jan. Jl, 1905 
You will substitute for the second cln.use of the preamble 
sent you in our draft of protocol Jan. 25, beginning, 
"Htereas the Government of the United States of America," 
the following, which is to take the place of the para-
c;r·iph of the pree_mble containing the territorial guaranty: 
I 66 ''The Santo Domingo Affair," Harper's Weekly, XLIX (Feb.11, i 19 0 5) f po 197 I 
' 67 l ''When is a Protectorate pot a Protectorate?," Review of 
J ~eviews, XXXI (1905), p. 118. 
! 
l 68 I 
J ?r2r:cis B. Loomis, "The Administration and Santo Domingo," 
1
. 
! 4 . ; '?he Indc~·0er;d.ent, LVI (il'.arch 3, 190 ) , p. 467. L~-~---- .. - c___..,.. ___ , __________ r ________ -.,,....,._-=-u,o,a..~~ 
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"'.!)-,t.:'eo.s the Gove:;:n.r;;ent of tr;e United St9tes, vie~'.'ins any 
~:.~.;t.,:-:i::pt on the i)FJ.rt of the EOVerrmont of this hemisphere 
~J) opp1·css or control the destiny of the Gominic~::i.n I:epub-
lic ::~.s a :~;o.nifestation oi'' an unfriendly disposition to1'lard 
~he Vnited States, is in compliance with the request of 
the ~onin!csn Goverrunent, disposed to lend its assistance 
to1~ard effecting a satisfactory a1"ran,•-::-egent with the 
creditors of the Dominican Goyern::nent, 11 9 
DaKson to State Depart:'nent, ~;-cb. lJ., 1905 
Kinister of finance insists on insertion after the word 
"3ssesslng," in the first paragraph prearr.ble, of7 t)ollo~·r­tn6 "the territorial integrity of the Bepubli.c, 11 
D::i.w·son to State Department, Feb. 5, 1905 
':orninican Government insists that suggested guaranty is 
::;ffecti ve only agair..st European power and not against the 
Pnited States itself. The Vice-President has received a 
i~2 lep;rs,m f!'.'o:n DoJY·ini can co:risul.:[-'.;eneral at l!ew York, which 
co~vinces him that that change in pre2mble means ulti~8te 
·•f:nexation, Do:•j_ni.cC1.n authorities suspicious and alarmed 
~s to our intentions. They insist 0n inserting at the end 
of second pnrasrG.ph pre2.i'Tlble: "agreeing to respect the 7 co~plete ~erritorial integrity of the Dominican aepublic. 11 • 1 
lhy to Da·.irncm, Feb, 6, 1905 
You cay add at end of second paragraph of preamble the words 
"0.greeing to respect the coL1plete territorial integrity of 
the Dominic.s_n Republic. 11 72 
Eay to Dawson, Feb, 6, 1905 
8 he President regrets his inability to consent to any 
f~Jrther changes in protc,col, The •·:ords "without the 
~onsent of the President of the United States "at the 
r -··---·-------·--- -·-------· 
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end of article 6 are 1nd1sp.ensable to the success of the 
plnn to relieve the Dominican Republic from its hopeless 
financial conditions, which ls rapidly growing worse and 
·threatens serious disasters. Other e;overnments have re-
peatedly threatened to intervene and the United States 
can not extend financial p~otectlon unless it can have the 
confidence of the Domini can Government o.nd of other parties. 
~oncer~ed, so ~s to en?~le the United States to carry out 
the plan succeasfully. . 
In the case of Santo Domingo, the United States intervention 
was n modenJ.ting elemen't to the European claims and the pressure 
due to its debt the occupation of its custom houses resulted 'in 
responsible clerks distributing the income among the creditors en 
the agreed ~rorated bas~s.7~ But in accordance with the Am~rican 
Constitution.the treaty had to be submitted to the Sennte for its 
Approval. Dawson proposed a ~eans which eluded a treaty and its 
requirement to be placed before the Senate of both the United 
[ . 
i.· States and Santo Domingo. 75 
i 
The mcaris arrived at for circumventing the Senate approval of 
i 
the proposed agreement would be a Presidential resolution to use 
the good of'fLc_eJL to attain their ends. The need to adopt this 
.......... -- ---- -
E].9.~-\~ v:\_~Jend.l. was even more pronounced after the Senate rejecti~n -
of the treaty form. This particular aspect, however, will be dis-
cussed at a later time. The E!.£C}.us viviendi r:md the treaty were 
pr8ct1cally alike with two e·xceptions. The American collectors of 
73 
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I_ , jzoo1 )~~fices to rccor:L11end, and our warships mglr,tainir:,cr, 
1"" 
I, -. , ·' c;c 11.ec tors in the custom-houses. Secondly, i:r;stcad ; ' ,, .. 
r 1
.-, ... -.- 2nt of the revF::r~l,;_e 
~ -
going to creditors it w~s deposited in 
i ~: r; t; i Ofl.E l 
! I(;.,., __ ,,,, ty. 
City :S::rnk of :Kew YoJ.~k to a1\"ai t .Senate 8..pproval ;:, fter 
' 
tf:e ! 
I 
At such time, the money would be paid to the credi~ors a~I I oritir.ally intended, otherwise it would be retumed to tbe qomi r.i-! 
; c~Jl Gov2r:r1Inent. 76 Root noted II the modus vi vi en di • • • cons i 8 ts r 
· l:.erco1y in a plan or way of getting along, pursu~d by the ~ov2;-,·:c ~ 
i~f Ss~ Domingo on its own responsibility but ~1th the acq~ie~ ·~nee· 
t-(:rl. 1xnoffi cial good offices of the I-resident." 77 Dawson no'!:;':,-" '. ,:.;.:; 
' 
I._ .. tl:n: "for tr.e present at 1east, abpolutely elimir.::i"._;es Snntc 
: . 
q potentially disturbing 
.-,q 
internationsil factor." 1 · :~cc.::;a-: 
( 
v :~•--!- 'h'r:ite to the Secretary of the Navy on Sept. 5, 1905, "tel:!_ ! 
r 
' Bradford to stop any revolution. I intend to keep the is-\ 
I 
_?t.gtu ~ unti 1 the Senate has had ti~~:e to :~ct on the 
and I shall treat any revoiutionary movement to upset 
l~0dus viviendi. That this is ethically right, I am sure, even 
:-··-·---
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of the major problems facing the Dominigan people 1'73.S the. growth 
of violence to resolve differences. ~inister Velasquez noted in 
hiS ~nnual·report of 1906: 
So contrary to order are the customs, so inveterate in 
Beneral has become the habit of disorder, that many of 
the men who theoreticaly express enthusiasm for the 
establishment of regular and systematic order under-
standing that only in_ that_ way in the salvation of the 
possible, when it comes to actual practice, when they 
find that such a state of affairs would be imposed . 
upon them, subjecting their life to certain limitations 
not in acco~i:'d with customs already rooted, in opposition 
to certain interests created, rebel against the saving 
reform, accusing the person in charge of its execution8 for his perserverance and faith in executing the same.·O 
Goerge Colton remarked that "these conditions as noted are in~ 
-. 
rHc·:itive of the apparently fnsurmountable obstacles wrlich have c.m-
fronted these patriotic Dominicans ·who seem 1-;ow, 'N"i th the 8.Ssis-
to nee of the rrJC?~l:i::.1.§.. :;r_i vi~ndi, ab9ut to place their country perma.-
r:ently upon a safe footing. 1181 These tendencies prompted other 
critics to realize that the wea~ness of Santo Dofuingo was its 
strength, since to attack it seems the part of a bully. The soci~ 
environment was primarily.responsible and it must be changed if 
£.OOd gover:nment were to prevail. President Morales believed this 
to be true and spoke {or many Dominicans. 
I believe it the only successful method under the existing 
80 
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81 
Ibid,, p. 334. 
82 
"Santo Domingo," Independent, LVI (February 28, 190l.J.), 
p. 4 54. 
Gondi ti ons, of up~·10 ld ing my government or P..ny go,vern,11ent 
1·1hi ch aspires to a decent and orderly administration of 
the republic's affairs. If it fails anarchy and warfare 
~ill inevitably ensue. This country will accept the 
convention. I will see to that,· With the exception of 
n few disgruntled political leaders, professional revolu-q3 tionists, all the intelligent peoples are in favor of it.~· 
Others, however, were of a different mind as early as 1904 de 
'?osas in L~-~~ S8id of possible financial control by the United 
Stntes. "The Do:ninican government attempted to escape the ~onse-
qucnces of the sentence: for a diplomatic intervention s;Jcceeds 
:;i_n anned interventlon. 1184 For the majority of the people the con-
vention was· a disgrace and united the patriot1~ interests of ali 
':tLd the political interests of most. • Those opposed to it, a ttaclro 
it as an infringement on Domini?an sovereignty. Those who defend-
. 
ed it called for the avoidance of circumstances that would lead to 
its extension or repetition. 8 5 The outcov.ie ·was attributed to thelr 
oNn rris::ldventures, the ambition of the United States, and a serfes 
P.6 
of their own sorrowful and irreparable errors, mostly financial.-
The Nueno Paris ext6lled the virtues of the modus viviendi 
"the Fnited States will guarantee the Dominicans protection agairst 
thomselves and against foreign cupidity. Now they may indeed boast 
83 
Packard, p. 122. 
84 
Troncoso, p. 62. 
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86 
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tho.t they a1~e on the road to civilized existence. 1187 t•:any felt th:· 
people would be in s~1pathy with the agreement because it provided 
f for the integrity of the territory of the republic and assured 
J pc3ceful conditions under which thei could work and prosper. 88 
1'P}-tus, in conformance with the decision and advise of the governmmt 
I 
the i'·~inister of Foreign Relations, Juan Francisco Sanchez, and the 
~.~ini ster of the Commerce House,· Federic Velazquez Hernandez,. hgd 
signed the agreement to establish the assistance of the United 
. 89 States in the form of a loa.n and regulation of the debt. 
In the main, the reaction throughout the world was one that 
i::~~:ted the tenets of the Roosevelt Corollary and there was no 
l'.,dc,,pread or flaming indignation, 9o. Las Ultima~ Noticias apprais-
· ed the Roosevelt corollary and the action in Santo Domingo as fal-
lows: 
It is in our hands to avoid this intervention, but it is 
not a menace to the established governments which take part 
with pride in the concert of nations, That intervention 
refers only to those republics which are in a perpetual 
state of HYlarchy, which disregard international laws, which 
do not meet their monetary or other obligations, which have, 
in fhct, done everything possible to los~ their character as 
87 
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civilized nations. 91 
It quoted Roosevelt as ~aying "It is regrettable that all the 
I 
~outh American republics do not. have, like Chile, a suitable foim 
of government, 11hich might give guarantees and be able to inspire 
i tne respect of the 1·ihole 11orlC. • • • • If all the Sou th American 
countries would follow in the footsteps of Chile, we should have 
no reason to regret the events which on several occasions have 
forced us to intervene actively in the p6licy of our continent.••92 
Thus, it concluded that "the peril of the North is only a myth if 
the .South d'oes not provoke the North with interval disturbances or 
.. . 
•.:iol9.tions of international law and break its word in financial 
L~~ tters. "93 
Laneta, the Argentine Minist~r of Foreign Affairs, had thi~ 
9.ppralsal of Roosevelt and his policy. - "In regard to the United 
States of .Mnerica, they are for ,us an example of peace and progre.% 
The Nonroe Doctrine I have understood in no other way than as a 
doctrine of friendship between the republics of this continent and 
our great model of th~ north, which has reached its place - I say 
it with American pride - at height of the most powerful nations of 
91 
"Aspects of the Santo Domingo Protectorate," Literary 
Sip;est, XXX (February 4, 1905), p. 157. 
92 
Ibid • , p • 158 • 
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It had been charged that. the agreement reached between Santo 
:Jo1riingo and the United States was one contrived by the Americans 
for their own designs. It was, indeed, forced on the Dominicans; 
but by circumstance rather than by any imperlalistic program of 
· the United States. 95 It was, as Melvin Knight pointed out, "A 
free and spontaneous decision • 
of the Republic." 96 , 
• • for avoiding the dismem'Qerment 
Critics of the policy attacked the plan on various fronts the 
?oston Herald felt that the si ti:'iation should have been left alone 
for ''the still disturbed countries Are paying for the penalty for 
their folly in being shunned by . foreig.n capital." 97 Others were 
n>:·:are that to many Latin Ameri earn the difference b~t1·1een annexing 
territory and controlling the finances seemed iffimaterial. The A~­
erican attitude of _dismissing them as "lesser breeds" who lived in 
;·:hat o. Henry called the "banana-stand republics" 11ho had to be 
. . 98 
supervised was also assailed. Thus, many Latin Americans felt 
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~ (~arch 18, 1905), p. 387. 
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. ~ , 
11·.:~·=u=r·:=:~~~~-in==~=~~=~~ncies they had no course but to follow the slogan."Against foreign interference ro-let 
c<r:; oppose domestic virtue." 99 Thus Elihu Root Nas prompted to 
l·,ccite Senator Ben Tillman on December 13, 1905. "The South ftJTieri-cci.ns now hate us largely because they think we despise them and 
try to bully them. I really like them and intend to show it.· I 
think their friends hip is reall:y important to the United Sta.tes, 
~.:nd the best way to secure it is by treating them like gentlemen • 
If you want to nake a man your friend, it does not pay to treat 
. 1., 11 d .. 100 Jnm lKe a ye ow og. 
Ex-President Jimenez struck anc1ther note in his letter of 
Jan., 1906. "The present historic epoch peremptorily demands that 
• 
the United States the only protector of these small nations, dec'ide 
to exert their influence over them, for the role of civilization, 
2.nd lift them up from the anarchy and prostration in which they 
, ' 
Jie. 11101 He found a responsive 'Roosevelt who adopted much the 
same attitude in his annual message of 1907. 
The United States are now, and will be for .a long time, 
the natural protectors of the weak Spanish-.Ameri can re-
publics, and in the hearts of the patriots of those 
countries there is a wound ·that bleeds when they re-
member the humiliations and impositions inflicted upon 
them whenever that protection has been diminished, or 
99 
Richard J. Alfaro, "A Century of the }~onroe Doctrine," in 
The Sentenary of the Monroe Doctrine a supplement to Annals, CXI 
( l 9?h) t p. 28. , 
100 
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101 
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' 
. 1 02 ~hen it could not be requested or grAnted.-
'!'he wounds seemed healed, at least tenpor·~;ri ly, when Boot rra:t: 
his visit to South America. The journey was the cause for much 
~oo~-will and praise of the United States and Roosevelt's policies 
Jose ~0rcelino de Souza on Ju1y 24, 1906 at Bahia made this state-
Lent. "'::'his policy of concord, therefore, 3ccompli shes c;ood. I 
repeat, America must prosper. It is necessary that the Xonroe D 
•trine triumph, not to the exclusion of the civilization of the Old 
~: orlc~., but to the benefit of all humc-.;.lli ty. 11 l03 Luis DrG.go on Aug. 
17, 1906 made his contribution to the outpouring of faith and 
trust in the United States and its a*bi li ty to 11 ve up to its po terr-
tial and promises. 
It is consequently our sacred duty to preserve.the integrity 
of Ar1eri ca, r.oa terial and moral, against the menaces and 
artifices, very real and effective, that unfortunately 
surround it. It is not long since one of the most eminent 
of living juris consults of Great Britain denounced the 
possibility of the danger. "The enemies of light and 
freedom," he said, "all neither dead nor sleeping; they a.re 
vigilant, nctive, militant, and astute." And it was in 
obedience to that sentiment of common defense that in a 
critical moment the Argentine Republic proclaimed the 
impropriety of the forcible collection of public debts by 
European nations not as an 'abstract principle of academic 
value or as a legal rule of universal application outside 
of this continent (which it is not incumbent on us to 
JT:aintain), but as a principle of American diplorlacy which, 
whilst being founded on equity and justice, has for its 
exclusive object to spare the peoples of this continent 
the calamities of conquest, disguised under the mask of 
102 
Foreign Relations, 1907, p. J54. 
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Arr.erica Washington: Government Printing Office, 190 , p. 31 •. 
financial interventions, in the sam~ way as the tr~ditiona~ 
policy of the Vnited States, without accentuating superior-
ity or seeking preponderan6e, condemned the oppression of 
the nAtions of this part of the world end the ~gatrol of 
their destinies by the great powers of Europe. 
Lisentiate Kanuel Calero on Oct. J, 1907 pointed up anothe~ 
i::,portGnt aspect of "Rooseveltian policy. ·"The integrity of the . 
n~tions of this continent is of vital interest to all, collective-
ly, ::-ind not alone to the country immediately affected. Any' attack 
on this integrity should constitute an offense in the eyes of the 
other nations of America. 11105 
The European effects of Rooseveltian actions were mixed and 
• 
enphasized different aspects of the poiicies as they changed the 
course of European affairs. Economically, the bonds j_ssued by 
states bordering on the Caribbean rapidly increased in value. As 
en after effect of Arr:erican att;empts to determine. the validity 
~any European creditors protested as they felt such action endan-
106 [ sered their just claims. Th~ J2nd A.nnual Report of the Counci 1 
~ 
r of British Bondholders best summed up general European economic 
;· 
reaction. 
It beca.me evident that in order to evade payment of their 
ob~_igations the dishonest Republics were taking deliberate 
advantage of the hostility displayed by the United States 
Government towards the attempts of European Governments to 
obtain ~edress fo~ their subjects. It was contended, 
104 
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therefore, that our responsibilities towards those to whom 
interference they were so strongly opposed, that this con-
tention was well founded. has been admitted by 5be present 
distinguished President of the United States.l l 
Strategic and hegemonic con~ideration prompted the Kreuz Zei-
to note that the new American policies mean "that the Union 
up a claim to suprGmacy over all Central and South Americi:;.n 
republics ;-:i thout having made so much as a thrust of the sword to 
atta.in it." 108 
The ,-\i"'Uerican reaction to the custotls receivership was divided 
each side as bitter in opposition to the other's conclusions. 
The I\ew York Evening_ Post noted. "the. Monroe Doctrine is too _much 
a great swelling word of vanity, 11ihich we utilize HS an ex-
for doing whatever we wish9 When the President says thA.t it 
is the Doctrine which inhibits foreign governments from demand-ing 
p.syn1cnt of Santo Domingo, he actually means that he does not want 
109 
them to do it." The opposition. of the Senate to the proposed 
;;,greement ·was assailed by the Hartford Times. II It is a narrow 
vi eK which shuts the eye to the _manner in 1\'hi ch Panama was detach 
from Columbia, and.the way by which American rule has been started 
--------
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1n Snnto Domingo, :::<nd praises the. President as safer, saner, or 
n:ore p:::.triotic than the Senate, 11110 The Ne~r '(ork Press was even 
more vehement in its denunciation of the opposition to Roosevelt's 
policies. "Any club to hit President Roosevelt is all right for 
the Senate to use. It is all the same to the Senate whether th~ 
blo~ hurts the cause of world peace, but leaves the President un-
hr'.r:ncd, or whether the blow puts the life of the ?>':onroe Doctrine 
in 1~nr:2;er if it is armed at the head of.the Ser.ate's o:rpor.ent. 
If c\'flr ever comes with a European Power in Santo Domingo the U.S. 
Senn.te v-:ill· be to blame.not President Roosevelt. 0111 In a letter 
. . to~. G. Tiffany Roosevelt sought to explain his position. 
Under the proposed protocol we could collect debts only in 
the sense that Collector Stranahan in Kew York collects debts 
for the ere di tors of the U.S. All th.Ht would be done would 
be to put I'.len that ~\'"8re honest and capable Within their spf-ece 
into Santo Domingan parts, honestly to collect the custom 
dues in accordance 'with the request of Santo Domingo; to turn 
over half to help run the government and to turn over the 
other half to a commission of high-minded men who :·:rm ld exam-
ine into the claims ot the various creditors and oppositions 
them on their merits. It wi 11 indeed be f::?n infamy if a ma-
jority of the Senaie, from purely partisan reasons, refuses 
to do its clear duty and grant the relil~f to Santo Domingo 
1··hi ch Santo Domingo needs. : Every man who votes against this 
treaty by his vote invites foreign nations to violate the 
Monroe Doctrine, and refuses relief and protection to a 
stru~f~ing American republic which has appealed to us for 
nid. 
110 
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I The Senate, however, was determined to control in "n ever more 
.effective manner the foreign bolicy of the United States.ll3 In~e~ 
'feet, the President's action had prompted the Senate into asserting 
fmore strongly the right of de~ision in regard to question of fo~-
f eign policy granted it by the Cons ti tut ion. n4 · The most caustic r 
1:-:iarks opposing Rooseveltian policies were made by rl'h~ l'!ation which 
!kept a string .of tirades against Roosevelt which ranged from judg-
f 1ng that "too much Vionroe Doctrine hath make him mad. 11115 To exte 
'ting the concept of adopting the Monroe Doctrine to keep it fr~ 
lbeing "foss-ilized" to conclude "the Doctrine is a conjurer's hat, 
'out of which anything he pleases may be pulled." ll6 In addition it 
ljudged American action was used to ke~p a compliant Morales regime 
f;n power. 117 His present action was deemed inconsistent with his 
'performance in the Venezuela ~ri.sis of 1902 and the whole concept 
of Monroeism was assailed. 118 ' He was charged with attempting 
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to stir up an emotional reaction in his f~vor; 119 while at the 
'.:;·;_me time running of risk of possible confrontation with Europe.'3.n 
'' l'd't f th·i J · 120 It 1 d d "t' ,po~ers over enc va 1 l Y. o er c_a1rns.. cone u e ne 
first swing of the Big Stick has simply ban~ed the shins of its 
121 
1<Jielder." 
There v:as, however, much support for the rccei vership as pro-
poserl by Roosevelt. ~any extolled the virtues of any agreement 
, G.-Juld promise to effective word off a possible European interve!:.-
tion with a subsequent violation of the Monroe Doctrine and solve 
t!--:e rising prob1em of the Dominican debt justly. 122 The action 
• 8fforded a demo~stration of what hoped_ to he a new snd dramatic 
,:~pproo.ch to the problems of Latin American states. Such a new po-
J.j_ cy would be of a predetermined consistent nature as opposed to a 
previous policy that had been accidental and vacillating. 123 This 
new era of policy would be marked by the Rooseveltian interpreta-
tion of the Monroe Doctrine, "police power," and its tenets would 
serve as deterents to possible threats which could result in 
119 
~ntion, LXXX 0·1arch 23, 1905). 
120 
Nation, LXXXI (August 17, 1905) .• 
121. 
Na ti on, . LXXX (Y.arch 23, 190 5). 
122 
Hancock, p. 51. 
123 
"A :-.:otion to Take from the Table," p. 507. 
... 
124 The Senate's failure t~ ratify the treaty was viewed a~ 
unfortunate, its failure to consider the restrictions and limita-
125 tions, however, 'We.s tragic. Santo Domingo itself was to main-
tf:lin the statu~ .9.:1::..2. not the United States "so th.tit if the treaty 
126 be r~tified it can be executed." The policy included American 
intc1·cst and self-protection over and above· its humanitarian as-· 
This concern for the material well-being of the Unit~d 
was vitally conceined with the passage of the agreement. 127 
Acturi.lly, Roosevelt was merely using his good offices to assist 
123 s~nto Domingo rather than operating in opposition to the Senate. 
The supporters of the agreement felt the Senate ~hould be called 
special session to notify an amended agreement since they earli 
rejected what \·<as coYisidered to be a vital docunent. 129 
In a letter to Jacob H. Hollander, Roosevelt made note of the 
cn·dtion with which he had to conduct himself in these matters, 
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1cst he be accused of backing the "money interest" in its dem3nC:.s. 
"I 8;;: alwriys afraid of seeming to back any big company which hA.s 
I fino.nclal interests in one of thi~se South i-l.meri can states, and c".an 
only do so under the narrowest restrictions and most sharply de-
finGd conditions. On the other hand, there are real advantages in 
not having a treaty but some such arranr.:;ement HS ·we suggested." ],JO 
Root in his speeches on his Latin A.inerican term made two po-
sitions very clear. First, the use of force for debt collection 
WctS 
the 
a serious cause of possible trouble in the relations between 
131 
nations of the Old and New Worlds. Second, he reiterated 
the Rooseveltian position that Amefica sbught no territory aggran-
rlizcment in the Hemisphere to the detriment of any of the States 
to its South. "No act of unjust aggression by the United States' 
8E:;ainst any smaller.and weaker power would be forgiven by the peo-
. 132 pl.e to whom the Government is responsible. 11 
Senatorial critics rejected the Roosevelt-Root interpretation 
of Latin American affairs. Santo Domingo was the representative 
case of all of the South and Central American Republics. Most 
were inclined to violence and ~iporder and used the Monroe Doctr' 
lJO 
Roosevelt to J. H. Hollapder, Morison, IV, p. 1259. 
lJI 
Speeches Incident to the Visit of Secretary Boot, p. 158. 
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Ibid, pp. 206-207. 
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.1_ L) 
Lo s!1i~ld their repudiation of their financial and other obliga-
133 
, ti on.s. America's historical tradition repudiated the use of 
force for the collection of its·· debts, contending that American 
citizens who made foreign investments surrendered himself to the 
pro tee ti on of that country and could rely only upon Ameri C8.n good 
. . 1J4 
offlces in attempt to secure Just treatment. Senator Rayner 
felt that such notions should be made to "realize that they must 
r;,•rform the obligations of a ci vi 11 zed society, and that if their 
~- -
property is rightfully seized upon their failuri to do so, we do 
not intend to intervene unless an attempt is made to subvert their 
ins ti tu ti on • 
• • • We repudiate t'he doctrine th8.t the flag fol-
lo~·Is a contract.,. l3 5 
The American people would then declare that the Monroe Doc-
trine places upon them no obligation to protect such states when 
they have arbitrarily done wrong to foreign countries or their ci-
tiz8nS. ::Iovrnver, when the action taken by European powers to re-
dress such grievances took the form of territorial occupation or 
8cquisition the United States was opposed to its continuation. 136 
1J3 
Francis G. Newlands, "The San Domingo Question," :t-Jorth 
Ar~eric8n Review, CLXXX (1905), p. 888, 
134 
Ibid., p, 893, 
135 
Randolph G. Adams, "Santo Domingo: A study in Benevolent 
Imp~rialism," South Atlantic Quarterly, XX (1921), p. 20, 
1J6 
~!ewlands, p. 895. 
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1.rhe treaty proposed by Roosevelt according to Senator Newlands ~in 
valves a new departure in our policy and active pRrticipation in 
t~1e a ff8 i rs of the 2epublics of South and Central America and of 
t!1c Caribbean Sea - a protectorate over all of them." lJ7 In plai-
i-,c,r }3ngue.ge Senator Tillman of South Carolina evaluated the trea-
ty as saying, "Here we are, your big brother; you are not behaving 
right, you have got to settle a·nd if you do not settle, we viill 
ttl 11138 dditi 1 1~hip you and make you se e. . A . ona opposition was ~oun-
Led because Roosevelt attempted to eliminate the Senate as much as 
possible from regulation of the' conducts of foreign affairs. :t-:rew-
" !.~r.ds feared "if we once entered on a .policy of active intcrven-
tion, we might become involved in such intervention perplexities 
8.S to d1~1 ft us away from the domestic problems that concern us :·139 
Roosevelt complained to Steffens, "the treaty is so obviously 
in the interest of the United States 1 in tl:e interest of Santo Do-
i:~1n.:;0 1 and in the lnterest of the entire civilized world that no· 
;:.:u.bs tan ti al opposition could by any possi bi li ty have been aroused 
140 
save on purely factional grounds." Later ~epresentative Bab-
: 
e·::>ck related that Roosevelt confided to him that party lines had 
1J7 
Ibid., p. 888. 
1J8 ,'.:' 
Adams 1 p. 20. 
1J9 
Newlands, p. 886. 
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Roosevelt to Stephens, February 6 1 1906, }'orison, V, 
r. 
~ 
' 
L ,·.r··r· . '.,, ... , flrnwn in the .Senate on the treaty and the dcfirint attitude of 
T/e:nczuela could be attributed to lnck of senn.torial support of l1is 
141 
rolicies. The entire Roosevelt Corollary was to be disavowed 
by the Senate's erasure of the Santo Domi~go treaty and the fail· 
142 
to r2 ti fy even its arr:ended form. He wrote to Carnegie. "Grad-
t::::.J.ly we are coming to a condition which will insure permanent 
peace in the Western Hemisphere. If only the Senate.will ratify 
L '.w S::mto Domingo treaty, we shall have ts.ken anot!:er stride in 
this direction. 11143 Later in a· letter to Taft, he confessed "the 
opposition to Santo Domingo is opposition to Panama. 11144 In a le 
ter to James E. 'llatson he elaborate~ on this point. "The opposi-
!)on to the adoption of the tre0-ty by which ou.r rip;ht to build the 
1Pan8ma Canal was secured, a part at least of the opposition even 
now being made to the ratificEttion of the Santo Domingo trea.ty, 
which is one more step in the effort to make peaceful and secure 
145 the waters through which the route of the canal leads." 
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141 
"The Situation in Santo Domingo," Independent, LVIII 
(~arch 30, 1905), p. 688. 
142 
"1·:here the Santo Domingo Affair Leaves the President and 
the Monroe Doctrine," Harper's Weekly, XLIX {April, 1905), p. 457. 
143 
~oosevelt to Carnegie, August 6, 1906, ~orisqn, V, p. 346. 
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Roosevelt to Taft, August 17, 1906, Morison, V, p. 365. 
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Roosevelt to J. E. Watson, August 18, 1906, Morison, V, · 
p. 374. 
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I 
f In answer to critics of the 
; Sooscvelt was quick to point out 
Constitutionality of his actio~s, 
"the Constitution did not expli-
cit ly give me the power to bring a bout the :necessary G_greement 
vi th Santo Domingo. But the_Constitution did not forbid me to do 
, ,:"wt I did, 0146 Reflecting on the di ff'i cul ties he faced in secur-
- J_ ng the passage of the treaty, he recognized one of the fundamen-
t~l choracteristics of the American people who "will, for instanc 
flame up about the Monroe Doctrine the minute they think it men-
·:-;_ced in the concrete. but will be utterly indifferent while· r am 
struggling to get through arrangements with Santo Domingo, or the 
Central American States, which, if ~dopted, would put the Monroe 
Doctrine beyond the possibility of jeopardy, because they would 
enable us to see that no ~ossible excuse existed for violating 
. t It 147 1 • Ee o.lso stated to Taft, "it took me two years to c;et 
through the Santo Domingan treaty - a treaty which was of unlimi-
ted benefit to this country - simply becau_se the people as a whole 
would not bother their heads ab~ut the situation. 11148 
The eventual successful passage of the treaty in 1907 was due 
in large measure to thi efforts of Elihu Root. Roosevelt wrote of 
him, "it 'i~as he who finally got the Senate to accept the Santo Do-
146 
}~elvin M. Knight, The Americans in Santo Dominp;o, (New· 
York: Vanguard Press, 1928), p. J2. 
147 
Roosevelt to A. H. Lee, June 27, 1911, Morison, VII, p.29c 
148 
Roosevelt to Taft, August 21, 1907, Morison, V, p. 761. 
rl ~ I 1 .~:nco treaty, which secured an oxtraordina~y increase in peace and I p1·osperi ty in Santo Domingo and may prove 11 terally invA.luable in 
'pointing out tte way for introducing peace 3.nd order in the Caric-
l'c;ins and around its borders. 11149 His success was due in lArge 
.rart to the rnutunl respect and coop~ration he ~sintained with the 
lccislature and the Senate Cornmi ttee on Foreign Relaticns in p9rti-
j°1118r, l50 Passage of this policy was due in part to the Progres-
• sives who failed to cast a single dissenting vote ag9inst the L __ _ i51 ~t·eaty. The Progressive, li~e Herbert Croly, felt the first 
task of a truly national foreign policy was to develop hemispheric 
,solidarity. 152 Roosevelt evaluated ~is policies at a speaking en-
:::;;:~ge:cent at the Howard Union, P~bruary 13, 1907 • 
.. 
I was immensely amused when at a p:rofessiorn1l peace meeting 
the other day, they incidentally alluded to ~e as having 
rr:ade "war" on Santo Domingo. The war I have war made 
literally consists in having them a collection of customs, 
at their request. We now give them 45~ of the customs to 
the Government, and the other 55% is put up to pay those of 
their debts which are found to be righteous. The Rrr8nge-
ment has gone on for two years now, while the coordinRte 
branch of the Government discussed whether or not I had 
149 
Roosevelt to Carnegie, February 20, 1909, Morison, VI, 
p. 1539. 
150 
Donald M. Dozer, "Elihu Root and Consular Reform," Missis-
0ippi VR~ley Historical Review,: XXIX (1942), p. J49. 
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The Progressive ~~ovement and American Foreign Policy, 1898-1916," 
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I 
usurped power in the matter, and finally concluded I had 
not, 8nd ratified the treaty of the 55% we have been s.ble 
to put $2,500,000 toward paying their debts; and with the . 
l~ 5:.~ thri. t we collected for them they have received more money 
th8n they even got when they collected lOO;'b therr.selves; and 
the island has prospered as never ~efore. I feel like para-
phrasing _Patrick Henryi "If this is war, ~ake the most 
of it."I53 - . . . 
~Qoscvelt wrote Lodge and expressed himself in the same vein. 
~e have interfered any at the request of the Santo Domingo 
people. We have interefered with the hearty approval of 
the foreign debt holders, because our interference bene-
fits them sorr,e1·;hat, although it benefits the Santo Domingo 
fPople much more. Its benefits are chiefly by preventing 
chaos and misery in an island so near t~c:ps that its wel-
fare must always cause us some concern • ../} 
~oot h'Tote to Hollander concerning t.he treaty on ~·~ay 7, 1907. 
' The present tre~ty •• ~ contains; not only a proposition 
that t~e United States shall ensure the service of the 
debt by collecting and applying the revenu~s, but also 
that the United Stat~s shall adjust the debt to which the 
revenues are to be applied. · 
The question has arisen in my mind 1·1hether the two questicns 
could not be separated, the debt being adjusted on a feir 
snd reason9ble basis by someone actj_ng under the authority 
of Santo Do~ingo, and making the adjustment conditional 
upon the United Sta~es ens~ing the service of the debt 
substantially as provided by the pending treaty. We would. 
have a different pr_oposi tion to present the Senate; tl".v~ t 
is, the simple proposition-of answering the service of 
the debt already adjusted. This, perhaprr, might be free 
from sooe of the objections which are made to the pending 
trcaty.i)5 . 
Root at the Jrd Conference of American Republics at Rio de 
253· 
Bishop, pp. 434-435. 
154 
Roosevelt to Lodge, April 30, 1906, Yorison, V, p. 256. 
155 
Jessup, pp. 546-547 • 
:-rr:·~iro on July Jl, 1906 rcitE:rated the !-:.ILcric;_,_n l)osition rec;nrct-
its southern neighbors. 
1:~0 Hish for no victoi·ics'but those of p2,,,c,e, for no terri-
Lory except our own; for no sovereignty except sovereicnty 
over ourselves. We deem the independence and equal rights; 
nf the smallest and ~eakest member of the fanily of nation~ 
entitled to as much respect as those of the greatest empire, 
:::nd '·~e deem the observance of that rcspGct the chief sue_rFtnty 
of the ~eak acainst the oppression of the strong. We neither 
claiE1 nor desire any rights, or privileges, or powers that 
1·;e do not freely concede to every American Republic. \·~e wish 
to j_ncrease our prosperity, to expend our tr~!.de, to e;row in 
:·:c:Jlth, in wisdom, and in spirit, but otT eonception of the 
true l-!AY to o.ccomplish this is not to pu11 c'l o~,,n others and 
T,rofi t by their ruin, but to help all frier1ds to a common 
prosperity and a common growthi that we may all become 
greater and stronger together. 56 
Roosevelt voiced much the same sentiments in a letter to Carne~ie. 
With Santo Domingo we have just negotiated a treaty especial-
ly designed to prevent the need of any intRrference either 
hy us or by any foreign nation with the i:nb:)rnal affairs of 
the island, while at the same time securing the honest credi-
tors their debts and to the govenllient of the island an 
assured income, and giving to the islanders ther.r1selves the 
chance, if they take advant:;i.~e of it, to achieve the internal 
peace they so sorely need. ~ .· 
r::he powers ere_nted the United States by the above mentioned 
81istoms Convention of 1907 did not con-sti tute a greater infringe-
on the sovereignty of the Domini"can Republic than when Heur-
hcd first alienqted the cuE:inms houses. This action still 
t-:;l'n_nted the protection of the modus vi viendi from European inte~­
i 
vcntion and thus continued Dominican credit and revenue. Such ac-
also abolished permanently the danger of fnfrir:gerlent of the 
156 
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'.'onroe "Goct:cine by i~uropean to collect their clRims • 1 58 The con-
vention 1·10.s different from the •)ld agreement that United States du 
. !~.ot 11.Ldertc~~\:e to cdjust or determine the Dominican clebt but r.ierely 
to administer the customs of the ~epublic for the service of a new 
t loan. ':'he proceec1 s of the customs were devoted to the a1210rti za tit'l' 
,of all the recoenizcd debts and claims at a level acceptable to 
hath republics and the creditors. The responsibility for such ~c-
ti on •·~as limited to fifty years o.:nd could be ended earlier incid _; 
to the [illortization of the debt. During this period the Dominic0n 
2~plhlic was not be increas~ its public debt nor modify its import 
~uties unless Agreed upon by the U~ited States. 159 
After his presidency Roosev~lt maintained his interest in {he 
cond'Ll.ct of Latin American affairs~ He voiced hope that "all of 
self-coverLlnent, of material prosperity, of potential strength, 
end of political and social conduct as to make the Monroe Doctrin 
in the sense of bei:r;.g merely a unllaters.l doctrine, a thing of 
past 3nd to substitute for it a conrnon agreencnt among all the f 
republics of the New World. 11160 • _At Rio de Janerio he reiterated 
his desire that Latin American nations "sufficiently advanced" 
should pnrticipate on an absolute equality in the responsibilities 
and development• of the Monroe Doctrine and that it must be made a 
158 
Welles, pp. 918-191. 
159 
Hollander, "The u.s. and the Dominican Republic," p. 295. 
160 
Blakeslee, p. 82; 
' 
conti:ncntal and not a unilatera~·-
161 
c.octrine. If In Uraguay he add-
ed: 
It is in no sense a doctrine of onc-si~ed 8dv0ntage; it is 
to involke only in the interest of our com~onwenlth of the ; 
;:es tern Hemisphere. It shonld be invo~ed ~-,y all our natiors 
in a spirit of mutual self-respect end on a footing of com~ 
plete equality of both right and obligation. I congratulate 
the eountries of South l0crnerica tr.at I have visited th8.t ·their 
prosTess is such in justice, political stability and natiocal 
prosperity as to make them also the sponsor of the Monroe 
Doctrine, so that, as regards them, all that the United 
States has to do is to stand ready as one of the great 
brotherhood of American £iz1-~ions to join with them in uphold-
ing the ~onroe Doctrine, 0 • 
In a letter to A. D. White Roosevelt evaluated the ~:onroe 
Doctrine as having done "more for the peace of the Western IIemis:_ 
.. 
phere, ond if lived up to will do more· in the future for the peace 
~f the Western Hemisphere, than everything done by the ultra-peac 
at-sny-price men during the last sixty years taken together.•• 163 
The Administrations immediately following Roosevelt adopted 
hls general policies, The period was marked by an ever incressing 
r:~or th2t the ls.nds bordering the Panama Canal would fail to meet 
164 their obligations and fall.prey to European interventions. A.rn-
161 
r.1. Stull Eol t, "The United States and the Defense of the 
1 '.·:c:s 3~·1rn Ecr::isphere, 1815-1940," Pacific Historical Review X(l941), p. _.,. 
162 
J. VarelB., "The Meaning of the Monroe Doctrine to the Re-
public of Uruguay," in The Centenary of the Monroe Doctrine a sup-
plement to Annals, CXI. (1924), p. 23. 
163 
Roosevelt to A. D. White, Nov. 2, 1914, :Morison, VIII,:A82A 
D3na G. Munro, 'T'he United Stn tcs c-.nd the Cori bbean Are:-i, 
(~oston: World Peace Foundation, 1934), p. 216. 
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cr:i ·=··i.ns dcsir,:-d to pror:~ote public order, alon3 1·:i th sound econo::iic 
'' d 1d pol:i.ticnl dcvelopment.
165 The 1Jomingan formula was expanded 
to ot'hcr of the f.:'3.ribbean states with equ9l 
166 
SllCCC~SS • Te ft' s 
8 ;J>r,inistration w-::.s narl{ed by outright military intervention to 
safccuard the security of the 167 Can8 l ree;i on. T:"' ft fe 1. t 
c<::->::ntial "th:qt the countries within that sphere sh:?..11 be rer:".OV(~d 
fro:-:1 the jeopardy involved by heavy foreign debt and chaotic na-
t:i 0n:J. l finances and f:com the ever present cl2,_nger of international 
co::1plications due to disorders at home. 11168 The \r!ilson ndminist 
tion ~lso accepted the principles of the Roosevelt Corollary. 16 9 
~!hi le both the T<J.ft and Hilson o.dmfnistrations 0-dopted the R·oose-
',:eJ. t ~orollary they did 11 ttle to rtdapt it to thRir oHn si tua ti qn 
is to say, the Corollary w~s used exactly as it had been des-
cl'i bed by Roosevelt r-:J.nd the succeeding two ad~i:r.istrations offered 
r.ew interpretation ·of the :Monroe Doctrine and are not sufficie 
significant to merit further discussion. 
The Rooseveltian interpret:;i.tion of the Vionroe Doctrine gave 
165 
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166 
Perkins, Ap;p:ro3.ch, pp. 58-59. 
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Weinberg, p. 432. 
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r.i:unro I Intervention, p. '331. 
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t~c D~ited Stntes a hegemony over 170 the ~estcrn Hemisphere. In 
~1ir0ss delivered on April 2, 1903, Roosevelt referred more.to 
)>:~··~·-nny th.:in the Vonroe Doctrine when he ::;::-,id th~t it is only 8. 
;·,1·iLG~ ple ·:rnd exprr~s.sed the hope that some day it 1•TOUld be a pni·t I: 
171 
of international lsw. Both, however, are recognized lines of 
co~i11ct respected by the States and, despite exceptions, have been 
cor.s tcJntly applied B.l1d have force behind them, 172 Root was ·co;>~ l 
o~ the fact that tho doctrine l'Jas not international law but: 
rcste~ upon the right of self-protection which was so reco3nized. 
a derivative of the concept of sovereignty and was recog-
extending beyond the lir1it.S- of the ter:citorigl jurisdic-
173 
of t~c strite exercising it, If the doctrine h8d never 
~~clared, however, limitations would still have been placed 
on the activities of the Americap states by each other. Such re-
str:i.ctio:1s devo1~1e from treaty obligations to which states are stit 
174 jcct ::1i>.d the duties irr..posed under inte1~national law. The Vene-
~ucla crisis offered an example of both the obligations involved 
170 
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Alvorez, p. 228. 
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173 
. ~ 'nPrn Root, Adresses on International Subjects, ed. by 
· r:o1:;crt Jo.con and James Brown Scott (Cambridge: }!arvard trni versi ty 
Press, 1916), p. 111. 
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~ ~ci l11;. 175 
The richt of cvel'Y sovereign state to p::.~ot2ct; itself by pre-
venting a condition of affairs in which could injure it was also 
, ~·,_:: co1_::::ii zed by internati on1.;~ 1 lr.:ii·;r. Such action, ho\·Jever, 'ilould be 
I ·..:is ;::ffecti ve as the po·,; er behind it • 176 Th:l. s rL:::;i1t, just '3.S the 
:~onroe Doctrtne, did not impose. any respcnsi bill ty on the l!ni ted 
St:~tes or any other country to exercise it, Therefore the Unitdd 
States did not have a need, other than its own co:1Sidcrations, to 
int,::1·vene .on the behalf of European Powers to collect debts, coe 
, ecmduct, redress wrongs, ·or reven3~ injuries suffered at the [\.snds 
I.of the le.tin American s_tates. 1 77 The ;:onroe Doctrine did not 
cssert, imply or involve any rights on the part of the United 
St::>ctcs to impair or control the independent sovereignty of any 
/l __ r:-ierie9.n state as this sovereignty is the bs,sis of international 
, 178· i:-:1~r. Root noted that: 
A false conception of what the r.-:onroe Doctrine is, of what 
it demands and what it justifies, of its scope and of its 
limits, has invaded the public press ond affected public 
opinion within the past few years. Grandiose schemes or· 
national expe.nsion invoke the Monroe Doctrine. Interested 
175 
Elihu Root, The Military and Colonial Policy of the United 
S t::-d.:es: A<idresses and Re orts, ed. by Robert Bacon and James 
Brown Scott Cambridge: Harvard University _Press, 1916), p. 107. 
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177 
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178 
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__ l_, I 
:~otives to compel Central or South Americ8 countries to do1 
or :c2frnin from doing sonething by '•lhi ch individual Americ::i.113 
~ny profit invoke th~ ~onroe Doctrine. Clamors for national 
clory from minds too shallmi to grG.sp at the sm:1e time a 
scDse of national duty invoke the ;ton1-oe Doctrine. The 
intoler:,:.nce -::·rhi ch de1riands tha_t control over the conduct and 
the opinions of other peoples which is the essence of tyran-
ny in•:okes the Monroe Doc~rine. Thou,o;htlcss people who see 
no di ffe:ccnce between lawful right and physical pm<Jer assume 
th~t the ~onroe Doctrine· is a warrant for interference in 
~~he intern-:iJ. aff;:1irs of all weaker Y'l.Gtions in the J'!ei\ World. 
Apqinst this suppositious doctrine, mRhy protests both in 
the United States Hnd in South America h8.ve been m8_de,,8nd 
jnstly msdc. To the ;c;0
9
:al ~1onroe Doctrine these protests 
' a ~ye l' -<. • 1 1 ( n'-,v no 8.pp _ _1.C8-vlo.1. 
The Roosevelt Corollary 1;;-as no inevitable deduction from the 
lnnr:;uo.ge of President Monroe according to Perkins. He goes on to 
~8Y tlmt it was revolutionary for 1t transformed the doctrine i6-
l"~nnded for the protection of the New World states ~gainst inter-180 vcnti on by Europeans into a doctrine of J\mer i can interventions. 
rcr~dns criticized Roosevelt for adopting the principle of inter:-
~"'"_1 ti on~ 1 poll ce power as a general principle and to rel8 te such a 
0bli.::;3_tion to the Doctrine. He based his opinion on a belief that 
the United States must not be tied down to :--my such generaliza-
181 
tion. Other critics had noted that Roosevelt made two assump-
tions not found in Monroe's message; first that the doctrine pre-
vented other nations from interfering in America, secc:nd, that 
b'.lc1n·;8rd or impotent countries must be policed and helped by some 
179 
Jessup, p. 561. 
180 
Perkins, Bist6ry of the Monroe Doctrine, 1867-1907. 
181 
IM_ d. , p. 464. 
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'.,.-iv,n:ced n:_:i.tion. !:oon concluded the first ~_1ssvJ11ption is fBlse ~,nd 
the second is the fund::tment8l dogma of modern imperi8.lism. 182 
Jn the movement toNord the reversal of the Roosevelt Caroll-
,; ry, Surrirner Welles, outhor of the fam.ed work in S?cnto Domin,s;Bn · 
r,,~f;:;irs, N'."lboth'~_:.i[ineyard, i'ias one of the pri:ne :novers.lSJ Eis 
inflw:;nce in the State Department was still felt when he published -
his book two years previous to the time the elark iv:emorandu.in sig-
nnlled the rep~diation of the Roosevelt Corollary. According to 
Cl2.rk "the so-coJ.led 'Roosevelt Corollary' was to the effect, i:;.s 
cenerally Understood, that in case of financial or other difficul-
- . 
t:ies in weak I.a tin Aw::;ric'?.n countries! the United States should 
?tt<)'"ript an adjustment thereof lest European Governu.ents should in-
tervene, 1-Jnd intervening should occupy terri tory--'.:'tn G.ct i:ihich 
l 1 t t h · i 1 f t' 1 • n 
184 
«;ou .d .)e con rary o t e princ p es o ne i·:onroe .;octrine." 
The Doctrine Clark holds "states a case of the United States vs. 
185 Surope, not of the United States vs. Latin America." Therefore 
1.1e co~cludes "It is not believed that the Corollary is justified 
t•y t~'1c terms of the l~onroe Doctrine, however ,much 1 t may be justi-
182 
J\":oon, p. 162. 
18J 
Perkins, Approach, p. 182. 
124 
Clark, p. xxiii. 
lP. 5 
~·, p. xix. 
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':'ivJ f:lc1rk !·:ernor,-,.ndum nar1<ed the repudiation of the ?.oosevclt Coro-
11nry and sign8lled ~hat was later to develop ns the Good Neighl)or 
Policy. 'l'he h..,sis of. this policy 1·ras the abstinence from force on 
the r~rt of the United States and th~t its action should be con-
187 
ag:c8e:nent. 
eo~c1udcd at the Special Inter-Americen Conference for the :·".ainte-
r:·-,nce of rcace at Buenos Aires in 1936. It provided that: 
';'he High Contracting Parties declare ino.dmiss9ble the inter-
vention of any one of them, directly or indirectly, 2nd for 
~h2tever reason, in the i~~grnal or external affoi~s of 
nny other of the Parties, 
.. 
'.'.'he )oli ey of intervention i;.·ras 18.id to rest by the Good :l\'.ei~-
~or Policy. It was to be resurrected in spirit, at least, less 
t:~1sn v .. :cn ty ye:3rs later. A new form of forci gn intervention, Com-
L':'-mis:r, now th:cc::i.tened to initic~te an alienat.ion of American ter-
ritory. In Cara6as, in 1954, John Foster Dulles sounded the call 
~~Pt ~ould mean an adoption of Roosevelt's principles to a new era 
"':'he doninci.tion or control of the political institutions of any 
( 
J.,.cJ.::ri c~:i.n state by the ir: terna tional communist. movement • 
• • 
186 
Ibid., pp. xxiii-xxiv. · 
ie.7 
Dexter Perkins, The Evolution of !irr:ericnn Fo~eign Poli cv. 
York: Oxford University Press, 19&8), p. 12b. ·' · 
188 
Pratt, Aneric~'s Colonial Experiment, p. 323. 
c;oi-::c.ti tutc a thrc8t to tt.e soverei,snty and political indcpendenqc 
. 139 
of t~·1e Ar.tci.'ican stn.tes." The result of th:ls new concern for 
~]crican sscurity in effect broke up the f8mily of nations concept 
thqt was the basis of the Good Neighbot 'Policy. The entire con-
cept, l10v:ever, ·;·;::,_s not de:=-tr to the hearts of L::o.tin ADerico.ns to 
• 
'l'>.e often-used metaphor of: an inter-Ameri ce.n "family" · 
p~::r!ni tted. the United States to consider itself as bis 
brother, rich uncle, or even head of tl::.e f9mily. ~1is­
toricRlly, we asserted, 11nder the Monroe Doctrine, the 
right and duty to protect the junior members of the 
f:iJ:',i ly, end tmcler the Theodore Roosevelt corolls ry, to 
ch:'"'sten them os necess9_ry. Such an attitude 1'!:.=i.s perh::i:ps 
~ccepted in the early ye~rs, hut it becaree increAsingly 
~alling to junior ~embers ~s the disperity of ~ealth and 
pov:er -;·:idencd D.Yld as the Uni t,-;d Stgtes gTe"':I norc pat1·onizing 
':-:r-•:1 ,,~::;s01·ti vc Di1d t}~:P. LR.tin Americc,ns :norc sensi ti \iG of 
their l.'1.G• This sensitivity was s.gc;ravo.ted by suspicions 
th~t--contradictory but ~lltually reinforcing--on the one 
11~1nd that ]'forth .11..meri CRD exp.1.)ra. t]on was to 1::1 "!me for the 
slower progress of the I"~tin peoples, and on the other--th:-:it 
they then;.sel ves had failed, t~q·5 perhaps in some way they 
~ere inferior to the gringos. ' 
'T'he Castro 2·evolution perE3onified the specter tha.t had h.<;_unt-
e:i tl:e ).r.lericans. A corrurn.mist regime had been installed a mere 
nirn:~ty miles off the American coast. This revolution was to sig-
nific;o.1!tly alter American policy, After Castro·_all insurrections 
·::ere :·:_ssurr.:ed to irivolve automatically the danger of a communist 
tal:c-over, 3nd thereby required direct mill tary intervention by 
t}1e 1in2- tecl States. The equ .. o:i. ti on "insurrection = comprnnism "" peri 1 
189 
Ronnld Steel, P8.X Americana (New York: The Viking Press'· 
1967), p. 202. 
190 
I bi ri • , p • 193 • 
~~o t::-- Pn:i_ ted Stn.tes K'J..S .9. direct conscqnencc of Cn_stro' s take-· 
The abortive Bay of Pigs • r • 1nvas1on to rt::nove c~1_stro prompted 
r-~,r,:~iir:-nt Kcnnc:;dy to make this appraisal of America's position in 
L· '.:in Arr:eri C8. 
Our restraint is not inexhaustible, Should it ever appe9r 
that the inter-American doctrine of rion-interfercnce Derely 
conceals or excuses a policy of non-action--if the nsticns: 
of this hemisphere should fail to meet their coTcrdtt:nc::r,ts 
2gninst outside com~unist penentration--then I W8nt it 
c1corly understood that this govcr:r1r1ent will not he~.>i tri_te 
in meeting its £:;i:::.~mary obligations, which are the security 
of this nation. ';) 
'i':ennedy was later to state: "We in this hemisphere mvst also 
l:.::;0 every resource at our command to prevent the establish11ent of 
:•hoth2r Cuba in this h~misphere. "l93 His successor phrased the 
s:.::rt:e sentir·;ents in a rwre homely fashion. "He don't p:r-opose to , 
3i t 1·1ere in our rocking chair with our hands folded and let the 
cor:,sr:.uni sts set up any government in the western hemisphere ... l94 
:Coth those administrations paid little more th0n lip service to 
the ideFtls of the Alliance for Progress, It h2.d been their policy 
to oake formal avowals of anti•communism within the context of the 
191 
Ihid,, pp. 219-220. 
192 
Ibid., p. 234. 
193 
Lyndon Johnson, "U,S. Acts to Mee·t the Threat in the Domi-
nic~n Republic," The Department of State Bulletin, LII (May 17, 
196 5), p. 746. 
191} 
Steel, p. 232. 
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• • i 1:-1-:::r::c-."...ru~ri can "fa;;·,i ly," of good neighborliness, c::.nd the princip]ss 
'of the OAS. The instruments it used however, held been based on·~ 
fl•S..[~ stick, the f~onroe Doctrine, e.r.d its oi·m refinc:1ent of the Bcos-
195 
cvelt Corol1~ry--the Johnson Doctrine. 
Ironically, it Kas th~ Dominican Republic which prompted the 
1~ecl8ration of the Johnson Doctrine, just as, it ~ad provided the 
I occc:si on for the fi ::cs t. appli ca. ti on of the . Roosevelt Co:toll.'.'rry. 
!The o"L1t1:,reak of trou1Jle in the ~ominican Tiepuclic in 1n.te Apri 1 Plrt 
f enrly ~ay, 1965 served as the vehicle for a re-Rffixmation of the 
policy of intervention by the United States to prevent the take-
. over of s. L'ltin Americ:.:i.n country by forces hostile to the interests 
()f t.hr_: l.'nited States. A subtle change hBd to.ken place, an j_dealo-
I regret that we may have to impose a military solution 
to a political problem •••• While leftist propaganda 
i·:ill :fuzy this up as a figh.t behreen those who want a 
Castro-type solution and those who oppose it. 
I don't ';•:rant to overdramatize, but if we deny the com-
:-nYYli.cations equipment, and if the opposition to the lef-
tists lose heart, we may 9e asking in the near fpture for 
a lq:nding of marines to protect United States ;L:r1terests 
195 
Ihid., p. 2Jl. 
·-::.nd for other purpose:s. 196 Vhat does Washinzton prefer? 
Other sources indicated t(1n.t captured d oc1Jrients and various 
:;0crct reports in the h:1nds of the C. I. A. sho~·red the crisis t? 
r·e L:crely the first on a long Corr1munist timet9.ble for the t8.keoYer 
197 
Senator Clark Kas sure the junta sent word 'cf I.ntin Arnerica. 
Ito ~~bassador Bennett that "you hG.d better send P..:ncrican troops in 
beco.use a Communist takeover threatens. 1 98 
President Johhson reacted in a series of speeches on April JO 
to r>=1y 2, 196 5. In the Apri 1 JO speech he first intir::ated that 
thn revolutionary struggle was more than a civil upheaval. 11 TI1ere 
are sicns that people trained outside the Dominican 1epuhlic are 
seeking to gain control. Thus the legitiEate ospirations of the 
. 
~o~inican people 2nd most of their leaders for progress, de~ocr2cy 
nnd socigl justice are threaten~d and so are the principles of the 
199 
inter-American system." The Kay 1 speech linked the responsi-
blli ties of this inter-P.nerican system and its adversion to com-
i::unisrn. "Today, forced with a threat to the principle of the In-
tcr-Aneri can system and the pe2,ce of the hemisphere, the OAS acted 
decisively." This action was due to the fact that "neither the 
Theodore Draper, "The Dominican Crisis': A Case Study in 
A7:':erica1~ Policy," Co10mentary, h~ (December, 1965), pp. 45-46. 
\ 
197 
Ibid • , p. 47 • 
198 
Ihid., p. 50, 
, 00 
-./ _, 
Johnson, "U.S. Acts," p. 71~2. 
·' j 
I St:::;.tcs, r..01~ ony nation, can want or per:ni t a return to th'"t 
hrutql and oppressive despotism which earned the condemnation and 
f-'l~~i shT!1ent of this hemisphere 'and of al 1 civilized humanity. W €: 
i11tcnd to carry on the struggle a~ainst tyranny no matter in wh~t 
5_.'Jcolosy it clca:rn itself. This is our mutual responsibility un,.. 
dcr ',:he '..lg1~eements we have signed and the cor!";mon values i.·1hich bind 
1, ,~ •.::> 
200 
toc;ether." 
The ~ay 2 speech was very much pointed and more b~llicose t: 
?DY of the President's previous state~ents. The allegation of 
Co1:n'.'lt.mist infiltration was age.in voiced. "The :revolution<=i_ry T'.!Ove-
' -: ~r1t. 'Sook ::i_ tre.gic turn. Conn;u:i!ist l~aders, mnny of then trAi:r.ed 
in Suba, seeing a chance to increase disorder, to cain a foothold, 
~oin0d the revolution. They took increasing control. And what 
12~?n as a popular democratic revolution, committed to democracy 
:>:J.d social justice, ve-zy short1y moved an1 1·:-as taken over and real-
1_y ~10izcd and placed into the hands of a band of Communist con-
201 .:1)i1~0tors." Although "revolution in any country is a mo.tter' 
for thqt country to deal with "this overriding circunstance mr>.de 
it :?~ "mo..tter for hemispheric action only ·when the object is the 
,::::3tablish:i1cnt of a co;:1munist di~te.torship." 202 The fear of such a 
:3;-:;ve1.op~:ient prompted Johnson to formulate what has been called his 
200 
Ibid., p. 7L1-3. 
201 
Ibid·., p. 74S. 
202 
Steel, p. 232. 
I 1·:r'.:'nt yon to knol'I', and I -i:·I,Jnt the vrnrld to know, thn.t 
:!.S long as I '.J.1'1 President of this country, we are going 
to defend ourselves. We will defend our soldiers against 
attackers. We will honor our treaties. ~e will keep our 
commit tments. W c wi 11 defend our D'i ti on 8.L;;Ji nst all those 
\:!10 seek to destroy not only the United States but every 
free cm1ntry of this hemis~1ere. We do not ~snt to bury 
. ..,11yovie "'S I c.,,; d 0 0 P' 0 ny ·ti· ····1 es 1~-"·"'c'r-"' P ..11t ',·.'t~ t".o r•ot 
'" ' ll f CC' UV.•- u 2.0:'.3 - . l!< Jt;.L -'--~ t '•• • • .J -• intend to be buried • 
.Johnson's actions and just-ifica.tion for tl!eEi p1'0:.:-:pted both 
~;o_·,~i:)? and critic1sB as had Roosevelt and on much the ssy:c :p~ci:nci-
~>le; Ancrica's right to intervene in another State's affciirs. t:'n-
rtc::sr::crct~,:ry of State Ball justified such action as it was design-
cJ. "~o cr-1rry out the f;_mdc-•Gental dc~ision of the A:':erics.n st0.tes 
~'1:~t the extension of Yarxist-Leninist power is inconp.qti ble i-.ri th 
:-.:i.c inter-A.merj_can systcm."204 Senn.tor Eussell of Georgis ne;reed 
·.:i th Johnson when he had cons~lted him regarding Don1inican develo1 
Lents. Russell was convinced Johnson "had no alternative other to 
proc0ed to send the Armed Forces to Santo Domingo to avoid anothe~ 
, - 205 
C1 l Cf;~_ • II 
Senator J. William Fulbright led the opposition to American 
intervention. He based his dissent on the basis that the justifi-
,·:'.3.tion for United States rested on "cinbiguous evidence, assuned 
203 
·.Johnson, "U.S. Acts,'' p. 747-7L1-8. 
2011-
Georce Ball, "The New Diplomacy' II The Department of st~tE~ 
nulJ~tin, LII (June 28, 1965), p. 1046. 
205 
Dia.per, p. 54. 
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domi-I .. 1 :co" t i'rom the be rel nni n,s that the revo 1 u ti on was Communist 
206 ::~'J.tecl or v:ould certainly become so." The sending of the troops 
to 1Jrotect 1~J:Jericon lives was dismissed in turn as being a ploy .to 
.: -. se home reEcti on to the troops' invasion. 11 In mid-afternoon of 
April 28, Col. Pedro B. Benoit, head of a junta which had been 
~~stily assembled, ~sked again this time in w~iting, for U.S. 
troops on the ground that this 11as the only 1-·ray to prevent a. Com-
r:Y:nist t::i.keover;· no T!J.erition Was l'Qede of the junta or inability to 
. 207 
protect American lives." Fulbright continued that this request 
~':-'.s rejected by 'dashington and Benoit informed that the U. S, woul1 
r::ot intervene unless ?.merican liveS' ·were endangered by 9. continued 
:H:t,Lor.. 'T'hus, if he clalmed that American lives were in danger, 
the U. S. would intervene, which is wh ... '1.t b?:.ppened. 208 Thus, Ful-
brizht concluded that "the U .s .. intervened in the Do.cni nican Bepub-
11c for the purpose of preventing the victory of a revolutionary 
f'orr;e which was judged to be Cominunist dominated. Cn the basis of 
Arhassodor Bennett's messages to Washington, there is no doubt 
th~::i.t the threat of Communism' rather than dan5er to American 11 ve·s 
\'!·_~s riis primary reason for reccm.mending mili ta~y inter~-rention. 11209 
206 
Ir-tel., p. 40. For Senator Fulbright's view of the inter-
~renti on see-his The Arrop.:ance of. Power. 
207 
Ibid., p. 50. 
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Ot!-1cr cri ~~ics hPld that the OAS 118.d gr~nted o.pproval to uni-
\ " 
lc: 1./T.'ll int.~r",-m1tion by the United States, and o.s a result hod 
:,:-,,r;doneci its role as a juridical organization Hnd a force for ha.F-
, 210 ~ony nnd law in the ~estern Hemisphere.- Johnson's actions, 
-') t: ,e;x-3 felt, rcsu l ted not from Conmunist strength in the Domini c'!'m 
I B c public but a ''ea k non-Cofnnuni st element, The non-Communist for-
ces Kere too weak, too lacking in political sophistication, ·and 
too little skilled in the arts of government to i•:i thstrind Com:riur:ist 
. 211 infiltration and subsequent control. 
Undersecretary of State Mann reacted violently to chRr~es tl 
,non-:l.ntervention had b~co:ne o1)solet!e. 
I J.::now of no ;!!nshington offieials who think this way, 
Cn the contrary, I believe unilateral intervention by 
one American state in the internal political affairs of 
:1nother is proscribed in the OAS Charter but that non-
intervention is a keystone of the structure of the inter-
American system. American sta.tes have a treaty as ~-;ell 
as a sovereign right to choose their political, social 
1 ~nd economic systems free of all outside interference.~-2 
Johnson, as :1oosevelt before him, made his position unmistak-
::_:i_hly clear. "Our eoal is to help to prevent another con:1n.unist '~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~· 
210 
R. 'I', Pohan, "The Domi~1j_ can Case: Uni lnteral Interventia-i." 
::'J:c ";,r~,cric>.'n Journql of International Lnw, IX (Oct., 1966), p. Al?. 
211 
Dr.'3.per, p· .. 60. 
212 
i·Tqnn, "The Dominican Crisis: Correcting Some Xisconcep- · 
tions," The D0partm~=mt of State Bulletin, LIII (November 8, · 1965) 
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! '--- ·- ·-h" ' - . ' - 11213 ,..,,, .L 1 ~ ] t• ;c- ;· 0_·,•c in ,,_.1s ne::r111spr1e_ce. _d1e acr,ua .:.ornu __ a ion of new !~r:·er-
jcnn i11tervention policy, like Roosevelt, Kas based on broad prjn-
d_)J.cs l:h i ch could be interpreted in E:;i_ny v;:;Ti ous r::CL<:>nings ~md 
dcc:raes depending upon the disposition of the United States. To 
1
-:oiYison threats to order included not only insu:iT..:::ct5-on, but evr.:m 
c;ur'Ie:r.:;ion :"-nd infiltr~1_tion. :re held "i·rhen a co1:--,1:-1vn1st group seoo 
to exploit misery, the entire free Americ2n system is put in dead-
ls -~k·ns;e:r." The dc;_::Tee of de0d ly dancer the EL-:r~e p1·es1~nce of com-
::,m:.i st groups involved or 1·;ho :·:as to determine ~·•hen such a pot er:= 
tial danger had become a dc2dly danger was not specified. ActuAl-
ly, the United States was again gi~en a c0 rte hlsnche in decid1n~ 
. ' --- ----~.o...,. --·-
~ ~,·'f~en, · ~·:11ere, ::.nd to what degree she chose to intcrver:e 1·:i th troops I . . 
.;,.1 T.-,t:J"n f,-...,Crl°C:> ~lJC"t 1°t haQ' done ov·:>r c1"vf-y< n,-,,~r~ '°'',_.,":•io113"l'7 214 
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'rhe sin118:rity bet;·reen Roosevelt and Johnson is even more 
,, 
vividly seen in this statement which could have been ffiade by eit~-
1 
er ·:_iut Vis.s m~_.:idc 'Jy Jo~:J:}son. "We seek no territory. We do riot 
to impose our will on anyone. We intend to work for the self 
deterrr:ination of the peoples of the Americas within tte framework 
215 
o:- freedom," The Johnson Doctrlne "although regarded by some 
n 'new corollary to the Monroe Doctrine' nothing more th~n 
21J 
·steel, p. 235. 
214 
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215 
L~rndon ,To1.•nson, "The Search for a Durable Peo_ce in the 
')o:~,:~_nj c~:n "':r~public," The Dep9rtrr.cnt of St9te 1?u1leti~, LII (Jun·:= 
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,a case of self-defense for protecting the security of the u.s ... 216 
Irr this be true, Clark's ririteria for judging the Roosevelt Carol-l I 
'18.ry is just as applicable to the Johnson Doctrine. "It is not 
I jbelieved that the corollary is _justified by the application of the 
1 doctrlne of self-preservation. 112·17 
II The Johnson Doctrine is representative of two of the import-1 ant innovations of Theodore Roosevelt in regard to the Monroe D,)c-
i trine. The first of these, armed American intervention to prevent 
ithe implantation of a foreign power hostile to the interests of: 
'the United-States in Latin America, was resurrected and adopted 
'for modern use. The fear of a Communist takeover was substituted 
:ror the fear of a European intervention of sixty yeaTS previotdy. 
rrhe Roosevelt Corollo.ry was 11 berated from the grave it had been 
'laid into by the Clark Memorandum and the successive Good Neighbor 
I 
0 Policy. Its adapted form shows its lasting impact on American di-
J 
lplomacy in the Western Hemisphere. I Its very adaption is the second Rooseveltian innovation. 
tRoosevelt had earlier stated, "No such policy as that of the Mon-
' roe Doctrine c~n remain fossilized while the nation grows, Either 
'it must be abandoned or it muqt. be modified to meet the changing 
216 
·Larman c. Wilson, "The Monroe Doctrine, Cold War Anachro-
1 nism: Cuba and the Dominican Republic," The Journal of Politics, 
1 28 (May, 1966), p. J46. 
217 
Clark, p. xxiii to xxiv. 
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!needs of national life. 11218 The Johnson Doctrine as it modifie<l 
lthe Monroe Doctrine to meet the problems and threats of a new era, 
1 Conununism, vindicated this position. 
The Roosevelt Corollary as it developed through the annual 
· message of 1902, the letter to the Cubans in 1904, Roosevelt's I . 1letter to Root on M~y 20, 1904, and the actual pronunciation in 
the annual message of 1904 ranks as or:e of the major milestones in 
;/1_r,1erican diplomacy, or lack of it. From its inception it ruled 
the conduct of foreign policy in the Western Hemisphere, through 
the administrations of Taft and Wilson it gained acceptance and a 
wider application. • Its renunciation by the Clark Memorandum did 
i~ot extinguish its impact on Latin American affairs. Throughout 
the era of the Good Neighbor Po.licy the BiS Stick was still suspect. 
in all American dealings with their neighbors to the South. The 
reincarnation of the Roosevelt Corollary in the adapted form of 
Johnson Doctrine only served to give substance to such doubts and 
suspicions• , 
The question of whether Roosevelt was merely an imperialist 
bent on wielding the "Big Stick" over the heads of less powerful 
'neighbors or whether he was one of the humanitarians of his days 
need further study and refinement. In the two episodes I selected 
for this study, these two elements are essentially in~olved. To 
say that they are equally represented would be to miss the point 
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! c.nd probably the truth. Roosevelt was first and above all else 
i concerned with America's secur!~ ty and its posi tlon as a world powe ! His training and intellectual assumptions further demonstrated I 
I this concern with America's world reputation and responsi bi li ti es. 
I Inherent in many of his belie'fs, however, was a desire and concer 
to tmprove the lot of those less-fortunate than himself. The con 
cept of Manifest Destiny which recognized American preponderanC'es 
ln the Western Hemisphere also implied what has been called "The 
~·lhi te Man's Burden." 
. . 
The precept of Anglo-American superiority he accepted in b?t 
I the Darwinian and Neo-J_.a.marckia.n sf!nse. That is both a natural-f selection which resulted in the biological superiority of the wMic 
I ;orthern Hemisphere dweller and the debilitating effects of the 
f Southern Hemisphere influenced the preponderance of this ruling 
I class, In order to maintain their position, it was necessary for 
them to oversee these people but to treat them fairly and eventu-
ally instruct them in the art of self-goverrnnent. 
Roosevelt's actions demonstrate this dual influence on his 
policy making decisions. The. Coronary itself points out this 
duality. For strategic reasons it was necessary to prevent Euro-
pean intervention and to uphold America's international reputatio 
(it could not permit disorder at its very door). T~ use of fore 
to bring about responsible government implied a teaching process 
in its application. Intervention would be required until respon-
sible mature leaders could be found. Such action could take plac 
J~nly if the people themselves were educated in the art of self-
) 
~ ~government. 'rhis intervention was necessary as long as education 
land self-improvement were denied the natives, even if by their 
loNn actions. To end the need for intervention, the causes for it 
!must be eradicated. It fell upon the intervening power to take 
I such measures as necessary to alleviate the situation. In Latin 
! America, the United States was the sole 1ntervene1~ under the prin-
l ciples of the Monroe Doctrine. It was, therefore, its respon~ibi-
f llity to educate the inhabitants in conduct proper to the mainten-
lance of order. 
Roosevelt was the wielder of the Big Stick and to a signifi-
• :cant degree the Big Brother of the South American states. 
! 
' 
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APPENDIX I 
Message from the President of the United States, 
transmitting a protocol of an agreement between the 
United States and the Dominican Republic, providing for 
the collection and disbursement by the United States of 
the customs revenues of the Dominican Republic, signed 
on February 7, 1905. 
To the Senate: 
I submit herewith a protocol concluded between the 
Dominican Republic and the United States. 
The conditions in the· Republic of Santo Domingo have 
been growing steadily worse for many years. There have been 
many disturbances and revolutions, and debts have been con-
tracted beyond the power of the Republic to pay. Some of 
these debts were properly contracted and are held by those 
who have a legitimate right to their money. Others are 
without question improper 9r exorbitant, constit-t:ting 
claims which should never be paid in full and pe:chaps only 
to the extent of a very small portinn of their nominal 
value. 
Certain foreign countries have long felt themselves 
aggrieved because of the nonpayment of debts due their 
citizens. The only way by which foreign creditors could 
ever obtain from the Repub].ic itself any guaranty of pay-
ment would be either by the acquisition of territory out-
right or temporarily, or else by taking possession of the 
customs-houses, which would of course in itself, in effect, 
be taking possession of a certain amount of territory. 
It has for some time been obvious that those who profit 
by the Monroe Doctrine must accept certain responsibilities 
along with the rights which it confers; and that the same 
statement applies to those ~ho uphold the doctrine. It can 
not be too often and too emphatically asserted that the 
United States has not the slightest desire for terrttorial 
aggrandizement at the expense of any of its sou~hern neigh-
bors, and will not treat the Monroe doctrine as an excuse 
for such aggrandizement, on· its part. We do not propose 
to take any part of Santo Domingo, or exercise any other 
control over the island save what is necessary to its finan-
cial rehabilitation in connection with the collection of 
revenue, part of which will be turned over to the govern-
ment to meet the necessary expense of running it, and part 
.r which will be distribut o rata among the creditors 
of the Republic upon a basis of absolute equity. The justi-
fication for the United States taking this burden and in-
curring this responsibility is to be found in the fact 
that it is incompat:tble With international equity for the 
United States to refuse to allow other powers to take the 
only means at their disposal of satisfying the claims of 
their creditors and yet to refuse, itself, to take any such 
steps. 
An aggrieved nation can without interfering with the 
Monroe Doctrlne take what action it sees fit in the adjust-
CTent of its db?utes with American states, provided that 
action does not take the shape of interference with thei~ 
form of Government or of the despoilment of their terri-
tory under any disguise. But, short of this, when the 
question is one of a money claim, the only way which remains, 
finally, to collect it is a blockade, or bombardment, or 
the seizure of the custom-houses, and this means, as has 
been said above, what is in effect a possession, even 
though only a temporary possession, of territory. The 
United States then becomes a party in interest, because 
under the Monroe doctrine it cfan not see any European power 
seize and permanently occupy the· territory of one of these · 
republics; and yet such seizures of territory, disguised 
or undisguised, may eventually offer the only way in which 
the power in question, can collect any debts, unless there 
is interference on the part of the United States. 
One of the difficult and increasingly complicated 
problems, which often arise in Santo Domingo, erows out 
of the violations of contracts and concessions, sometimes 
improvidently granted, with valuable privileges and exemp-
tions stipµlated for upon grossly inadequate considerations 
which were burdensome to the State, and which are not in-
.frequently disregarded and violated by the governing au-
thorities. Citizens of the United States and of other 
governments holding these concessions and contracts appeal 
to their respective~governments for·active participation 
protec1:1on and intervention. Except for arbitrary wrong, 
done or sanctioned by superior authority, to persons or to 
vested property rights, the United States Government, 
following its traditional usage in such cases, aims to go 
no futther than the mere use of its good offices, a measure 
which frequently proves ineffective. On the other hand, 
there are governments which do sometimes take energetic 
action for the protect1on of their subjects in'the enforce-
ment of merely contractual claims, and thereupon American 
concessionaries, supported by powerful influences, make 
loud appeal to the United States Government in similar 
cases for similar action. They complain that in the 
actual posture of affairs their valuable properties are 
practically confiscated, t{la.t American enterprise is 
paralyzed, and that unless they are fully protected, even 
by the enforcement of their merely contractual rights, it 
means the abando11ment to the subjects of other governments 
of the interests· of American :brade and commerce through 
the sacrifice of their investments by excessive taxes im-
posed in violation of contract, and by other devices, and 
the sacrifice -of the output of their mines and other in-
dustries, and even of their railway and exploitation of 
their concessions. Thus ihe attempted solution of the 
complex problem by the ordinary ruethods of diplomacy reacts 
injuriously upon the United States Government itself, and 
in a measure paralyzes the action of the Executive in the 
direction of a sound an~ consistent policy. The Unite~ 
States Government is embarrassed in its efforts to foster 
American enterprise and the growth of our commerce through 
the cultivation of friendly relations with Santo Domingo, . 
by the irritating effects on those relations, and the con-
sequent injurious influence upon that commerce, of :frequent 
interventions. As a method of solution of the complicated -, 
problem arbitration has become nugatory, inasmuch as, in 
the condition of its finance.s, ~n award against the Re-
public is worthless unless its payment is secured by the 
pledge of at least some portion of' the customs revenues. 
This pledge is ineffectual without actual delivery over 
of the custom-houses to secure the appropriation of the 
pledged revenues to the payment of the award. This situa-
tion again r~acts injuriously µpon the relations of the 
United States with other nations. For when an award and 
such security are thus obtained, as in the case of the 
Santo Domingo Improvement Company, some foreign govern-
ment complains that the award conflicts with its rights, 
as a creditor, to some portion of these revenues under 
an alledged prior pledge; and still other governments 
complain that an award in any considerable sum, secured 
by pledges of the customs revenues, is prejudicial to the 
payment of their equally meritorious claims out of the 
ord~nary revenues; and thus controversies are begotten 
between the United States and other creditor nations, 
because of the apparent sacrifice of some of their 
claims, which may be just, or may be grossly exaggerated, 
but which the United States Government can not inquire 
into without giving grounds of offense to other friendly 
creditor nations. Still further illustrations might 
Aasily be furnished of the hopelessness of the present 
situation growing out of the social disorders and the 
bankrupt finances of the Dominican Republic, where for 
considerable periods during recent years the bonds of 
civil society have been practically dissolved. 
Under the accepted law of nations foreign govern-
ments are within their right, if they choose to exercise 
it, when they actively intervene in support of the con-
tractual claims of their subjects. They sometimes exercise 
this power, and on account of corn;nercial rivalries there 
is a growing tendency on the part of other governments 
more and more to aid-diplomatically in the enforcement 
of the claims of their subjects, In view of the dilemma 
in which the Government of the United States is thus place~, 
it must either adhere to its usual attitude of noninter-
vention in such cases--an attitude proper under normal 
conditions, but one which in this particular kind of case 
results to the disadvantage of its citizens in comparison 
with those of other States--or else it must, in order to 
be consistent in its policy, actively intervene to protect 
the contracts and concessions of its citizens engaged in 
agriculture, commerce, and transportation in competition 
with the subjects and citizens of other States. This 
course would render the United States the insurer of all 
the speculative risks of its citizens in the public secur-
ities and franchises of Santo Domingo, 
Under the plan in the protocol herewith submitted to 
the Senate, insuring a faithful collection and application 
of the revenues to the specified objects, we are well 
assured that this difficult t~sk can be accomplished with 
the friendly cooperation and goo~ will of all the parties 
concerned, and to the great relief of the Dominican Re-
public. 
The conditions in the Dominican Republic not only 
constitute a menace to our relations with other foreign 
nations, but they also concern the prosperity of the 
people of the island, as well as the security of American 
interests, and they are intimately associated with the in-
terests of the South Atlantic and Gulf States, the normal 
expansion of whose commerce lies in that direction, At 
one time, nnd that only a year ago, three revolutions were 
in progress in the island at the same time, 
It is impossible to state with anything like approxi-
mate accuracy the present population of the Dominican Re-
public, In the repprt of the commission appointed by 
President Grant in 1871, the population was estimated at 
not over 150,000 souls, but according to the Statesman's 
Yearbook for 1904 the estimated population in 1888 is 
given as 610,000. The Bureau of the American Republics 
considers this the best estimate at the present population 
of the Republic. As shown\by the unanimous report of the 
Grant commission the public debt of the Dominican Repub-
lic, including claims, was $1,565,831.59t. Th~ total 
revenues were $772,684.75!. The public indebtedness of 
the Dominican Republic, not including all claims, was on 
September 12 last, as the Department of State is advised, 
$32,280,000; the estimated revenues under Dominican manage-
ment of custom-houses were $1,850,000; the proposed budget 
for current administration was $1,300,000, leaving only 
$550,000 to pay foreign and liquidated obligations, and 
•I 
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~ p::=iyments on these latter 'l':i 11 amount during the ensuing 
year to $1,700,000, besides $900,000 of Rrrearages of 
payments overdue, amounting in ri.11 to ~2,600,000, It is 
therefore impossible under existing conditions, which are 
chronic, and with the estimated yearly revenues of the 
Republic, which during the last decade have averaged 
approximately $1,600,000, to defray the ordlnary expenses 
of the government and to meet its obligations, 
The Dominican debt owed to curopean creditors is 
about $22,000,000, and of this sum over ~~18,000,000 is 
more or less formally recognized, The representatives of 
European governments have several times approached the 
Secretary of State, setting forth the wrongs and intol~r­
able delays to which they have been subjected at the hands 
of the successive governments of Santo Domingo in the 
collection of their just claims, and intimating that un-
less the Dominican Government should receive some assis-
tance from the United States in the way of regulating its 
finances, the creditor governments in Europe would be forced 
to resort to more effective measures of compulsion to 
secure the satisfaction of the'ir claims, 
If the United States·Goverrrrnent declines to take action 
and other foreign goverTu~ents resort to action to secure 
payment of their claims, the latter would be entitled, 
according to the decision of the Hague tribunal in the 
Venezeulan cases, to the preferential payment of their 
claims; and thi's would absorb all the Dominican revenues 
and would be a virtual sacrifice of American claims and 
interests in the island, If, moreover, any such.action 
should be taken by them, the only method to enable them 
to secure the payment of their claims would be to ta.ke 
possession of the custom-houses, Bnd considering the 
state of the Dominican finances this would mean a definite 
and very possibly permanent occupation of Dominican terri-
tory, for no period could be set to the time which would 
be necessarily required for the payment of their obliga-
tions and unliquidated claims. The United States Govern-
ment could not interfere to prevent such seizure and occu-
pation of Dominican territory without either itself pro-
posing some feasible alternative in the way of action, or 
else virtually saying to European governments that they 
would not be allowed to collect their claims. This would 
be an unfortunate attitude for the Government of the United 
States to be forced to maintain at present. It' can not with 
propriety say that it will protect its own citizens and 
interests, on the one hand, and yet on the other hand re-
fuse to allow other governments to protect their citizens 
and interests, 
The actual situation in the Dominican Republic can 
not, perhaps~ be more forcibly stated than by giving a 
brief account of the case of the San Domingo Improvement 
I . 
I 
Company. 
From 1869 to 1897 the Dominican Government issued 
successive series of bonds, the majority of which were 
in the hands of European ~olders. Successive issues bore 
interest at rate ranglng from 2 J/4 to 6 per cent, and 
what with commissions and other deductions and the heavy 
discount in the market the government probably did not 
receive over 50 to 75 per cent of their nominal value. 
Other portions of the debt were created by loans, for 
which the government received only one-half of the amount 
it was nominally to repay, and these obligations bore 
interest at the rate of 1 to 2 per cent a month on their 
face, some of them compounded monthly. 
The improvidence of the government in its financial 
management was due to its weakness, to its impaired credit 
and to its pecuniary needs, occasioned by frequent insur-
rections and revolutionary changes and by its inability 
to collect its revenues. 
In 1888 the government, in order to secure the pay-
ment of an issue of bonds, placed the custom-houses and 
the collection of its customs tuties, which are substan-
tially the only revenues of the Republic, in thehands of 
the Westend.orps, bankers of Amsterdam, Holland. But the 
national debt continued to grow and the government finally 
intrusted the collection of its revenues to an American 
corporation, the San Domingo Improvement Company, which was 
to take over the bonds of the Westendorps. The Dominican 
Government finally became dissatisfi'ed with this arrange-
ment, and, in 1901, ousted the Improvement Company from 
its custom-houses and took into its own hands tne collection 
of its revenues. The company thereupon appealed to the 
United States Government to maintain them in their position. 
but their request was refused. The Dominican Government 
then sent its minister of foreign affairs to Washington 
to negotiate a settlement. He admitted that the improve~ 
ment company had· equities which ought not to be disregarded; 
and the Department of State suggested that the Dominican 
Government and the Improvement Company should effect by 
9rivate negotiation a satisfactory settlement between 
them. They accordingly entered into an arrangement for a 
settlement, which was mutually satisfactory to the parties. 
A similar arrangement was likewise made between the Domi-
nican Government and the European bondholders. The latter 
'3rrangement was carried into execution by the Dominican 
Government and payments made toward the liquidation of the 
bonds held by the European holders. The Dominican Congress 
refused to ratify the similar arrangement made with the 
improvement company, and the government refused to provide : 
for the payment of the American claimants. In this state 
of the case it was evident that a continuance of this treat-
ment of the American creditors, and its repetition in other 
I 
r 
cases, would, if allowed to run its course, result in 
handing over the island to European creditors, and in time 
would ripen into serious controversies between the United 
States &.nd other governments, unless the United States 
should deliberately and finally abandon its interests 
in the island. 
The inrp1~ovement comp;;:;.ny and its allied companies 
held, besides bonds, ce:cta.in banking and railway interests 
in the island. 'l,he Domini can Govern.'Tient, desirous to own 
and possess these properties, agreed with the companies 
that the value of their bonds and properties was ~4,500,000, 
and they submitted to arbitration the question as to ~he 
installments in which this sum should be paid and the 
security that should be given. The Hon. George Gray, 
judge of the United States circuit court of appeals, and 
the Hon. Manuel de J. Galvan, both named by the Dominican 
Republic, and the Hon. John G. Carlisle, named by the 
United States, were the arbitrators and rendered their 
award on July 14, 1904. By its terms the Dominican Govern-
ment was to pay the above-rr..e:ationed sum of $1},500,000, 
with 4 per cent interest per a:ri .. p:u..l!l, in monthly install-
ments of $37,500 each during two years, and of $41,666.66 
each month thereafter, beginning with the month of Sep-
tember, 1904, said awa.rd to be secured by the customs 
revenues and port dues of all the ports on the northern 
coast of Santo Domingo. The award further provides for 
the appointment of a financial agent of the United States, 
who was authorized in case of failure during any month to 
receive the sum then due to enter into possession of the 
custom-~house at Puerto Plata in the first instance and 
assume charge of the collection of customs duties and 
port dues and to fix and determine these duties and dues 
and secure their paymentt in case the s1uns collected at 
Puerto Plata should at any time be insufficient for the 
payment of the amounts due under the award, or in case of 
any other manifest necessity, or in case the Dominican 
Government should so request, the financial agent of the 
United States was authorized to have and exercise at any 
and all of the other ports.above described all the rights 
and power vested in him by the award in respect of Puerto 
Plata. Under the award the financial agent could only 
apply the revenues collected toward the payment 1 after he 
had first paid the expenses of collection and ~ertain 
other obligations styled "apardos," which constituted 
prior charges on the revenues assigned. These prior 
charges are specified in the award. The Dominican Gov• 
ernment defaulted in their payments; and in virtue of 
. the award and the authority conferred by the Dominican 
Government, and at its request, possession was delivered 
of the custom-house of Puerto Plata to thefiscal agent 
appointed by the United States to collect the revenues 
assigned by the arbitrators for the payment of the award; 
and in virtue of the same authority possession of the 
custom-house of Monte Christi has also been handed over. 
I sub;nit herewith a report of Mr. John B. Moore, agent 
of the United States in this case, and a copy of the award 
of the arbitrators. 
During the past two years the European claimants, 
except the English, whose interests were embraced in those 
of the American companies, have, with the support of their 
respective governments, been growing ~nore and more im- · 
portunate in pressing their unsatisfied demands. The 
French and the Belgians in 1901 had entered into a con-
tract with the Dominican'Government, but after a few 
payments •·:ere made on account it fell into neglect. Other 
governments also obliged the Dominican Government to enter 
into arrangements of various kinds by which the revenues 
of the Republic were in largd part sequestrqt~d, and under 
one of the agreem~nts, which was conclnded With Italy in 
1903, the minister of that government was empowered directly 
to collect from the importers ~nd exporters that portion 
of the customs revenues as$igned to him as security. As 
the result of chronic disorders, ~ttendant with a constant 
increase of debt, the state of things in Santo Domingo has 
become hopeless, unless the United States or some other 
strong government shall interpose to bring order out of 
the Chaos. The custom-houses, with the exception of the 
two in the possession of the financial agent appointed by 
the United States, have become unproductive for the dis-
charge of indebtedness, except as to persons making emer-
gency loans to the government or to its enemies for the 
purpose of carrying on political contests by force. They 
have, in fact, become the nuclei of the various revolu-
tions. The first effort of revolutionists is to take 
possession of a custom-house so as to obtain funds, which 
are then disposed of at the absolute discretion of those 
who are collecting them. The chronic dls·orders prevailing 
in Santo Domingo have, moreove~, become exceedingly dange~· 
ous to the interests of Americans holding property in that 
country. Constant complaints have been received of the 
injuries and inconveniences to which they have been sub-
jected. As an evidence of the increasing aggravation of 
conditions the fact may be mentioned that about a year ago 
the American railway, whch had previously been ~xempt from 
such attacks, was seized, its tracks torn up, g_nd a station 
destroyed by revolutionary bands. 
The ordinary resources of diplomacy and international 
arbitration are absolutely impotent to deal wisely and 
effectively with the situation in the Dominican Republic, ·· 
~hich can only be met by org;arilzing its finances on a sound 
basis and by placing the custom-houses beyond the tempta-
tion of insurgent chieftains. Either we must abandon our 
. . 
•-·c -, ,,-~ ,__., •. ,.......,._ .. 4"-••--""'~A--•·..,K.-..~.-t;.- ........... ··.~<,·,·.,~-···~':..·.·,."""°'"""""~-11'--~.,,..;.••••~·~,:~"'.:.\,..., . .,,_,___,.,,.,.,~~.~-""-• ............. -.·,__,_,.~.,,....r.~..-u~-~.-----
I j 
l 
I 
I 
! 
! . 
duty under our traditional policy toward the Dominican 
people, who aspire to a republican form of government 
while they are actually drifting into a condition of 
permanent anarchy, in which case we must permit some 
other government to adopt its own measures in order to 
safeguard its own interests, or else we must ourselves 
take seasonable and appropriate action. 
Again and again has the Domini can Governme.nt invoked 
on its own behalf the aid of the United StRtes. It has 
repeatedly done so of recent years. In 1899 it sought to 
enter into treaty relations by which it would be placed 
under the protection of the United States Government. 
The request was refused. Again, in January, 1904, its· 
minister of foreign affairs visited Washington and be-
sought the help of the United States GoverTu~ent to enable 
it to escape from its financial and social disorders. 
Compliance with this request was again declined, for this 
government has been most reluctant to interfere in any way, 
and has finally concluded to take action only because 
it has become evident that failure to do so may result 
in a situation fraught with-grave danger to the cause of 
international peace. 
In 1903 a representative of a foreign govern..~ent 
proposed to the United States the joint fiscal control 
of the Dominican Republic by certain creditor nations; and 
that the latter should take charge of the custom-houses and 
revenues and give to the Dominican Government a certain 
perc€ntage and apply the residue to the payment ratably 
of claims of foreign credi ·~ors. The United States Govern-
ment declined to approve or to enter into such an arrange-
ment. But it has now become evident that decided action 
of some kind can not be muqh longer delayed. In view of 
our past experience and our knowledge of the actual situa-
tion of the Dominican Republic, a definite refusal of the 
United States Government to take any effective action 
looking to the relief of the Dominican Republic and to 
the discharge of its own duty under the Monroe Doctrine 
can only be considered as an acquiescence in some such 
action by another government. 
That most wise measure of international statesman-
ship, the Platt amendment, '.has provided a rnethori for pre-
venting such difficulties from arising in the new Republic 
of Cuba. In accordance wi t.h the t'erms of this. ,;;Unendrnent 
the Republic of Cuba, can not issue any bonds which can be 
collected from Cuba, save as a matter of grace, unless 
with the consent of the United States, which is at liberty 
at all times to take measures to prevent the violation of 
of the letter and spirit of the Platt fu~endrnent. If a 
similar plan could now be entered upon by the Dominican 
Republic, it would undoubtedly be of great advantage to 
them and to all other peoples, for under such an arrange-
r 
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ment no larger debt would be incurred than could be 
honestly paid, and those who took debts not thus authorized · 
would, by the mere fact of taking them, put themselves in 
the category of speculators or gamblers, who deserved no 
consideration and who would be permitted to receive rone; 
so that the honest creditor would on the one hand be safe 
while on the other hand the Renublic would be safeguarded 
against molestation in the interest of mere speculators. 
But no such plan at present exists; and under existing 
circumstances, ,,;hen the condition of affairs becomes such 
as it has beco!lle in Santo Domingo, either we must submit 
to the likelihood of infringement of the Monroe Doctrine 
or we must ourselves agree to some such arrangement as 
that herwi th submitted to the Senate. In this c2.se, 
fortunately, the prudent 8.nd far-seeing sta temanship of 
the Dominican Government has relieved us of all trouble. 
At their request we have entered into the agreement here-
with submitted. Under it the custom-houses will be admin-
istered peacefully, honestly, and economically, 45 per cent 
of the proceeds being turned over to the Dominican Govern-
ment and the remainder being"used by the United States to 
pay what proportion of the debts it is possible to pay 
on an equitable basis. The Republic will be secured 
against over-seas aggression. This in reality entails 
no new obligation upon us, for the Monroe doctrine means 
precisely such a guaranty on our part. 
It is perhaps unncessary to state that no step of any 
kind has been taken by the Administration under the terms 
of the protocol which is herwith submitted. 
The Republic of Santo Domingo has by this protocol 
wisely and patriotically accepted the re_sponsibili tes 
as well as the privileges of liberty, and is showing 
with evident good faith its purpose to pay all that its 
resources will permit of its obligations. More than this 
it can not do, and when it has done this we should not 
permit it to be molested. We on our part are simply 
performing in peaceful manner, not only with the cordial 
P._cquiescence, but in accordance with the earnest request 
of the goverr.1111ent concerned, part of that international 
duty which is necessarily involved in the assertion of the 
r-:onroe doctrine. We are bound to show that we perform 
this duty in good faith and without any intention of 
aggrandizing ourselves at the expense of our w~aker 
neighbors or of conducting ourselves other,.;ise. than so as 
to benefit both these weaker neighbors and those European 
powers which may be brought into contact with them. It 
is in the highest degree necessary that we should prove 
by our action that the world may trust in our good faith 
and may understand that this international duty will be 
performed by us within our own sphere, in the interest not 
merely of ourselves, but of all other nations, and with 
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strict justice toward all. If this is done, a general 
acceptance of the Monroe doctrine will in the end surely 
follow; and this will mean an incre~se of the sphere 
in which peacef~l measures for the s~ttlement of inter-
national difficulties gradually displace those of a 
warlike character. 
He can point with just pride to what we have done 
in Cuha as a gu9r;:.1nty of our good faith. We stayed in 
Cuba only so long as to start her aright on the road to 
self-gOV8I'P~ment, Nhich she has since trod With SUCh marked 
and distinguished success; and upon leaving the island we 
exA.ctcd no conditions save such as would prevent her from 
ever becomimg the prey of the stranger. Our purpose i'n 
Santo Domingo is as beneficient. The good that this 
country got from its action in Cuba was indirect rather 
th,qn direct. So it is as regards Santo Domingo. The 
chief material advantage that will come from the action 
proposed to be taken will be to Santo Domingo itself and 
to Santo Domingo's creditors. The advantages that will 
come to the United States will be indirect, but never-
theless great, for it is sup:cerrl'ely to our in'_.~rest that 
all the co1i:.muni ti es i1!1r'Cedia te ly south of us should be 
or become prosperous snd stable, e.nd therefore not merely 
in r .• ari1e, but in f8.ct independent and self-governing. 
I call attention to the urgent need of prcrnpt action 
on this matter. We now have a great· opportunity to secure 
peace and stability in the island, without friction or 
bloodshed, by acting in accordance with the cordial in-
vitation of the governmental authorities themselves. It 
will be unfortunate from every standpoint if we fail to 
grasp this opportunity; for such failure will probably 
rr:ecin increasing revolutionary violence in Santo Domingo, 
and very possibly embarrassing foreign complications in 
addition. This protocol affords a practical test of the 
efficiency of the United states Government in maintaining 
the Monroe doctrine. · 
Theodore Roosevelt 
The White House, February 15, 1905. 
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APPENDIX II 
Messages and Papers of the Presidents 
To the Senate: 
I wish to call the attention of the Senate at this 
executive session to the treaty with Santo Domingo. I 
feel that I ought to state to the Senate that the con-
dition of affairs in Santo Domingo is such that it is very 
much for the interest of that Republic that action on the 
treaty_ should be had at as early a moment as the Senate, 
after giving the matter full consideration, may find 
practicable. _ 
I call attention to the following facts& 
1. This treaty was ente:ced into at the earnest request 
of Santo Domingo itself, and is designed to afford Sant 
Domingo relief and assistance. Its primary benefit wil 
be to Santo Domingo. It offers the method most likely 
to secure peace and to prevent war in the island. 
2. The benefit to the United States will consist chief""! 
ly in the tendency under the treaty to secure stability 
order, and prosperity in Santo Domingo, a.nd the removal 
of the apprehension lest foreign powers make aggression 
on Santo Domingo in the course of collecting cl8ims due 
their citizens; for it is greatly to our interest that 
all the islands in the Caribbean Sea should enjoy peave 
and pro~perity and feel good will toward this country. 
The benefit ·to honest creditors will come from the fact 
that for the first time under this treaty a practicable 
method of attempting to settle the debts due them will 
be inaugurated. 
3. Many of the debts alleged to be due from Santo Do:~ 
go to outside creditors unquestionably on their face 
represent far more money than ever was ac~ually given 
Santo Domingo. The proposed treaty provides for a pro-
cess by which impart1al experts will determine what 
debts are valid and what are in whole or in part invali 
and will apportion accordingly the surplus revenue 
availa.ble for the pay'ment of the debts. This treaty 
l~~~~~~o-f_f_e_:_s--~t-~---o-n_l_y~m-e_t_h_o_d_l~;_:_r~p-r_e_v_e_n_._t_i_~~ the collection of 
I . 
I 
frau~ulent debts, whether owed to Americans or to cit1~ 
zcns of other nations. 
4. This treaty affords the most practicable means of 
obtalning pay1;H:mt for the just claims of American c1 t1-
zens. 
5. If the treaty is ratified, creditors belonging to 
other nations will have exactly as good treatment as 
creditors who are citizens of the United States, and at 
the same tiL1e S2.n to Domingo wi 11 be protected against 
unjust and exorbitant claims. If it is not ratified, 
the chances are that'AJnerican creditors will fare. 111 as 
compared with those c•f other nations; for foreign m:ti9ns, 
being denied the opportu:ni ty to get what is rightfull;f 
due their citizens under the proposed arrangement, will 
be right to collect the debts due their 6itizens as 
they see fit, provided, of course, there is not perma-
nent occupancy of Dominican territory. As is such case 
the United States will have nothing to say as to what. 
debts should or sho~ld ndt be collected, and as Santo 
Domingo will be left without aid, assistance, or pro-, 
tection, it is impossible to state that the slm1s collec-
ted from it wi 11 not be improper in sJnount. In such · 
event, whatever is 'collectred by means of forcible inter-
vention will be applied to the creditors of foreign na-
tions in p1~eference to creditors who are citizens of th_e 
United States. · 
6. The correspondence between the Secretary of State 
and the Minister of'Haiti, submitted to the Senate sev-
eral days ago, shows that our position is explicitly 
and unreservedly that under no circumstances do we in-
tend to acquire territory in or possession of either 
Haiti or Santo Domingo, it being stated in these letters 
that even if the two republics desired to become a part 
of. the United States the United States would certainly 
refuse its assent. 
?. Santo Domingo grievously needs the aid of a powerful 
and friendly nation. This aid we are able, and I trust 
that we are willing, to bestow. She has asked for this 
aid, and the expressions of friendship, r~peatedly sanc-
tioned by the people and the Government of the United 
States, warrant her in believing that it will not be 
withheld in the hour of her need. 
Theodore Roosevelt. 
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